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Abstract
Security assessment and configuration is a methodology of protecting computer systems
from malicious entities. It is a continuous process and heavily dependent on human
experts, which are widely attributed to being in short supply. This can result in a
system being left insecure because of the lack of easily accessible experience and specialist
resources. While performing security tasks, human experts often revert to a system’s
event logs to determine status of security, such as failures, configuration modifications,
system operations etc. However, finding and exploiting knowledge from event logs is a
challenging and time-consuming task for non-experts. Hence, there is a strong need to
provide mechanisms to make the process easier for security experts, as well as providing
tools for those with significantly less security expertise. Doing so automatically allows
for persistent and methodical testing without an excessive amount of manual time and
effort, and makes computer security more accessible to non-experts. In this thesis, we
present a novel technique to process security event logs of a system that have been
evaluated and configured by a security expert, extract key domain knowledge indicative
of human decision making, and automatically apply acquired knowledge to previously
unseen systems by non-experts to recommend security improvements.
The proposed solution utilises association and causal rule mining techniques to auto-
matically discover relationships in the event log entries. The relationships are in the
form of cause and effect rules that define security-related patterns. These rules and
other relevant information are encoded into a PDDL-based domain action model. The
domain model and problem instance generated from any vulnerable system can then be
used to produce a plan-of-action by employing a state-of-the-art automated planning
algorithm. The plan can be exploited by non-professionals to identify the security is-
sues and make improvements. Empirical analysis is subsequently performed on 21 live,
real world event log datasets, where the acquired domain model and identified plans
are closely examined. The solution’s accuracy lies between 73% − 92% and gained a
significant performance boost as compared to the manual approach of identifying event
relationships.
The research presented in this thesis is an automation of extracting knowledge from
event data steams. The previous research and current industry practices suggest that
this knowledge elicitation is performed by human experts. As evident from the empirical
analysis, we present a promising line of work that has the capacity to be utilised in
commercial settings. This would reduce (or even eliminate) the dire and immediate
need for human resources along with contributing towards financial savings.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis work concerns the area of learning domain action models through sys-
tem event logs for Artificial Intelligence planning systems. This chapter provides the
overview, research question, motivation, rationale, novel contributions of the thesis and
a reader’s guide to the thesis structure.
1.1 Overview
Many organisations are vulnerable to critical security threats exposed due to their digital
infrastructure, and given the continuously increasing size and nature of their business
operations, there is a need to pro-actively identify and mitigate security vulnerabilities.
This process requires expert and up to date knowledge of the security threats and how
they can be eliminated. Such knowledge is in short supply, costly, sometimes unavailable
and requires a high amount of human effort [2]. Businesses are facing challenges with
recruiting and maintaining cyber-security expertise within their organisation and as
a result, they are often unable to adequately secure their systems. According to a
survey1 conducted in 2018 by International Information System Security Certification
Consortium, or (ISC)2, 2.93 million cybersecurity positions remain open and unfilled
around the world, depicting the lack of skilled security professionals. Despite the skills
shortage in cyber analysis, it is imperative to maintain the system security against
malicious attacks.
1https://www.isc2.org/Research/Workforce-Study
1
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The lack or absence of expertise can be resolved using computational intelligence to
autonomously perform security evaluation of a machine and generate mitigation plans.
There is potential to develop a system whereby expert knowledge is automatically cap-
tured through monitoring experts’ system interactions and therefore minimises any over-
head of knowledge creation as it can be captured during or after live analysis/config-
uration tasks. Non-expert users will be able to obtain the desired knowledge. This
enables the use of expert knowledge, either in an assistive mode for training purposes or
autonomous mode to execute the knowledge model to determine if a vulnerability exists
as well as recommend automated configuration activities. Besides security, researchers
from various other domains are also exploring automation techniques, such as in in-
ferring behaviour models from execution traces of object-oriented programs [3], mining
specifications directly from software libraries [4], merging existing specification miners
to produce a superior specification [5] and automatically discovering program flaws by
learning method calls [6].
This research work presents an automated solution that can extract security actions
performed on a system using event log entries. An event log dataset is a discrete,
ordered sequence of event instances that contains information regarding the activities
of the system; generated by either a user, application or the operating systems (OS)
itself [7]. Event logs are used as a tool for tracking user, application and system changes
(e.g. creating or deleting users), along with troubleshooting the system failures and
other related issues. The proposed solution assembles the knowledge by discovering
complex chains of event relationships that represent linked human expert activities.
Therefore, every chain of connected events is the representative of a specific security-
related action. In this thesis, the relationships are termed as ‘temporal-association-
causal’ rules, which are obtained by incorporating a notion of time to frequently co-
occurred events and subsequently applying causal inference to prioritise the discovered
event relationships. The rules are then used by the automated planning tools to provide
appropriate knowledge to the non-expert users. The proposed solution is capable of
providing a technological solution to help reduce the security skills shortfall, enabling
expert-like decision making capabilities for users without cyber security expertise. It is
reasonable to suggest that a large amount of users are interacting with the vulnerable
machines, and providing an automated solution with access to skilled expertise has
potential to have a positive impact on overall cyber resilience.
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The developed technique is currently tested on Microsoft Window OS [8], but the ap-
proach is independent of OS and can easily be applied to the event logs of other systems
or sources. The data recorded by Microsoft event logging mechanism is fully-structured
and represented in the form of object-value pairs. A default set of classes exists in the
.NET framework for identifying and parsing all categories of events, which facilitates
an easier development and creation of a valid testing environment for the proposed ap-
proach. The future extensions of this research will extract features focusing on other,
widely used Linux- and Mac-based systems along with web-servers, OpenStack cloud [9]
and Fog computing platforms [10].
1.2 What Are Event logs?
Event logs are a powerful source of knowledge that can be used for understanding op-
erations, performance and security status of the underlying system [11]. Event logs
are often described as the gold mine of knowledge due to their extensive and detailed
record-keeping ability. According to Microsoft documentation, the events are divided
into five different levels: Information, Warning, Error, Success Audit, and Failure Audit
and categorised into separate Application, Security, Setup, System and Forwarded logs.
A complete explanation of the general types of event logs, along with the classification
of security events, is provided in Appendix A. This research work only focuses on the
security events, which are easily identifiable within the existing entries. The security
events contain structured data that can be easily extracted and processed by a software
application to provide detailed state information on a system’s security controls. These
events include records of failed login attempts, system operations based on the firewall
policy, changes in user or application permissions, cryptographic operations and many
other security-related activities. The system activity is recorded based on the security
auditing and configuration policy, which is predefined by the administrator. Each entry
is created from their prototype/blueprint, called event type. Any event type can have
many instances or entries, and each entry consists of a series of objects that define a
particular occurrence of an event. The objects include a unique identifier, user name,
event source, machine name, time-stamp, and application and service-specific objects.
The security events of a system provide a detailed record of the security controls, which
describes both unauthorised activities and configuration events [12]. Many techniques
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have been developed in previous research to identify relationships among events. Such
techniques generally employ variations of clustering [13], correlation rule mining [14] and
causal inference [15] algorithms. Most of the existing solutions construct a security model
that determines the causes behind system failures and suggest or in some cases implement
remedial actions. Although these techniques are focused on identifying problems using
software agents, there is a great potential to adopt this same philosophy for identifying
missing or incomplete security configurations as well as the security issues. It should
be noticed here that a configuration process against a certain issue usually generates a
large number of events, according to the specified audit policy, and produces a complex
chain of events to record the whole activity. The audit policy of a system defines the
types of events stored in the Security log. The Microsoft OS uses nine audit policy
categories and fifty subcategories for fine-grained control over which the information is
logged. To the best of our knowledge, there are no autonomous Security Incident and
Event Management (SIEM) solutions aimed at capturing actionable knowledge from the
event log sources that can be exploited by an intelligent software agent to aid non-expert
users.
It would be of great benefit to automatically determine and extract chains of events
against configuration activities. As an example, consider a scenario where a system
administrator is maintaining a file server. An unauthorised user attempts to view a file
named confidential.doc and successfully gains access to it. To document this activity,
an event of type 4663 will be recorded along with the relevant objects that shows ‘An
attempt was made to access an object’. Assuming the administrator takes notice of
this event and realises that the user is not authorised to access any file on this server
and their permissions should be immediately removed. The administrator proceeds to
alter the network share rights and permissions. As a result, an event log entry will be
logged with the type of 4670, detailing that ‘Permissions on an object were changed’.
The event logging mechanism generates this event in a way where it keeps a record
of the new and previous set of permissions. Many additional event log entries might
also be generated during the time span of events 4663 and 4670 due to other system
activities, and therefore it would require expert knowledge, time and effort to establish
the connection between events. Despite being simple, this example describes the fact
that managing security requires both experience and expert knowledge. A system that
can discover a relationship between events 4663 and 4670 in an automated manner would
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be beneficial for the non-expert users. It would enable the immediate investigation of
such event entries, and determine if any user is exercising more than the required set of
permissions.
1.3 Assumptions
Following are the assumptions made in this thesis:
1. The event log was not cleared at any point in time. All event logging
mechanisms allow the user to clear or remove the entries of an event log. So,
if a user clears the event log, it would delete one or more entries. Processing
such event log entries by the proposed solution would output an incomplete set of
event relationships. This can be detrimental for the non-expert users in terms of
identifying all security issues and making improvements;
2. The event log dataset was retrieved directly from the system, not
through any intermediary tool. For extracting knowledge, the event log
dataset should be in raw format and acquired directly from the main source. In-
volving third-party tools to obtain any dataset might alter the event entries and
lead towards erroneous results. Moreover, all event logs should be acquired and
formatted through the same mechanism for accurate results; and
3. The user, application and system activities stored in the event logs have
satisfactory coverage of the required security knowledge. Any machine
that is being used to extract the expert security knowledge needs to be properly
configured/secured. The machine’s event log should possess a set of entries that
are required to be generated to document a certain security-related activity. It
should be noticed here that according to the default audit policy, all categories
and sub-categories are not enabled. Therefore, it is possible that the event log does
not have a full record of performed activities, and the proposed solution produces
invalid event relationships; and
4. The machine from which the knowledge is acquired and the machine on
which the knowledge is applied have similar settings. The configuration,
environment and intended use of the vulnerable machine are the same as of the
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machine from which the domain action model was extracted. The similar operating
system, settings, and context of events are required to enable a compatibility
between the learned security knowledge and its utilisation for making the necessary
changes.
1.4 Research Question
The research question addressed in this thesis is whether it is possible to automatically
extract security-related actions (i.e. knowledge) performed by an expert on a machine,
and allow non-experts to utilise the actions for auditing and improving the security of
their systems. The current knowledge mining techniques rely on human experts, where
the knowledge is collected and modelled either manually or via assistive tools. Exploring
this question led to the development of an unsupervised knowledge acquisition technique,
which can discover (temporally ordered) cause and effect relationships among the event
log entries of any given machine. The terms ‘machine’ or ‘system’ used in this thesis
refers to any computing device, such as personal computer, laptop, server, etc.
This thesis presents the development and evaluation of a generalised approach, which
can be applied to any event log dataset that is or can be structured in a certain format.
The approach employs correlation and causal mining algorithms due to their known
suitability in finding such relationships. The solution first generates correlation rules,
which are combined and ordered based on a temporal metric, and then used to produce
cause and effect relationships. The final rules are encoded into a domain action model,
which is subsequently used by an automated planning algorithm to determine a course
of action on a previously unseen machine. Therefore, the proposed approach allows
non-expert users to conduct expert actions without the presence of a human expert.
Further to that, the automated solution can perform frequent monitoring, analysis and
mitigation activities. By doing this, potential security threats and vulnerabilities can
be identified quickly and mitigation activities can be put in place.
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1.5 Scope, Motivation And Aim
Aim: To provide an automated method of extracting security knowledge by learning the
expert user activities performed on a machine, hence reducing the amount of required
knowledge, resources and effort required by non-expert users to identify and eliminate
security issues.
The non-expert users do not possess sufficient knowledge and/or experience to recog-
nise and comprehend the security issues. The work presented in this thesis provides a
method that can automatically enable all kinds of users to perform the security analysis
without needing expert knowledge, along with suggesting remedial actions. The primary
driver behind this research is to reduce the disparity in system security between those
configured by experts and non-experts. This will ensure a higher level of security is
maintained for all users. The automated process of building security knowledge base
will further reduce the manual effort and allow better efficiency in terms of resources
and time. Another motivation of this research is to create a solution that is generic and
universally applicable.
The scope of this work is to explore how, and to what extent, knowledge can be ac-
quired automatically from the existing data sources. Moreover, how that knowledge
can be utilised by automated planning algorithms for the intelligent application and
optimisation of the security issues identification and elimination process. The focus is
on obtaining useful knowledge that can strengthen the security of any given machine
by mimicking the traditional human expert analysis. The philosophy of this thesis is
well-justified because it automates and enhances normal industry practice. This work
can be viewed as a step towards an increase in autonomous knowledge elicitation and
utilisation in the domain of cybersecurity. The thesis will also examine the performance
of the proposed solution in terms of time, memory and processing power consumption
to demonstrate its application in the real-world environment.
1.6 Objectives
The objectives with respect to the security knowledge mining are:
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1. The first objective is to develop a mechanism that can gather and process the user
activities data into a single, structured format; and
2. The second objective is to build a technique for automated knowledge extraction
that can utilise the formatted data and identify the relationships among the user
activities.
The objectives concerning the automated planning are:
1. The first objective is to produce a domain action model of the extracted rela-
tionships in a standardised language. This will allow state-of-the-art, domain-
independent automated planning tools to generate both accurate and temporally
ordered optimal plans;
2. The second objective is to convert the automated plan into a format that can be
easily understood by the non-expert users; and
3. The third objective is to acquire data from live, real-world data for evaluation and
demonstrate the accuracy, performance, and usability of the proposed solution.
1.7 Contributions
To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first work in the domain of Security In-
cident and Event Management (SIEM) systems. It presents a mechanism for automated
knowledge acquisition from event log sources, along with an intelligent utilisation of the
elicited knowledge. The novelty of this research lies in the automated learning, mod-
elling, and planning of security event relationships by applying correlation and causal
rule mining coupled with the generalised automated planning.
The summary of the primary thesis contributions to the subject area is as follows:
1. A novel technique for extracting and representing security knowledge
from event log entries. This technique starts by creating an object-based model
of event log entries, which is processed by an association rule mining algorithm.
The association rules are then converted into sequences of event relationships using
a temporal metric, which are further validated by applying a causal inference
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technique. The extracted knowledge is represented in the form of a domain action
model. The problem instance is generated from a previously unseen computer that
requires security improvements. Together with the domain model and problem
instance, plan solution is generated by the automated planning algorithm and
utilised by the non-expert users for configurations;
2. A mechanism to automatically find support values for correlation min-
ing in event log dataset. The solution is capable of calculating minimum and
maximum support values without any human input used by the association rule
mining algorithm. The values are derived from the object-based model of the event
log dataset. The support value influences the amount and quality of correlation
rules and it is subjective to the characteristics of a provided dataset;
3. Software implementation. A novel software tool that is capable of learning
knowledge from mining Microsoft event log sources. The software represents the
output of using acquired knowledge on previously unseen machines in a user-
friendly manner. Several other tools have also been developed that can serve
the non-expert user for debugging purposes; and
4. Empirical analysis. The developed tool is evaluated on event log datasets taken
from live, multi-user and network-based machines to determine the overall per-
formance and accuracy of the proposed technique. This empirical analysis also
demonstrates and objectifies features of the proposed solution from various as-
pects, such as usability, efficiency, and productivity.
The solution presented in this thesis is inspired by on-going research in applying Artificial
Intelligence techniques in the area of cybersecurity. It is expected that the contributions
made in this research will entice more researchers towards the subject.
1.8 Publications
The following publications are related to this PhD project:
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1.9 Thesis Structure
The document is organised as follows:
Chapter 2 reviews and analyses existing domain learning techniques, automated plan-
ning, correlation mining and causal inference techniques, alongside the critical literature
analysis to highlight the importance of the proposed system.
Chapter 3 describes the process of rule mining from event log dataset. It starts by
detailing and motivating the pre-processing phase of event entries and elaborates the
process of generating object-based model. Following on, it explains the association rule
mining process using an automatically calculated support value. Here, the association
rules are represented by their respective event types, where any sequence of events are
related through their objects. Next, it presents the process of filtering insignificant
rules based on a temporal metric. The remaining individual rules are combined to
form sequences of events, where each sequence represents a single configuration activity.
Finally, it explains the process of forming a directed acyclic graph from the extracted
rules, assigning a causal rank score to each rule based on the level or strength of causality.
Chapter 4 starts by formalising the classical planning and knowledge modelling tech-
niques. Following on, it presents a process of encoding the extracted event relationships
into a domain action model, which leads onto the explanation of the automated method
for extracting the problem instance from vulnerable machines, and applying an auto-
mated planning technique to generate plan-of-action for security improvements.
Chapter 5 is divided into two parts. The first part presents the implementation details
of knowledge acquisition and representation applications. The second part presents the
evaluation methodology and results in terms of performance and accuracy using the
security event logs of live machines.
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and provides the future plans and extensions of
this research work.
Chapter 2
Background and Literature
Review
The purpose of this chapter is to survey and review the existing knowledge acquisition
technologies that are relevant for this thesis. It starts by exploring the available data
sources that can provide the required security knowledge. Next, it analyses the existing
manual, assistive and automated approaches that can extract security knowledge from
the data sources and distribute it to non-expert users. In the end, it performs a brief
analysis to demonstrate the current state and limitations of the knowledge acquisition
systems.
2.1 Data Sources
Many resources are readily available for individuals, who are seeking to learn knowledge
and gain expertise in a security-related area. Knowledge can be defined as the theoretical
or practical understanding of a phenomenon or an area. Knowledge can be of different
types and is presented in the form of postulations, facts, concepts, principles, proce-
dures, models, cognition, heuristics and examples. The resources for presenting security
knowledge include books, journals, articles, online discussion forums, vulnerability and
solution databases, tutorials, hands-on training sessions, certifications, human experts
and many others [16]. Knowledge sharing is a process of exploiting existing knowledge by
identifying, transferring and its application to solve tasks in a better, faster and cheaper
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manner [17]. A major issue with such type of knowledge sharing is the requirement
of effort and time to probe the resources and manually learn about security issues and
remedial operations. Another limitation is that the user needs to know what skills they
are lacking to perform the security assessment and configuration of a specific system.
Moreover, due to a large amount of diversity in information systems, it is difficult for
novice users to appropriately secure all aspects of a system.
In this research, we selected event logs as a source of security knowledge. The event
logs are often referred as a ‘gold mine’ of information because they possess a record of
all activities performed on the machine. The knowledge in the event logs is acquired
through several pattern analysis techniques. The patterns are represented by a set of
rules, where each rule contains two or more related events depicting a particular security-
related activity. The rules can be formulated using a manual, assistive, or automated
approach. All of these approaches are explained in the remaining sections along with
their advantages and disadvantages.
2.2 What Is Knowledge Acquisition?
Knowledge Acquisition (KA) is a process of extracting and encoding the knowledge from
a certain data source into a form that can be utilised by knowledge-based systems [18].
This process generally consists of several phases: identifying the source of knowledge,
developing and applying a technique to extract the knowledge, representing the knowl-
edge in a way that can be understood by a software agent, applying the knowledge to
solve given problems along with the provision of explanations and justifications for the
steps taken, and a continuous cycle of updating and maintaining the knowledge.
The main purpose of KA is to build a system that can provide expert knowledge re-
garding a certain subject. The KA can be a long, tiring and expensive process as it is
difficult to capture accurate knowledge. The KA is recognised as the major bottleneck
for knowledge-based systems, limiting the wider adoptions of such systems [19]. The
main difficulty lies in the process of extracting expert knowledge with reasonable ac-
curacy, efficiency, and robustness. This is the reason several KA techniques have been
developed over the years. Such techniques can be taxonomised into manual, assistive
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and automated approaches, and have their own advantages and disadvantages. These
techniques are described briefly in the following sections.
2.3 Manual And Assistive Knowledge Acquisition
The manual and assistive techniques of extracting knowledge are based on the help and
underpinnings of human security experts, who manually extract the knowledge from the
data sources. The process of knowledge discovery is either fully manual or semi-manual
using some supporting tools. The acquired knowledge is then used to automatically
identify vulnerabilities of a system and alert the user to implement corrective solution.
Several methodologies are available for this approach, and some of them are explained
in the following:
2.3.1 Rule-Based Systems
One of the most common method of acquiring and storing knowledge is the rule-based
systems. In rule-based systems, human experts use their knowledge and experience to
define patterns among events using condition-action relationships (rules). Many tools
and techniques are available that can be used for creating, storing and applying rules.
A patented research work developed a multi-tier security incident response system [20],
which is based on user-defined and configurable rules. The rules are created as open-
ended expressions, which can be both conjunctive and disjunctive in operation. The
purpose of this system is to identify critical threats and complex attack patterns, notify
the user and then generate human-readable reports.
A tool, named Simple Event Correlator (SEC), was developed for network and security
management. The SEC is an open-source and platform-independent tool1. The tool has
various significant features and uses a predefined knowledge base of hard-coded, static
rules to monitor and detect event patterns [21]. The rules are created as IF–THEN
statements to represent the condition of a specific security issue and propose adminis-
trative action to resolve it. Another tool, called Logsurfer [22], conducts the patterns
and relationships detection among the events of a given log file. The rules are defined
with the help of manually created regular expressions. An important feature of the
1https://sourceforge.net/projects/simple-evcorr/
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Logsurfer is the ability to encode context of an event in the rules. The context describes
all relevant data for diagnosing a problem and keeps track of time, users, configuration,
environment etc. Another similar tool, called Simple Log Watcher2 (previously known
as Swatch), uses regular expression based rules to identify event patterns and perform
specified actions. Both regular expressions and corresponding actions are written by the
user in C programming language.
Another interesting tool, named Variable Temporal Event Correlator (VTEC) [23], al-
lows the user to define, modify and utilise event relationship rules. The VTEC uses Perl
language to define condition-action rules, which are directly applicable on computer
networks as well. An important feature of VTEC is efficiency; it is capable of apply-
ing rules on large amounts of event data using a multi-core, distributed architecture.
Another tool, called Prelude3, is a rule-based event correlation engine, where the rules
are written manually using Lua programming language. Each rule is a function that
has a particular input and output alert. This tool can also perform log analysis and
general event management operations. An open-source tool, called AlienVault OSSIM4,
performs the event collection, normalisation and correlation. The main achievement of
OSSIM is the modelling of cyber-attacks using event correlation rules. It also assigns
probability and priority values to an asset for providing better risk management and
security visibility. The rules are written manually using XML-like directives, and can
also enforce the security policies of a company.
Besides these security applications, rule-based systems are used in several other areas.
For example, a research work proposed a rule-based approach to determine energy ef-
ficiency anomalies in smart buildings [24]. The rules were developed with the help of
human experts and data analysis techniques. After testing on a real-time database, the
authors claim that the developed system successfully detected the anomalies along with
quantifying the energy consumption behaviour. Another interesting study proposed a
rule-based solution to create animations of Java algorithms [25]. The rules are manually
written using a tool called, Constraint Handling Rules. Given an algorithm, the solution
starts by identifying the interesting segments of the algorithm, and then dynamically
creates visual objects and effect to produce animations. Apart from the applications and
advantages, one of the main problem associated with the existing rule-based systems is
2https://sourceforge.net/projects/swatch/
3https://www.prelude-siem.org/projects/prelude/wiki/PreludeCorrelator
4https://www.alienvault.com/products/ossim
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that it demands domain knowledge, skill and manual effort for extracting and defining
complex patterns. Furthermore, the rules production can be a challenging task for larger
and dynamic systems as it requires constant maintenance and management to encode
new knowledge and updating the existing ones.
2.3.2 Case-Based Reasoning Systems
The case-based reasoning (CBR) approach mainly consists of two parts: case repository
and reasoning engine. The case repository is a collection of past cases, containing the
knowledge of security issues and their corresponding solutions. The initial repository
is developed by human experts. The inference engine takes the (unfamiliar) problem,
identify the most similar case in the repository and retrieve the best-suited solution. If
the solution is found to be correct, the given problem is formulated into a new case and
stored in the repository. A research study [26] acquired the knowledge for case repository
by processing large amounts of security content in the textual format. They used text-
analytic and clustering algorithms to sanitise and categorise the text and used that to
manually build the knowledge for case repository. After that, they employed CBR to
analyse event logs and discover the patterns within system maintenance activities to
reduce the number of crashes and prevent failures. Another research study applied CBR
approach on temporal log data for intelligent monitoring and diagnosis of workflows of a
software system [27]. The knowledge and context for case repository was captured with
the help of software users. The authors concluded that the solution found and classified
given workflow-related problems with high accuracy and efficiency.
Another study presented an assistive solution for security and forensic investigators that
can profile attackers using CBR [28]. The experiments conducted has shown positive
results in exposing the identity of humans behind the attacks as well as determining if
the attack was successful. A similar study built a report generation mechanism using
CBR that can save security analyst time [29]. This solution can automatically fill the
corresponding templates of known threats and policy violations on the local network.
According to the authors, this solution can manage the slight deviations in attacks;
however, it cannot handle new, zero-day attacks. One of the major disadvantages of
CBR is its inability to represent problems and include the notion of time that is crucial
for defining the ordering of security-related actions [30]. Without conclusive ordering,
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the CBR cannot produce quality solutions. Furthermore, building a case repository
that includes all possible security threats and their solutions is not feasible for practical
application as it would require a substantial amount of time and effort.
2.3.3 Codebook-Based Systems
The codebook-based systems define the event relationships by using coding techniques [31].
In this approach, the human expert performs the localisation process, where connections
between observable behaviour of the system and actual underlying problem are analysed
to identify the set of responsible events, i.e. codebook or knowledge. Every connection
made is assigned a codeword. After that, for every possible problem, a binary vector is
created to determine if each event in the codebook can be triggered by that particular
problem. The elements in a vector can either be one, to depict a relationship between
the event and problem, or zero if there is no relation. The codebook (or set of events)
is required to be sufficiently large so that it can cover all possible problems of a system.
For the problem identification process, events of the underlying system are monitored
in real-time and formed into vectors. These event vectors are compared with the ex-
isting codebook event vectors to find the most similar match and notify the user with
respective problem.
Another research study proposed a codebook-based approach to enhance the perfor-
mance, efficiency and usability of an anomaly intrusion detection (AID) system [32].
Initially, the normal/legitimate network traffic profiles were used to train a large struc-
tural codebook with 541,048 data items, each having a unique index. To find network
intrusions or deviations from the codebook, vector quantisation framework was employed
that determines similarity between feature vectors, along with reducing vector dimen-
sions. The results have demonstrated high detection rate, lower computational cost
and real-time intrusion detection. Apart from requiring a significant amount of time
and effort in building and indexing a codebook, these systems are not very productive
for dynamic environments, where a slight change in system configuration can cause an
ambiguity in matching with the corresponding codeword.
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2.3.4 Voting-Based Approach
The voting approach is based on problem-opinion architecture, where each expert pro-
vides an opinion against a given problem and the absolute majority opinion is used as
a solution [33]. Usually, the opinion does not provide an exact solution but rather a
general direction to solve the problem. A research study employed the neural networks
to implement voting approach for detecting poison messages in large-scale networks [34].
The poison message exploits a software or protocol vulnerability by sending a malicious
message in the network and cause certain machines to fail. The neural network was
trained with the help of human experts, using various kinds of poison messages along
with opinion weights and biases. The evaluation of this solution shows the accuracy
range from 55% − 75%. Another study proposed a voting-based approach for an effi-
cient detection of unknown malware [35]. Initially, datasets were prepared by extracting
and using several features of executable files and trained an ensemble of classification
algorithms, namely K-nearest neighbours, C4.5 and Ripper. The authors applied three
different voting-based approaches to create the ensemble; majority voting, veto voting
and trust-based veto voting. The ensemble consolidates the individual decision of each
classifier in a way that can classify new malware samples, hence improving the deci-
sion strategy, and consequently increases the overall detection capability of the solution.
It should be noticed here that most of the voting-based approaches require extensive
input from the human operator, which is why they are usually deemed unsuitable for
large-scale and complex systems.
2.3.5 Commercial Event Correlation Software
There are several commercial solutions that enable the development and elicitation of
event correlation rules. These solutions fall under the category of Security Incident and
Event Management (SIEM). Majority of the rules are acquired manually through ex-
perts and community of users. One such solution, called Unified Security Management
(USM)5, is developed by AlienVault. The main purpose of this solution is to collect
and analyse the log data from multiple applications and devices, and identify malicious
patterns related to data security. These tasks are performed using event correlation
rules, which are constantly being developed by the company’s internal experts. Another
5https://www.alienvault.com/products/usm-anywhere
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solution is developed by Logrythm6 that combines correlation rules with Artificial In-
telligence to identify malicious behaviour of users and applications. The main benefit
of this solution is the context learning of events, detection of statistical anomalies and
ability to assign risk level to an asset. The correlation rules are provided by the company
and can be developed by the users as well.
2.4 Automated Knowledge Acquisition Approaches
In order to discover relationships or patterns of events for knowledge discovery, a com-
plete set of information is required about the structure, properties, triggers and depen-
dencies of a system. Such information can be acquired automatically, or manually from
human experts. It is obvious that the second method requires a large amount of effort,
time, resources and experience. The manual techniques are only feasible if the majority
of supplied knowledge remains constant over an extended period, i.e. static knowl-
edge. Unlike these conventional systems, if the knowledge is mostly dynamic (changes
or requires updating over time), a self-learning, automated approach would be more suit-
able [36]. Although this approach does not require human assistance in generating and
maintaining knowledge, there is a possibility of acquiring unstable and incorrect knowl-
edge if not implemented properly. Recent progress in the research has shown promising
techniques in terms of accuracy, productivity and efficiency. Some of the automated
techniques are discussed in the following:
2.4.1 Clustering Techniques
A variety of classification algorithms exist that are based on either supervised or unsu-
pervised learning. These algorithms are commonly utilised for knowledge acquisition by
exploring the relationships among data items. The unsupervised classification is termed
as clustering or exploratory data analysis. Data clustering is a process of grouping items
or entries of a finite unlabelled dataset, such that the similar entries with respect to fea-
tures and attributes are classed together in the same clusters [37]. This process creates
one or more segregated groups of entries, where each entry is more related to the other
entries of the same group than those of the other groups.
6https://logrhythm.com/use-cases/advanced-correlation/
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The clustering algorithms can be broadly categorised into Partitional and Hierarchical
schemes [38]. The Partitional clustering schemes are parametric, where the algorithms,
such as K-means, divide the data into a predefined number of clusters specified by the
user. The Hierarchical clustering schemes are non-parametric, where the algorithms,
such as MeanShift, decide the number of clusters to create based on certain metrics. The
clustering of data items is performed based on a ‘similarity’ metric [39]. The K-means
algorithm groups the data points based on closeness to the centroid of clusters [40]. The
closeness is measured with one of the following methods: Euclidean distance, Manhattan
distance, Mahalanobis distance and so on. This algorithm starts by taking the desired
number of clusters, and randomly assigns each data point into a certain cluster. Then
it computes the centroid of each cluster and re-assigns the data points to the closest
centroid. This step is repeated until each centroid position becomes stationary. At
this point, if the number of iterations are not defined, it will terminate the clustering
process, otherwise, it will continue to execute without changing anything. The MeanShift
algorithm [41] starts by selecting a random data point and creates a radius of specific
length around it, encompassing other data points. The radius length can be defined by
the user or automatically determined by the algorithm. The algorithm calculates the
centre of all data points (one after another) that are present within the same radius.
This process is continued until the centre stops shifting, and a cluster is formed. The
algorithm iterates over the remaining data points to find all clusters. Another important
distinction in the clustering algorithms is the hard and soft cluster assignment [42]. In
hard clustering, each entry is classified into exactly one cluster, whereas in soft clustering,
one data entry can be a member of multiple clusters.
A recent paper has proposed a clustering technique to evaluate the Distributed Denial
of Service attack security situation [43]. It starts by finding the risk indexes of all ma-
chines in a network, merges them and creates a fusion feature set. After that, Fuzzy
C-means clustering algorithm is employed to categorise machines into one of the five
security classes to determine the level of threat. The real-time experiments have shown
this technique to be reasonable and effective. One of the main applications of clustering
algorithm is in detecting anomalies and intrusions in a network. A research study pro-
posed a combination of hierarchical clustering and support vector machines approach to
detect intrusions in a network with 95.75% accuracy [44]. The original feature set is first
processed for quality improvement and size reduction. By training on the new dataset,
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experimental results of the new technique have shown higher performance, especially for
the denial of service and probing attacks. Clustering techniques have also been utilised
for log analysis. For example, a study presented a novel clustering algorithm, called
the Simple Logfile Clustering Tool [45], which identifies infrequent events based on out-
liers that could represent previously unknown fault conditions, irregularities, and other
anomalies. Although clustering techniques have been used in many real-world applica-
tions, they are not suitable for identifying knowledge in our research, given the nature
of event logs data and required output.
A major drawback of using clustering to learn relationships among events is that it may
find a connection among events that are not necessarily related, but in fact, they might
be opposite to each other. Consider the following two Microsoft events: the event type
4728 shows that a member was added to a security-enabled global group, whereas the
event type 4729 explains that a member was removed from a security-enabled global
group. Both of these events have almost similar content and properties, but they are
triggered from contradictory activities. The clustering algorithm always inserts them in
the same cluster depicting a relationship, due to lack of semantic understanding. Same
applies to the event types 4732 (A member was added to a security-enabled local group)
and 4733 (A member was removed from a security-enabled local group). Hence, the
clustering approach only groups similar items together that do not necessarily represent
security identification and mitigation activities. Another drawback is that the clustering
algorithms only process numeric data, whereas the event logs contain both numeric and
non-numeric entries. The conversion of non-numeric to numeric data would decrease the
efficiency of the overall solution.
2.4.2 Automated Planning Techniques
The knowledge in event logs can also be acquired with the help domain model learning.
This approach takes a plan of actions (or plan traces) against a particular problem
and learns a domain action model to represent the knowledge. The learning process is
based on determining the expert actions and the relationship among their objects (i.e.
parameters). The domain model is then used by Artificial Intelligence (AI) planners to
determine a plan solution for unseen problems. The knowledge in the domain model
is required to be sufficiently efficient, so that it can be used for automated reasoning
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and construction of a plan for output. Several tools and techniques are available that
can construct domain models either manually by human experts or autonomously using
machine learning techniques.
For manual construction, several tools are available that provide interface for the de-
sign, validation and verification of domain models. For example, an open source tool,
called itSIMPLE [46], uses Object Oriented architecture and Unified Modelling Language
(UML) to enable the users for building, visualising and modifying domain models. The
knowledge is initially constructed in the form of UML, which is then converted to Petri
Net graph and shown as domain model. This tools is also capable of analysing dy-
namic aspects of the modelling requirements, such as deadlocks and invariants. Another
tool, called GIPO (Graphical Interface for Planning with Objects) [47], was created to
increase the efficiency of domain modelling and validation process. This tool uses its
own object-centred language to encode knowledge, domain structure and several other
features. It also includes a built-in visual editor that allows the user to inspect and
verify the produced plans graphically. Another tool, named EUROPA (The Extensible
Universal Remote Operations Planning Architecture) [48], was developed by National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to tackle real-world problems. It allows
an interactive planning process, and provides support in domain modelling and plan
visualisation.
Researchers have also produced several autonomous domain learning and modelling tech-
niques. An algorithm, called SLAF (Simultaneous Learning and Filtering) [49], was
created to learn the actions using partially observable (unfamiliar and uncertain) do-
main knowledge. It takes action-observation sequence, states of the world and partial
observations of intermediate transition states between action executions as input. As
a result, it produces action model that consists of preconditions and effects containing
implicit objects and unstated relationships between objects. Another automated tool,
called Opmaker [50], takes a partial domain model and a set of training data for plan-
ning, and outputs a complete domain action model. An important feature of this tool is
the heuristics that are part of the output and can be used to make plan extraction more
efficient. The tool automatically determines the intermediate transition states by track-
ing and generalising the object changes provided in the training set. It was observed
during the experiments that some objects have multiple aspects and behaviours, and
thus require Finite State Machines (FSM) to completely represent them. A FSM is a
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computation model that simulates sequential logic and presents all possible states of an
object. With this motivation, a tool called LOCM (Learning object-centric models) [51]
was developed that induces the domain model by allowing multiple state machines to
represent a single object using FSM characterised by a set of transitions. The extracted
domain models only include dynamic facts. A major limitation of LOCM is lack of
compatibility with domains having static facts (i.e. remain unchanged throughout the
planning process [52]). Recent advancements have started to address this issue, such as
in Automated Static Constraint Learner or ASCol [53]. The ASCol exploits a directed
graph representation of operator arguments in a plan solution and uses that to discover
pairwise static relations among preconditions and effects.
The learning process of the aforementioned tools is dynamic and usually takes additional
information, e.g. partial domains and uncertainty factors, for building the complete
domain model. The input used is gathered from goal-based solutions and manual ob-
servations or experiments. Despite the advantages of state-of-the-art domain learning
solutions, a major drawback is the need for pre-existing domain knowledge in the form
of plan traces and human assistance. A plan trace is the sequence of actions that rep-
resent a solution to achieve a desired goal. Almost all of the existing solutions require
plan traces in some form, and as such conducting autonomous learning in a previously
unseen application area would first require the construction of a plan trace. In prac-
tical and real time domain modelling processes, this is not feasible because creating
well-formed plan traces could be viewed as almost as challenging as building a domain
model. More specifically, a plan trace can only be constructed once the domain is fully
comprehended. In addition, it would also require expert knowledge, something which is
not guaranteed to be always available. These issues can be resolved by applying different
techniques, like, crowd-sourcing to acquire action models [54] or learning from human
demonstrations to perform case-based planning [55]. However, such techniques are ex-
pensive and require large amount effort to prevent human-errors and perform conflict
resolution. Another significant challenge is that the learning solutions cannot acquire
complete and sound domain model if the data sources are noisy and incomplete. This
motivates the research challenge of developing an autonomous approach to acquire and
use security domain knowledge directly from the available data sources, without having
prior knowledge and human expert support. The output plan will be capable of helping
experts and non-experts alike for the improvement of security in any new or previously
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unseen machines.
2.4.2.1 Domain Representation Languages
After acquiring the domain knowledge, whether through manual or autonomous ap-
proach, a variety of modelling languages are available that can be used for encoding
domain knowledge. The following sections explain some of the existing domain mod-
elling languages.
Stanford Research Institute Problem Solver (STRIPS) – The STRIPS language was
developed in 1971 [56] and is the base for most of the latest languages in use today. A
STRIPS planning problem contains the following three components: (1) initial state,
(2) goal state and (3) declarative actions containing preconditions and post-conditions.
This language only supports positive literals along with their conjunctions (combining
multiple literals into a single literal). The capability of defining preconditions in each
action is the major accomplishment of STRIPS as no assumptions are made regarding the
structure and validity of domain, and also allows the domain-independent planning. In
early days of AP, STRIPS was considered as the most popular representation language.
Action Description Language (ADL) – The ADL is considered as a successor of STRIPS
and was particularly developed for robots in 1987 [57]. An ADL contains the following
four components: (1) actions, (2) optional parameters for each action, (3) optional
clauses for preconditions and (4) add, delete and update parameter list that is not part
of the action schema. The ADL supports both positive and negative literals and their
conjunctions, unlike STRIPS.
Planning Domain Definition Language (PDDL) – Considering the existing literature
on domain model generation, the Planning Domain Definition Language (PDDL) along
with its variants are the best-known languages for modelling domains and planning
problems. The PDDL is a successor of STRIPS and ADL and was developed for the
planning competition with the aim of having a single and common domain representation
language. Many planners support PDDL due to its wide usage and acceptance in the
AP community. The PDDL is a standard, action-centred language and is also based
on first-order predicates. Some of the important versions of PDDL are explained in the
following:
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1. PDDL 1.2 – This version of PDDL was the official language of first and second
International Planning Competition (IPC) in 1998 and 2000, respectively. The
PDDL 1.2 [58] divides a planning problem into the following two components: (1)
domain action model to represent knowledge and (2) a problem instance to describe
the problem. It is suitable for classical planning as it includes few additional
features, such as object types and conditional effects;
2. PDDL 2.1 – This version was the official language of third IPC in 2002. Appen-
dices B.1 and B.2 provide detailed schemata of domain model and problem in-
stance, respectively. The PDDL 2.1 [59] is more equipped to represent real-world
problems as it introduced numeric fluents, plan-metrics and durative-actions. A
numeric fluent (also referred as a function) is a type of state variable or predicate
that is used to model non-binary resources in the form of real numbers, such as
distance, volume, weight etc. These fluents can be used in both precondition and
effect definitions. In precondition, a fluent simulates an if-statement, where the
comparison between fluents and real numbers is performed with the help of fol-
lowing symbols: less than or equal to (≤), less than (<), equals to (=), greater
than (>) and greater than or equals to (≥). In effect definition, a fluent can be
used as a then-statement that performs the following arithmetic operations: ad-
dition (+), subtraction (−), division (/) and multiplication (∗). Other operators
are also available that can modify a fluent, such as increase or decrease value by
certain amount and assign a new value. The plan metrics enabled the quantitative
evaluation of plan solutions using numeric fluents. This increases the capability of
goal-driven planning algorithms and performs plan optimisation through minimi-
sation and maximisation criterion. The durative-actions allow the simulation of
temporal aspects of plan solutions. The time is encoded with respect to action’s
duration, where preconditions and effects are defined for either beginning or end
of the action. The preconditions can also be defined for the entire duration of the
action;
3. PDDL 3.0 – This version was the official language of fifth IPC in 2006. The PDDL
3.0 [60] improved the previous PDDL versions by adding numeric constraints to
perform arithmetic operations. It was the first version, where temporal planning
was introduced by adding features to durative actions. It also includes hard and
soft constraints, where hard constraints must be true during the plan execution
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while soft constraints (or preferences) if found to be true, will increase the quality
of plan;
4. PDDL 3.1 – This version was the official language of deterministic track of sixth
and seventh IPC in 2008 and 2011, respectively. The PDDL 3.1 [61] introduced
object fluents, where the range is not limited to numbers but can also involve
any object type. The syntax of PDDL 3.1 is significantly expressive in terms of
semantic;
5. Other versions – Probabilistic PDDL (PPDDL) [62] and PDDL+ [63] are also
among useful extensions of PDDL. These two languages have been applied to
several real-world problems. The PPDDL was presented in the probabilistic track
of fourth IPC and incorporates probability distribution in actions. PDDL+ is
specially designed for continuous planning problem with respect to discrete-time, in
order to encode continuous processes. Another domain representational language
is New Domain Definition Language (NDDL) [64], which was developed by NASA
in 2003. The NDDL mainly focuses on space applications. It uses object fluents
and is capable of modelling continuous planning tasks. A major disadvantage of
NDDL is the lack of supporting planners.
2.4.2.2 Searching Techniques
After representing the knowledge in a domain action model, Automated Planning (AP)
algorithms are applied to select and organise purposeful actions in achieving expected
outcomes [1]. Several AP algorithms are implemented in software solutions, known
as automated planners. Every planner employs a searching technique [65] to find a
sequence of actions from initial to goal state. The searching can be classified into either
uninformed or informed approach that explores or traverses the state space to determine
one or more solutions P by using a forward chaining mechanism. The state space is a set
of all available states that are organised in a graph structure, where the nodes represent
states, the edges are indicative of domain actions (representing state transition) and the
path from initial to goal nodes represent a plan.
The uninformed search – This approach traverses the graph without using any addi-
tional knowledge, and is based on two basic algorithms: breadth-first and depth-first
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search [66]. The breadth-first search (BFS) first traverses all the nodes on the same
level before moving to the next level. The BFS repeats this process until there are no
more states left to traverse or the goal state is reached. The space and time complexity
of BFS is O(bd), where d is the depth of goal node and b is the number of successors of
all non-goal nodes (branching factor). The BFS is complete and optimal but uses a large
amount of space. On the other hand, the depth-first search (DFS) first selects a node
and completely traverses it until either the solution is found or there is no successor of
the current nodes. The DFS will then backtrack one level in the path and traverse the
successor node in the same manner. The time complexity of DFS is O(bm) and the space
complexity is O(b ∗m), where b is the branching factor and m is the maximum depth of
any node. The DFS is neither complete nor optimal but uses less space and resources.
The informed search – This approach makes guided decisions based on some prior knowl-
edge or a heuristic function other than the domain model. The heuristic function is used
to obtain the optimal path between two nodes of the graph. It can also enable a ‘greedy’
search, where the nodes that appear closest to the goal are traversed first in order to
find a quick solution. Several algorithms are available to perform the informed search,
such as A* [67] and branch-and-bound optimisation [68]. The A* algorithm is one of
the most common algorithms. The aim of this algorithm is to perform the best-first
search and avoid traversing nodes that appear to be expensive. On current node n, this
is done by an evaluation function f(n) = g(n) + h(n), which determines the cost of the
previous path g(n) and an estimated cost of the remaining path all the way to the goal
h(n). The other informed search algorithm, branch-and-bound optimisation, maintains
lower and upper bounds on the global objective value over a given region. The upper
bound B denotes the best solution found so far during the search. The lower bound is
calculated on traversing a new node by a heuristic function I that estimates the cost of
the path currently being explored. If I > B, then the algorithm removes the new node
from path as it will not result in a better solution with a lower cost than B. Most of the
new planning algorithms employ heuristic functions to improve their accuracy, efficiency
and productivity [69], hence employing informed search approach.
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2.4.2.3 Applications Of Planning In Cybersecurity
The plans are generated by considering optimisation constraints defined in terms of qual-
ity and quantity. It is demonstrated through experimental analysis that such (computer-
generated) plans provide better and more efficient security solutions depending on the
quality of domain model knowledge [70] because the planner search and explore a wide
array of possibilities before finding the most feasible solution. Therefore, AP has be-
come an integral part of numerous security-related areas, which is also evident from the
literature discussed in the section below.
There have been successful exploration of the use of AP in producing attack plans for
penetration testing. One of the earlier work involves utilising classical planning to gen-
erate hypothetical attack scenarios that can exploit a web-based system [71]. This study
simulates realistic adversary courses of action, with the main focus on malicious insider
threat. The presented domain model includes 25 objects (hosts, processes, programs,
files, etc.), 124 propositions representing information about system (configurations, vul-
nerabilities, etc.) and 56 actions to denote the adversary’s objectives. The problem
instance is based on 200 − 300 facts of the underlying system. A classical planner,
named FF-Metric [72], was used to extract the plan of attack actions. The domain
model was constructed by human expert using a semi-manual (i.e. employing assistive
tools) approach. The study also presented a post plan processing tool, which was written
in Perl script, to convert the planner output in a human-readable format.
Another research study [73] used planning to assess the degree of network security. It
starts by transforming the attacks into domain models, which represents the require-
ments and exploits, whereas the information about system, such networks, ports, op-
erating systems, machines and services are encoded in problem files. The proposed
approach analyses the entire network using the domain mode, which has up-to 1800 ac-
tions and hosts 700 exploits. A similar research work [74] presented a solution that can
generate sequences of actions to compromise a network in the low cost, shortest path
possible. The actions comply with the network environment and configuration and are
aimed at exploiting a series of vulnerabilities for adversarial gain. A commercial tool
(Core Impact) has also been developed that uses AP to generate possible attack plans
and is capable of conducting real-time penetration testing [75]. The tool extends the
domain model to encode probabilities of attacks. The tool also builds AND−OR trees
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to determine all possible attack paths against a certain asset. The tool is claimed to be
efficient with respect to execution time and amount of network traffic. The computa-
tional complexity is described as O(n log n), where n is the total number of actions in
domain file.
One of the main issue in these solutions is the lack of ability to handle incomplete
knowledge and scalability limitations. Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes
(POMDP), can be used to eliminate the problem of incomplete knowledge and uncer-
tainties [76]. POMDPs are capable of ranking the domain actions based on expected
reward, which is composed of asset value and time/risk of detection to accomplish the
desired goal. Further research [77] emphasises how to produce better attack plans for
a particular machine within the shortest time possible. The proposed solution uses in-
telligent vulnerability scanning actions with the help POMDPs and discovers feasible
attacks for each individual machine. Despite all the advantages of POMDPs, construct-
ing them is a complex task and they also require large computational resources. It is
also difficult to calculate the probability values for every attack scenario. To address the
scalability issues, a study [78] proposed a middle ground between classical planning and
POMDPs, called MDPs. The probability value depends on the level of attacker’s uncer-
tainty in launching that particular action. The values will remain constant throughout
the planning process and assigned regardless of environment or configuration.
2.4.3 Association Rule Mining Techniques
Considering the importance of creating a domain model in an autonomous manner, this
research pursues potential Association Rule Mining (ARM) techniques that are unsu-
pervised and can discover relationships among a diverse set of event log entries. ARM
is a sub-domain of data mining that refers the method of identifying patterns to reveal
strong/frequent co-occurrences in the form of correlation rules, containing antecedent
and consequent, among seemingly unrelated items [79]. The first ARM algorithm [80]
was created to identify regular co-occurrences between the products in large transaction
data. The data was recorded by point-of-sale systems used in supermarkets. This initial
approach could only have one consequence statement in the rule, i.e. it can determine
X ∩Y → Z, but not X → Y ∩Z types of rules. Following this, two new algorithms were
introduced called Apriori and AprioriTid [81], which were based on breath-first search.
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A detailed working example of Apriori algorithm is provided in [82]. The main target
of these algorithms was to improve the performance of ARM process by reducing the
execution time. Apriori was the first algorithm to pioneer efficient pruning scheme and
prevent the exponential growth of possible frequent itemsets. The algorithm iteratively
generates sets of items in increasing arity; singletons, pairs, triplets etc. The general idea
to increase efficiency was based on the Monotonicity Principle [83]. Given an itemset
ABCD, first determine all of its subsets ABC, AB etc. If a subset, say ABC, does not
generate a rule, remove it as there is no need to process its further subsets. Similarly,
if any itemset is found to be frequent, then every subset of the itemset will also be con-
sidered frequent. This property is known as the Apriori Principle. Another approach
was introduced to further increase the performance of ARM by storing the itemsets
in a hash tree format [84]. The proposed algorithm, called DHP (direct hashing and
pruning), uses a hashing technique to trims unnecessary itemsets in every iteration, thus
reducing the number of transactions for further processing. According to a study [85],
there are 38 measures that can be used either individually or combined to improve the
quality of rule mining process. Some of the measures are support, confidence, lift, re-
call, precision, specificity, etc. The proposed solution in this research uses the ARM
technique, which relies on support, confidence and some other metrics to determine the
correlations among data items. It enables searching for valuable information based on
frequency and is combinatorial and symbolic in nature.
ARM has been widely exploited in many different application areas. A research study
proposed a tool, called LogMaster [86], which uses ARM to find the correlation between
failure and non-failure events in the logs data, and predict future crashes of the system.
This tool starts by pre-processing the events data and applies the Apriori algorithm
to mine correlation rules. The extracted rules are collectively represented as an event
correlation graph. After that, the tool uses events timings and statistical measures
on the graph to build event prediction model The LogMaster was tested on three sets
of Cloud event logs, with the average precision rate of 83.66%, 81.19% and 79.82%,
respectively. A similar study, which is only based on frequent itemset mining, has been
used for knowledge discovery in the event logs [87]. This study presented a solution,
called AllMining, which consists of the following three steps: pre-processing of event logs
data, discovering frequent co-occurrence in events and pruning the irrelevant frequent
itemsets increase the quality of knowledge discovery and decision-making process. The
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evaluation of AllMining shows that it is scalable and efficient tool, and provides better
coverage of knowledge. Researchers have also proposed a variant of ARM that can
identify irregular rights/permissions in a file system [88]. This solution finds the rules
with least frequent or irregular co-occurrences, as oppose to finding strongly correlated
rules like in the most applications of ARM. This allows them to identify anomalies or
rather suspicious permissions that should be removed to improve the protection of user
data.
A research study has proposed the use of ARM in analysing server logs [89]. It provides a
new variant of FP-Growth, called a Long Sequence Frequent Pattern (LSFP) algorithm.
The LSFP takes the log files, produces association rules as a directed graph and creates
a description or timeline of the user behaviour. According to the authors, support value
has a direct impact on the quality and efficiency of the overall solution. Another research
work used an ARM technique to detect phishing URLs [90]. First, a set of features is
produced that can help in distinguishing between the legitimate and phishing URLs, such
as length of the host URL, number of slashes, dots in hostname, etc. After that, Apriori
algorithm is applied to find interesting patterns and combination of features in the form
of rules. The developed solution was tested on a dataset containing 1400 URLs and
achieved 93% accuracy. A recent paper has used ARM to categorise Darknet network
traffic streams to gain a better understanding of global trends in cyber-attacks [91]. This
paper considers two cases; correlation between attacking hosts and destination ports,
and the correlation between Darknet traffic probing sensors. The ARM discovered some
significant rules as they comply with the behaviour of known botnets. Therefore, this
paper claims that the mined rules can facilitate in building secure strategies.
It should be noted here that the existence of association relationship among mutually
exclusive items of the dataset does not necessarily imply the actual connection [92]. The
rules are subjective and usually applicable to the given data (i.e. the results are local,
not universal). In other words, a rule is a just depiction of strong correlation between the
antecedent and consequent data items. Hence, there is a need to improve the quality and
confidence of the rules. This is can be achieved by adding an extra measure to determine
meaningful correlation, as evident from many studies. One such measure is temporality
or time-based ordering, which can be used to identify and extract interesting association
rules among items [93]. It provides complementary evidence for the relationship to
exist. For example, consider event X (antecedent) and event B (consequence) are in
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associative relationship. Finding whether event A always happens before event B can
help in establishing a higher confidence. Several research studies are available that
developed different methods for temporal ARM and obtained quality results. One of
the earlier work proposed using temporal metric as an interestingness measure for ARM
(based on a survey) and demonstrated the numerous benefits in terms of relevancy
and quality of knowledge discovery in rules. It also showed that the incorporation
of temporal dependencies in ARM can group and (re)arrange rule items into correct
semantic sequences [94]. Later on, a research work developed a new algorithm, called
T-Apriori [95], which integrated a time-based constraint in Apriori algorithm and used
it for analysing ordered ecological events set. The algorithm requires an additional layer
of data pre-processing using K-Means clustering algorithm, which reduces the overall
performance. Also, according to the authors, the efficiency of the algorithm has not been
tested on larger datasets. Another study presents an algorithm, called ARMADA [96],
which uses time dependency to discover sequential frequent patterns. The algorithm
was tested on large, interval-based data that was constructed synthetically. The authors
claim that the quality temporal association rules were extracted and provided richer
knowledge with respect to semantics.
A recent study has proposed a new mining algorithm for time-series dataset, called
temporal association rules with frequent itemsets tree (T-FS-tree) algorithm [97]. This
algorithm mines frequent itemsets and builds a FS-tree structure in parallel, hence ef-
fectively reducing the computational cost by skipping the candidate itemset generation
phase. The algorithm outputs interesting temporal association rules, which are acquired
by traversing and pruning the irrelevant rules in the tree. Another work proposed a
Multi-level Intensive Subset Learning (MISL) algorithm [98], which modifies frequent
itemset mining to include a temporal metric. The algorithm uses temporal metric to
identify and remove such rules that have occurred by chance. It was successfully used
on financial time series data and identified profitable trades by generating association
rules, which lead to uncover hidden knowledge. Another study takes presents a dif-
ferent technique that first generates a complete set of association rules from the given
time-stamped data, and then convert them into temporal-association rules based on the
co-appearance of sequences [99]. This approaches requires input of states and events
of interest. It has been successfully tested on live systems where data belonged to fish
movement in a river. Another correlation technique for heterogeneous data has also been
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developed that connects the security events of a system based on clustering, properties
and temporal precedence [100]. The output is presented as a graph, which shows both di-
rect and indirect connection of events. For testing, the data was collected from multiple
sources and the resultant graph contained 1309 nodes identifying many malicious activ-
ities regarding malware, network attacks and user behaviours. Another research study
presented a solution for assisted living using a temporal metric in Apriori algorithm that
can be used for activity reminder and abnormal behaviour detection systems [101]. This
solution recognised temporal relations of user activities, such as start time and duration,
and used that to construct a predictive activity model.
Despite having significant advantages, the existing ARM approaches are unable to yield
a suitable solution for identifying temporal correlation rules in raw data streams using a
fully automated mechanism. They usually either rely on the manual input by human or
operate in a determined, constrained, specific and predictable environment to extract the
rules. Some of the solutions require additional configuration and processing layers, which
might not suit large-scale and complex models. Furthermore, the need for manual input
again leads towards the human assistance and expertise, which as discussed before lacks
efficiency and are in short supply. Another significant lacking in the existing techniques
is the incapability of finding the initial (starting) item of a temporal sequence/pattern of
multiple correlated events. As the results are shown as a graph or cluster, they cannot
provide the basis to develop a domain action model.
2.4.4 Causal Inference Techniques
The existence of correlation does signify a strong statistical relationship among the linked
items (or events in our case), but it is not always true [102]. The relationship between
events can be made certain by finding evidence of causation. A cause and effect connec-
tion demonstrates that the events are dependent on each other given certain conditions
and are defined with the help of Markov chains [103]. A Markov chain is a sequence and
description of random events that cause the system to transition from one state to any
other state. It also includes the probability of each transition, which depends on the
state reached due to the previous event only. A number of algorithms have been devised
that can find causality among items. The process of determining causal relationships can
be broadly classified into two main categories: CCC and CCU triplets causality [104].
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Both techniques are based on induction and statistical probability principles. Assume
there are items: A, B and C. The CCC mechanism considers all three possible pairs of
items as correlated and one variable is already known to have no cause. For example, in
case of (A, B), (B, C) and (A, C) pairs, if A has no causes then the causal relation will
be A causes B and remaining B causes C. On the other hand, the CCU mechanism
is that only two pairs are in associative relationship, and one pair is not correlated.
For example, if the pairs (A, B) and (A, C) are correlated and (B, C) pair is not in
association, then B and C cause A. The CCU causality mechanism is deemed as better
in performance, while the CCC is better in producing quality results.
Many techniques have been introduced in previous years that can discover causal re-
lationships. Most of the algorithms are based on either Bayesian [105] or Constraint-
based [106] approaches. Both approaches are based on Markov chain but differ in theory
and practice. The Constraint-based approach can make categorical decisions about the
conditional dependence and independence constraints among the data items, whereas the
Bayesian approach weighs the degree in terms of probability to which these constraints
hold. If two items are conditionally dependent (or not conditionally independent), it
means they are in cause and effect relationship. Any Constraint-based approach is
based on two steps: conduct statistical tests to determine conditional (in)dependence
among the data items, and use the tests to define the types of causal connection that ex-
ist among the items. This approach uses different kinds of statistical tests to reduce the
complexity and complete the process in a reasonable time. Furthermore, the Constraint-
based solution have been widely utilised in several real-world problems as they are more
generalised. On the other hand, Bayesian solutions find all possible causal structures
and use a probabilistic framework to determine if ‘Event A cause Event B’? This ap-
proach requires user-specified probabilities in the graph structure. If it is not feasible
for the user to provide this information, then non-informative priors can be used. For a
large and complex observational data, Bayesian solutions will require high computation
power to identify and process all causal structures. Moreover, the incomplete or hidden
variables may also make it difficult to directly observe the data and produce accurate
results.
One of the earlier research studies presented an algorithm, called Local causal discov-
ery (LCD) [107], which uses a Constraint-based approach to determine pairwise causal
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relationships in a completely observational data. The LCD algorithm uses CCC mech-
anism (but not the CCU) to conduct independence tests between all data items. It
uses a function, called Independent(A, B, C), which implicitly scans the entire set of
relationships R to determine whether A is independent of B, given C. If found indepen-
dent, then the function returns true, or else, it returns false. This function is applied
to each pair of items and causal structures are represented as a graph. A recent study
presented an algorithm, called Logical Causal Inference (LoCI), that conducts minimal
conditional (in)dependent tests and then convert them into logical statements to form
initial causal relations. After that, the algorithm combines all statements using aggrega-
tion, elimination and basic properties of causality to output a complete causal structure.
Another study presented a Constraint-based algorithm, called Markov blanket/collider
set (MBCS*) [108], which starts by finding a Markov Blanket (MB) of each item to
determine all items (parents and children) that shield this particular item from the rest
of the network. So, instead of conducting conditional-independence tests for all pairs of
items in the data to infer causal relationships, it only considers MB of each item and
provides better results in terms of accuracy and efficiency. Several Constraint-based
approaches are also developed for learning a single, collective causal structure from joint
observational datasets. One simple algorithm for this purpose is Structure learning us-
ing prior results (SLPR) [109]. The algorithm starts by finding the causal structure for
each dataset individually and then combines them by removing common edges to get a
full graph. After that, it reapplies causal inference mechanism to the graph and output
a final causal structure.
A research work presented a method for discovering causation through Bayesian ap-
proach by using a mixture of observed (deterministic) and experimental (non-deterministic)
data [110]. The proposed model was tested on a manually created dataset of potential
anaesthesia problems in the operating room that contains 37 nodes and 46 edges. An
improvement made by this solution is the automatic assignment of initial probabilities,
which are then used to build a Bayesian network. After that, it used joint probability
distribution to successfully infer the causal structures and parameters among randomly
selected item-pairs. A variant of LCD algorithm has also been proposed, called Bayesian
Local Causal Discovery algorithm, which reduced the amount of false positives and in-
creased efficiency [111]. It uses a Bayesian scoring metric instead of conditional inde-
pendence testing. The results are modelled as a probabilistic graph of connected items,
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known as Bayesian network. The Bayesian network satisfies Markov chain property and
the availability of probability distribution allows the efficient inference between two ran-
dom items. After that, it applies a heuristic-based greedy search in the Bayesian network
to derive Markov Blanket (MB) for each node. By limiting the causal learning to the MB
of each node, the algorithm significantly reduces the size of probability-based inference
calculations, and thus have improved accuracy and efficiency. A similar research study
presents two hybrid (Bayesian- and Constraint-based) algorithms CD-B and CD-H that
can discover causal relationships from observational data [112]. The CD-B algorithm
employs a greedy search to determine the MB of a node, and then use it in a scoring
method to identify the parents and children. This process is repeated for every node and
a global Bayesian network is constructed to discover all causal structures. On the other
hand, the CD-H algorithm is based on a two-step mechanism to perform conditional
dependence and independence tests and determine the parent-child relationships of all
nodes. The rest of the process is similar to the CD-B algorithm.
There are also other causal mining techniques that are not based on Bayesian/Constraint-
based approaches. An algorithm, called causal association rule discovery [113], presented
a correlation mining approach to determine causal rules in observational data. It starts
by extracting all association rules, and for each rule (A − B), it hypothesises that the
left (A) causes right (B) item. After that, it applies retrospective cohort studies mecha-
nism to find odds ratio for each corresponding hypothesis and discover persistent causal
rules. Another study presents a Relational causal discovery algorithm [114], which uses
automated relational blocking to determine causal relationships, instead of statistical
tests. The relational blocking is essentially a manual technique that divides the data
into unrelated groups based on certain criteria (blocking factor). In the proposed algo-
rithm, groups are defined based on a graph structure that aims at reducing variation
and adjusting for common causes. The groups are then used to determine causal struc-
tures. However, unlike conditional (in)dependence tests, the relational blocking is not
capable of inducing dependence when discovering common effects. Apart from the al-
gorithms, certain mechanisms are developed to obtain evidence of a causal connection
between a presumed cause and an observed effect, for example, the Bradford Hill [115]
and Granger [116] models. They claim that a causal rule should satisfy the following
factors: association, specificity, consistency, plausibility, temporal order, coherence and
experimental evidence. Another approach to infer causality is presented by Popper,
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which is based on three considerations: temporal precedence, dependency, and no hid-
den variables [117]. This approach constructs incremental causal network and has been
successfully exploited in the unbounded data streams of events to build causal networks.
2.5 Literature Analysis
This section provides a brief discussion on the current state of knowledge acquisition
systems:
1. Several data sources are available that can provide security knowledge to the non-
expert users;
2. The manual or assistive techniques are heavily reliant on the manual processing
of knowledge, which requires human experts, domain-specific experience, error
and conflict management and continuous maintenance in terms of updating and
constructing new knowledge. These techniques might also be counterproductive for
large-scale knowledge acquisition as it would be time, cost and resource-intensive,
and demand additional expertise in building, representing and storing complex
patterns for utilisation. Such methods are not feasible for our research as we are
aiming to acquire knowledge in an automated manner that does not require any
human intervention;
3. Most of the security-based applications of manual or assistive event correlation
techniques are in monitoring and fault/anomaly detection;
4. The applications of automated planning mostly lies in the domain of offensive
security, i.e. penetration testing and attack planning;
5. The existing automated technologies have shown strong theoretical foundation,
but are not fully equipped to process the data sources in generating actionable
intelligence of higher quality and accuracy. The solutions are either too simple or
difficult to reach out to the necessary audiences. Also, they require a high use of
expert knowledge and results in high costs and poor scalability; and
6. The existing literature shows that no research has been conducted to extract a set
of security-related actions performed on a system and utilise them to create plans
for improving the security of vulnerable machines, all without any human support.
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2.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter presents the relevant background theory that establishes the basis of this
research. It starts by introducing main areas with the emphasis on automated knowledge
acquisition, representation and utilisation. This chapter aims to provide a reader with
the background of contributions made in this research, along with surveying past research
in the closely related areas. This chapter starts by investigating the data sources that
can provide useful security knowledge. After that, it explains some manual and assistive
knowledge acquisition techniques along with their lacking and drawbacks. Further ahead,
the chapter explores the state-of-art research on the role of Automated Planning in
cyber security-related applications, correlation and causal rule mining techniques, and
how they are extensively used for automated knowledge acquisition. All references are
provided against discussed literature. The chapter does not provide detailed review and
analysis of all aforementioned techniques but provides a context of important concepts
to aid the understanding of the contribution of this thesis.
Chapter 3
Automated Knowledge
Acquisition
Automated knowledge acquisition (KA) is an alternative to the laborious procedures of
collecting the right knowledge from given data sources. This chapter explains the novel
mechanism of acquiring ‘rules’ from Microsoft security event logs that contains the expert
knowledge. The entire process is performed in an automated manner, i.e. computer-
mediated discovery and representation of knowledge that allows the elevation in the
performance, effectiveness, efficiency, coverage and continuous updating of a knowledge-
based system. Following are the five steps and their corresponding components that
have been developed as part of this process, and also shown in Figure 3.1:
1. Data pre-processing:
(a) Identify and remove routine events from the given event log dataset; and
(b) Convert the remaining event log entries to an object-based model.
2. Association rule mining:
(a) Determine both minimum and maximum support values from the object-
based model;
(b) Identify object-based rules from the model using the support values in an
association rule mining algorithm; and
(c) Determine the event-based rules, such that any two events are associated by
the object-based rules.
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Figure 3.1: Summarised steps of proposed automated knowledge acquisition process,
where same coloured components belong to a single step.
3. Sequences of event relationships:
(a) Improve the quality of relationships based on the temporal order of events,
alongside discarding insignificant relationships; and
(b) Combine and expand the individual relationships to form and validate se-
quences of events.
4. Determining causality:
(a) Convert the sequences of events into directed acyclic graph and infer a causal
rank for each relationship.
5. Storing Rules:
(a) Store all relationships in a database along with all relevant information.
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3.1 Data Pre-Processing
This section presents the pre-processing phase of security event log entries. It has two
steps and prepares the data for passing to rule mining algorithms. The first step is to
read security events log of a system and remove routine log entries. The second step is
to build an object-based model from the remaining entries for further processing.
3.1.1 Filtering Routine Entries
During system use, a large quantity of the routine entries are created and stored, re-
porting on events that are not security configuration related. These entries do not
contain object-value pairs and contain little, if any, information. For example, event
1105 is logged in the Microsoft system to denote that the maximum log size is reached
and the operating system starts saving the new event log entries in another file, as an
alternative to over-writing the existing one. The description of event 1105 is ‘Event
log automatic backup’ and it only contains a single object-value pair, such as File:
C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Archive-Security-2019-02-11-18-37-03-002.evtx, to
display the file name where new entries will be saved. Similarly, the event type 4608
does not show any security related activity. The description of event 4608 is ‘Windows
is starting up’ and has no object-value pair as it is only logged for information.
Although the routine events provide valuable information for forensic analysis and sys-
tem management, it can be the case that they do not depict any security expert knowl-
edge or the reason behind why it was performed. In this research, such routine events
are considered as noise due to their relatively high frequency of occurrence, lack of in-
formation and their strong relationship amongst a large volume of system users and
resources. Also, if these events are allowed to be processed in the rule mining process,
their respective event entries will dominate and correlate with all other entries, hence
having an negative impact on the techniques effectiveness. Furthermore, when the rules
are encoded into a domain action model for knowledge utilisation as described in the
next Chapter 4, the resultant action plan for the identification and ramification of se-
curity issues loses conciseness, hence creating unnecessary difficulty for the non-expert
users.
Chapter 3. Automated Knowledge Acquisition 42
To remove routine events, the first step is to create a frequency distribution (FD) of
the event types in a given dataset. The size of FD will be equal to size of unique event
types, where each element corresponds to the number of total entries of a particular
event type. The following shows an example of FD from a live system:
FD = {152, 35, 158, 2148, 10, 36, 4, 4, 2121, 32, 8, 44, 44, 23, 1, 1, 1, 8, 2, 1, 2, 1, 26, 1, 2, 2,
5, 152, 1, 1, 1}
(3.1)
Here we make an assumption: events that have occurred significantly more than others
are routine. This assumption is based on empirical observation from several event log
datasets. For a human being, it would be an easier task to determine that the event types
against fourth (2148) and ninth (2121) elements of FD are routine, as their occurrence
is relatively greater than others. For the similar detection and elimination of the routine
events in an automated manner, Mean (µ) and Standard Deviation (s) values can be
used. A µ is the central value of any given set, more specifically, it is the sum of
elements divided by the number of elements. The s is a measure of spread of elements
in a set [118], and determines that how much they differ from the mean value (µ). A
low s depicts that the elements are closer to the µ, while a high s value shows that the
elements are distant from the µ. In other words, lower s means that the elements do
not have substantial numerical difference among each other, while higher s means that
the elements are dispersed over a wider range of values. The formula of s is shown in
Equation 3.2:
s =
√√√√ 1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
(xi − x)2 (3.2)
Where N denotes the number of elements, xi is the ith element and x is the average of
FD. It is possible that the given set of event log entries does not contain a complete
record of security-related activities due to insufficient computing resources for event
logging mechanism, memory or storage corruption while saving continuous stream of
events, lack of defining time period in filtering events etc. Hence the proposed solution
uses Sample Standard Deviation to form an estimate of larger population and output
a generalised result. Instead of using N , which is used in the Population Standard
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Deviation, it uses N − 1 in the denominator of Equation 3.2, which is known as Bessel’s
correction [119].
The ratio of the s to the µ is called the coefficient of variation (Cv), which is a measure
of variability [120]. If the value of Cv is greater 1 (or 100%), it means the set contains
one or more outliers [121], i.e. the frequency of certain event types is significantly higher
or lower than others. The routine event types can be filtered if all those event types are
removed whose frequency is higher than s. For FD1 in Equation 3.1, the s is 528.44,
µ is 162.16 and Cv is 3.26. As Cv > 1, two elements (2148 and 2121) are found to
be higher than s and hence the corresponding event types will be eliminated from the
further processing. The remaining elements of FD1 are shown in Equation 3.3.
FD1 = {152, 35, 158, 10, 36, 4, 4, 32, 8, 44, 44, 23, 1, 1, 1, 8, 2, 1, 2, 1, 26, 1, 2, 2, 5,
152, 1, 1, 1}
(3.3)
3.1.2 Preparing Object-Based Model
To enable a structured mechanism of processing event log entries for automated knowl-
edge acquisition, it is necessary to extract meaningful parts of each event and model all
entries into a uniform format. In this research, the normalisation of event log entries
is called as ‘object-based model’. Each event in the object-based model is represented
in terms of the system objects (or properties) found in the entry. These could, for ex-
ample, be account names, machines names, system resources, permission levels, security
identification etc.
In the following discussion, D is used to model a dataset of event entries, where D =
{E1, E2, ..., EN}. The event, E = {id,O}, where id is a numeric event type, and O is the
set of event objects. The set O belongs to set I = {o1, o2, ..., on}, such that O ⊆ I. Each
entry, Ei, contains corresponding objects from I to represent an occurrence of event.
Note that the event types are not part of D as it is only used for mining object-based
correlation rules. For example, D = {E1, E2, E3, E4}, where:
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Figure 3.2: A visual time line representation of D covering a time span of 20 seconds.
E1 = {{4567}, {User1,Win7, Port : 53176, NTLM}}
E2 = {{1234}, {User1, ReadEA, svchost.exe, IKE}}
E3 = {{2345}, {User2, ReadEA, System,NTLM}}
E4 = {{5678}, {User2,Win7, NtLmSsp,Winlogon}}
In this trivial dataset, each entry consists of an event type (e.g. 4567 and 1234) and
4 objects (e.g. User1 and Win7). A sequential timeline of the dataset is presented in
Figure 3.2, where the events occur over a 20 second period. Both event type and objects
involved are necessary to understand the occurrence of any event.
It should be noted that the real time event log entries are much more diverse than
the presented example. They contain large number of objects and require computing-
resource efficient solution for processing. One example of a live entry from Microsoft
system is shown in Figure 3.3. This entry contains 33 object-value pairs and is typically
generated while modifying the user-group security policies. Each entry is tagged with
a time stamp as well to denote creation time. The events only occur over the duration
that a system is running and they appear in sequence; although, simultaneous execution
of multiple processes can generate intricate entries.
As mentioned before, it is fairly straightforward to acquire the object-value pairs from
a structured event log dataset. However, there are some event logging mechanisms that
store each entry in a textual format as it is easier to create and provides better readability
for the users. In that case, text mining approaches will be employed to analyse the
data from different aspects and then extract properties (or features) for constructing an
object-based model. Several text mining techniques have been gathered and reviewed in
this book [122]. These techniques use a standard representation model for text, called
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Figure 3.3: A live entry of event type, 5447, acquired using the Event Viewer appli-
cation of a Microsoft system. It shows the description of event, list of all object-value
pairs and other relevant information.
bag-of-words. This model disregards grammar and word order, and produces a two-
dimensional binary vector based on word appearance. The vector can be processed by
several types of statistical, machine learning and natural language processing techniques
for extracting the features.
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3.2 Association Rule Mining
As discussed in the literature review (Section 2.3.3), there is a potential of using asso-
ciation rule mining (ARM) to identify relationships amongst the objects of event log
entries. It is evident from the evaluation of existing solutions that the ARM can suc-
cessfully discover quality knowledge from all the data streams. ARM is an unsupervised
process [123], and employed as a method for explaining, analysing and illustrating as-
sociation rules that satisfy the condition of (strong or rare) co-occurrence. Identifying
an association rule between the objects of two events will demonstrate the existence of
connection between the events.
The application of ARM in the proposed solution consists of multiple steps. It starts
by calculating minimum and maximum support values for ARM algorithm. Following
on, object-based rules are first identified before being used to establish into event-based
rules. More specifically, the strong relationships amongst event objects are utilised to
discover correlation between events.
3.2.1 Object-Based Association Rules
The purpose of object-based rule mining is to identify such objects that are likely to
occur together. The premise here is that if the objects are co-occurring, the respective
events will co-occur too. The proposed solution uses Apriori algorithm [81] for ARM.
The association rules are discovered within a tabular dataset of objects that uses different
measures to mine interesting results. ARM takes two fundamental steps to extract usable
rules:
• Frequent itemset : scan the entire dataset to discover the set of all items that
appears more than a certain number of times. The number is pre-defined by the
user; and
• Correlation: identify co-occurrences among the sets and their subsets of frequent
items. The degree of which a certain group of items have occurred together defines
the strength of their relationship.
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The reason behind using Apriori algorithm is that it performs exhaustive search in the
dataset to produce large number of frequent itemsets [124], which consequently results in
finding complete set of correlation rules. Consider the set D of event log entries and the
set I of total unique objects from Section 3.1.2. The fundamental idea behind generating
correlation rules is to determine frequent co-occurrence of objects. They identify different
objects in event log entries that have appeared multiple times together. The following
three steps are taken in order to discover interesting relationships [125]. In these steps,
both X and Y contains objects from I. More specifically, X = {oi, ...} and Y = {oj , ...},
where the values of i and j are between 0 and size of I.
Step 1 (Association rule). X → Y is an Association Rule (AR), where X and Y contain
one or more objects each from I. X is the LHS (left-hand side) or body and Y is RHS
(right-hand side) or head of rule. Both X and Y are disjoint objects, i.e. X ∩ Y =
∅. X → Y means whenever E contains X then E probably contains Y too. In the
continuing example, an AR would be {User1} → {Win7}.
Step 2 (Support of an AR). The support (supp(X)) of an AR is defined as the percentage
of event log entries that contain bothX and Y . It can also be construed as the probability
P
(
X∪Y ). The support value is also known as statistical significance and ranges between
0.01-1. The example AR has a support of 1/4 = 0.25, since it occurred in 1 out of 4
event log entries.
Step 3 (Confidence of an AR). The confidence of an AR is defined as the ratio between
the number of transactions that contain X ∪ Y and the number of transactions that
contain X. It can also be defined as P
(
X ∪Y |X) = P (X ∪Y )/P (X) = conf(X → Y ).
The confidence value ranges between 0.01-1. In the example, the confidence (supp(X ⊂
Y )/supp(X)) of rule {User1} → {Win7} would be equal to 0.25/0.5 = 0.5. This shows
that for 50% or 2 of the 4 entries that contains Win7 are related to User1.
Researchers have demonstrated that the ARM technique generates a high quantity of
rules and has a complexity of O(N2), where N is the total number of unique items in
the given data [126]. In our case, N is the total number of unique objects across all
log entries. It should be noted here that any rule with a required support count and
confidence value is deemed relevant by the algorithm; however they might still not be
interesting or useful to the users. The ARM process performs scans entire dataset for
items that have strong co-occurrences. The term ‘strong’ is defined by the amount of
support and confidence. According to an analysis of 61 interestingness measures on 110
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different datasets [127], using a right support value with respect to a dataset is essential
for producing high quality rules.
3.2.2 Establishing Support Value
Given the fact that ARM algorithm has no prior knowledge about the dataset and the
output is based on frequent itemsets, there is a possibility of extracting meaningless
rules that do not add value to the security knowledge. For this reason, choosing a right
support for ARM algorithm is critical for generating rules of better quality and quantity.
In traditional ARM, the algorithm takes a single support value and outputs each rule
with that support value or above. For example, if the input support is 0.5, all rules
having support between 0.5-1 will be displayed.
Events triggered due to the security activities may be lesser in number as compared to
the routine events. This is because system administrators do not often repeat the same
security actions on a frequent basis. So, we can form an assumption that quality results
be produced by lowering the support value. But, if the support value is kept at minimal
to identify low frequency activities, it would allow more routine events to correlate, hence
generating large amount of meaningless rules. Due to these issues, there is a need to
define both minimum and maximum support values, hereafter termed as support range
(SR), at the same time to guide the algorithm to consider less frequent events whilst
avoiding large number of routine events. As each dataset has different properties and
specifying appropriate support thresholds without the knowledge of dataset can be diffi-
cult, we have devised an automated mechanism to determine the SR. The implemented
ARM algorithm takes both minimum (minsup) and maximum (maxsup) support values
and finds all those rules having minsup 6 support > maxsup. Moreover, as the aim is
to generate high quality association rules and the SR may come out as quite low (e.g.
3%-10%), the confidence is always set to maximum. The confidence value is an indi-
cation of how often the rule has been found to be true, and setting it to 100% ensures
the discovery of the most interesting as well as reliable association rules [128] within the
limits of SR.
The SR is calculated based on the object frequency distribution (OFD) of events types.
The OFD is a set of positive numbers, where each element describes the number of
times a unique object has appeared in a given event log dataset. Two other techniques
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of a similar nature have also been developed [129, 130]; however, they do not calculate
support values from the dataset but rather rely on the confidence to define threshold
and filter interesting rules. The first approach is not capable of finding those interesting
rules, which are composed of more than two items. This approach is unsuitable for
events correlation as more than two events can exist in an associative relationship.
The second approach generates all possible association rules, regardless of support and
confidence thresholds, and then use transitive set property and manual examination to
filter interesting patterns [131]. This approach too is not reasonable as it would require
huge computing resources (or manual effort) for large-scale datasets. So in this research,
the ARM algorithm employs frequency of objects to estimate the SR. The formulae used
to determine the minimum and maximum support values from an OFD are shown in
Equations 3.4a and 3.4b. It should be noticed here that the algorithm uses frequency of
objects rather than frequency of events for SR calculation as the rules are mined from
object-based model, not directly from event log dataset.
SR =

Fmin
Ftot
to
Fmax
Ftot
if OFD is normal (3.4a)
Favg
Ftot
to
Fmax
Ftot
if OFD is not normal (3.4b)
Where Fmin is the minimum of OFD, Fmax is the maximum of OFD, Favg is the average
of OFD and Ftot is the sum of all elements of OFD. In any normal distribution, the data
points are in symmetrical order and if the size of distribution is relatively small, there will
not be a substantial difference between the minimum and maximum elements [132]. So
the minimum support value is calculated as the ratio of minimum frequency to the total
of the OFD, while the maximum support value is calculated as the ratio of maximum
frequency to the total of OFD. However, if the distribution is not normal, the minimum
support value is calculated as the ratio of average frequency to the total of OFD, while
the maximum support value is calculated as the ratio of maximum frequency to the total
of OFD. If the same Equation 3.4a is used here to calculate the SR, the large difference
between Fmin and Fmax will generate a wider SR, i.e. the Fmin/Ftot value becomes
significantly lower and that will subsequently force the ARM algorithm to include less
interesting and redundant rules. Hence the distinction between a normal and abnormal
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distribution is necessary during the calculation of SR. This can be performed using a
normality test, which will allow the ARM algorithm to include interesting and useful
rules, meanwhile, preventing the extraction of irrelevant rules.
3.2.2.1 Normality Test
Many methods are available to determine whether a given distribution is normal, such as
Shapiro–Wilk (SW) and Two-Sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov (TSKS) tests. The distri-
bution size can grow large as there are hundreds of distinct events that can be triggered.
The SW test only provides better results for small (50 or less) sample sizes [133]. Re-
cent comparisons [134, 135] show that the TSKS test is an effective method among
others and is suitable for large sample sizes. The TSKS test takes two one-dimensional
distributions and decides if they significantly differ from each other. The TSKS is a
non-parametric test [136], which means it does not make any assumptions about the
distribution and quantifies a distance between the empirical distribution functions of
samples. The process of normality test is provided in the following:
Step 1 (Generate a random normal distribution). The first step in the TSKS test is
to produce a known, standard normal distribution, which will be used as a reference
against the object frequency distribution (OFD) of the dataset. We used an algorithm
proposed in [137] that either takes a pair of standard deviation and mean values or first
and last elements of the OFD to generate a reference normal distribution (RND). The
RND has similar range of values as of OFD, which helps in increasing the accuracy of
normality test.
Step 2 (Determine empirical distribution functions). The next step of TSKS test is to
determine the empirical distribution function (EDF) [138] of both OFD and RND. The
EDF assigns 1n probability to n elements and outputs a discrete distribution. This uses
the formula provided in Equation 3.5.
EDFn(x) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1xi≤t (3.5)
where 1xi≤t is the indicator function. It is a step function and outputs 1 if xi ≤ t is true
or else 0.
Step 3 (Test the hypothesis). The next step is to test the empirical distributions of RND
(EDFOFD) and OFD (EDFRND) under the hypothesis that both samples come from
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a common distribution. If the hypothesis is accepted, then OFD is normal as RND is
known to be normal. Otherwise if the hypothesis is refuted, then the OFD is not normal.
This is determined by finding the maximum set of distances (or differences) between the
items of EDFOFD and EDFRND using Equation 3.6:
D = sup |EDFOFD − EDFRND| (3.6)
where sup is the supremum or maximum of found distances. The maximum distance
value, D, is used to determine if the hypothesis is acceptable or void by calculating a
critical value using the Equation 3.7.
D > 1.36
√
n+m
nm
(critical value) (3.7)
where n is the size of EDFOFD and m is the size EDFRND. If D is greater than the
critical value, the hypothesis is acceptable, and hence the OFD will be considered as a
normal distribution, otherwise not normal [139].
Step 4 (Step-4: Repeat the test for better accuracy). This process is repeated with
several, distinct reference normal distributions that are generated from the same pair of
values from OFD. The dominant outcome of hypothesis, which is either true or false,
is considered as a final outcome. The multiple tests improves the consistency of TSKS
tests, which consequently provisions better support values for correlation mining.
Consider an OFD shown in Equation 3.8. The total number of objects in OFD1 is 12,
minimum value is 1, maximum value is 144, average is 41.58 and sum of all elements is
499. The empirical distribution of OFD, EDFOFD1 , is presented in Equation 3.9.
OFD1 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 14, 22, 31, 59, 60, 68, 91, 144} (3.8)
EDFOFD1 = {0.08, 0.17, 0.25, 0.33, 0.42, 0.5, 0.58, 0.67, 0.75, 0.83, 0.92, 1.00} (3.9)
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Now consider the RND shown in Equation 3.10. It is generated using the minimum
(1) and maximum (144) values of OFD1. The total number of objects in RND1 is 12,
minimum value is 9.80, maximum value is 137.35, average is 71.09 and sum of all elements
is 853.09. The empirical distribution of RND, EDFRND1 , is presented in Equation 3.11.
RND1 = {9.80, 40.60, 43.03, 57.11, 60.50, 73.42, 74.15, 79.30, 82.98,
90.93, 103.92, 137.35}
(3.10)
EDFRND1 = {0.08, 0.17, 0.25, 0.33, 0.42, 0.5, 0.58, 0.67, 0.75, 0.83, 0.92, 1.00} (3.11)
After applying Equations 3.6 and 3.7 on EDFOFD1 and EDFRND1 , the value of D is
found to be 0, which is not greater than the critical value 0.54. Hence, the hypothesis
is proven false. After repeating this process for 12 times (as there are 12 elements),
the dominant output still comes out as false. This means OFD1 has failed the TSKS
test and is considered as not normal. The Equation 3.4b will used to define a range
of support values for OFD1. The minimum support value would be
41.58
499
= 0.08,
whereas the maximum support would be
144
499
= 0.29. Therefore, the ARM algorithm
will mine all those (object-based) association rules, whose support is between 0.08-0.29.
At this stage, correlations amongst event objects have been discovered and extracted,
and the next stage is to translate these relationships to determine connections among
event types. The object-based rules describe how objects contained in event entries are
related in a particular machine; however, the aim of this work is to determine generic
relationships amongst event types.
3.2.3 Event-Type Association Rules
As previously defined and repeated to increase readability, the object-based rules are
in the form of Xi → Yi, where (Xi, Yi) ⊆ O and Xi 6= Yi. The process of convert-
ing them into event-type rules requires matching objects belonging to both Xi and Yi
separately within all event entries, and extracting the event types of matched entries.
This matching process accounts for both similarities and dissimilarities by considering:
the number of matched objects (matched), the number of objects missing from a rule
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but exists in the event entry (missing) and number of objects that are in the rule
but missing from event entry (additional). The formula used to determine similarity is
(matched/(matched+missing + additional)). If a similarity of 0.70 or above is found
between the objects of Xi or Yi of a rule and event entry, it is considered a strong match
to extract feasible event types. The similarity threshold is flexible and depends on the
user, where a high value will generate higher quality rules but lower in quantity, whereas
a lower value will generate a higher number of rules that might be of a lower quality.
For example, consider an object-based rule X0 → Y0, where X0 = {a, b, c} and Y0 =
{a, b, c, d, e, g} and two event log entries E0 = {a, b, c, d, e, f} and E1 = {a, b, c, d}. All
elements of X0 are fully matched with E0, but X0 is missing 3 elements that are present
in E0. Hence the similarity amount will be
3
(3 + 3 + 0)
= 0.167. Again, all elements of
X0 are fully matched with E1 as well, but X0 is missing 1 element that is present in E1.
Hence the similarity amount will be
3
(3 + 1 + 0)
= 0.75. On the other hand, the elements
of Y0 are not a full match with E0, and the similarity amount is
5
(5 + 1 + 1)
= 0.71.
Likewise, the elements of Y0 are not a full match with E1, and the similarity amount is
4
(4 + 0 + 2)
= 0.67. Therefore, the rule X0 → Y0 will become E1 → E0 as X0 and E1
have 75% similarity, whilst, the Y0 and E0 have 71% similarity.
In this manner, the proposed solution processes LHS and RHS of all object-based rules,
which are then replaced with corresponding event types (numeric identifiers). At this
point, there is a possibility of same event type occurring in both LHS and RHS. In that
case, the event type having the highest similarity with rule objects remains, whilst the
other one is removed. If both events have equal similarity to their respective LHS and
RHS of a rule, both events will be excluded from the event-based rule to remove the
error and prevent any ambiguity as well.
The correlation rules among events are now grouped together. It is clear that rela-
tionships exist between events as evident from the object-based rules. However, the
information of temporal ordering of events, i.e. which event occurred first, second and
so on, is currently missing from the rules. This is problematic as temporal ordering is
important to identify the order by which events occurred, and thus the order of actions
performed on the monitored system. For now, due to unknown temporal ordering, an
undirected edge symbol (−) is used to represent the undefined direction in the event-
based association rules. For example, in an object-based rule, if the LHS objects match
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with 1234 and 4567 event types, while the RHS objects 5678, the resultant event-based
rule will be denoted as {1234, 4567} − {5678}.
3.3 Sequences Of Event Relationships
This section presents the process of identifying the order of events in event-based rules
by employing a temporal metric. Following on, individual rules are formulated into
sequences of events which are later validated as well.
3.3.1 Temporal-Association Relationships
Now that the event-based correlation rules have been established, it is necessary to
determine the ordering of events within each association relationship. The event logging
mechanism attaches time-stamp with every entry. The proposed algorithm utilises a
temporal metric for ordering of events, which is based on the time-stamp of entries. In
other words, the ordering of events in all rules is determined based on when the events
were generated and logged. According to a survey [140], applying temporal metric to
several algorithms has improved the quality and efficiency of results in different domains,
such as statistics, machine learning and databases. The survey mainly targeted those
algorithms that take sequential data streams and discover interesting patterns. This
research presents a new Algorithm 1, which takes the event-based rules and the event
log dataset as input and assigns a direction to each event relationship, based on the
temporal accuracy values.
The algorithm starts by iterating over event-based rules on line 3 and determines all
pairwise subset combinations between the items of LHS and RHS on line 5. For a rule
(x1, x2) − (y1, y2), the subset would be (x1 − y1), (x1 − y2), (x2 − y1) and (x2 − y2).
The total number of subsets is the product of the number of elements on LHS and
RHS, which is 2 × 2 = 4 in the example. The main reason behind this approach of
finding all subset combinations is to determine if there exists a temporal link between
each pair of correlated events. Processing each subset combination of all rules is a
computationally expensive task, especially if there are large number of event-based rules.
Several techniques do exist that can decrease the number of rules, and as a result decrease
the time and resource consumption of overall process, such as iterative rule pruning based
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Algorithm 1 Identifying and filtering temporal-association rules.
Input: Set of event-based rules R = {r1, ..., rn}, where r = (rx − ry), and rx and
ry consist of at least one EventType each
Input: Set of ordered event log entries D containing 2-tuple of EventTypes and
their corresponding objects, which were used in creating object-based associa-
tive rules
Output: Set of temporal-association rules C = {(c1, TAA1), ..., (cn, TAAn)},
where c = (cx → cy) and cx results in cy event and TAA is the temporal
accuracy of relationship
1: procedure Temporal-Association-Relationship
2: Initialise C ← ∅
3: for all ri ∈ R do
4: (rx, ry)← ri
5: for all EventTypex, EventTypey ∈ rx, ry do
6: PosEx ← GetIndicies(EventTypex, D)
7: PosEy ← GetIndicies(EventTypey, D)
8: tf ← Count(∀x ∈ PosEx < (∀y ∈ PosEy))
9: ts ← Count(∀y ∈ PosEy < (∀x ∈ PosEx))
10: Initialise TAA← 0
11: Initialise direction← 0
12: if tf > ts then
13: TAA← tf/(tf + ts)× 100
14: direction← 1 . means X → Y
15: else if tf < ts then
16: TAA← ts/(tf + ts)× 100
17: direction← −1 . means Y → X
18: end if
19: if TAA > 50 and direction is 1 then
20: C.Add((EventTypex, EventTypey), TAA)
21: end if
22: if TAA > 50 and direction is −1 then
23: C.Add((EventTypey, EventTypex), TAA)
24: end if
25: end for
26: end for
27: end procedure
on a user-defined criteria [141] and rule pruning based on a probabilistic classifier [142].
However, inspecting each subset combination reduces the risk of missing any interesting
rule that can be beneficial for the user, hence improving the quality of overall process.
In this research, we trade-off time and resource consumption with quality, therefore
generating high accuracy rules.
The next step is to determine the temporal-association accuracy (TAA) of all subset
combinations from each event-based rule. This will facilitate the conversion of correlation
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rules into temporal-association relationships. The TAA value depicts the number of
times a certain relationship was found accurate according to the given dataset, i.e.
correct event ordering based on the temporal sequencing of events. So if an event was
logged first with respect to time, it will appear first in the event ordering as well. It
is also demonstrated by Pearl [143] that the temporal ordering of entities can provide
beneficial results in inferring the practical and useful event connections. Processing
events based on their temporal sequence does introduce a degree of uncertainly as we
cannot measure reliability of the temporal sequence. For example, it could be possible
that the event logging processes operate at a low system priority and the process of
raising an event may be queued during high priority processing of other applications.
Hence to eliminate or at-least reduce this issue, we have used the event-generation rather
than event-written timestamp. Event-generation timestamp denotes the time at which
this event was triggered and submitted to the logging service, whereas, event-written is
time at which this event was received and written to the log file1.
To determine TAA value, the indices of event type from LHS (line 6), as well as RHS
(line 7) of a subset are gathered and saved in PosEx and PosEy lists, respectively.
The indices are acquired from database D and sorted in timely order. After that, by
comparing the elements of PosEx and PosEy lists, calculate the number of times each
LHS event occurred before every RHS event and save the count in tf , as shown in line 8.
Similarly, determine how many times each RHS event occurred before every LHS event
and count the value in ts (line 9). If the value of tf is found to be greater than the
value of ts on line 12, it means the LHS event (mostly) occurred before the RHS and
the direction of rule will be X → Y . Otherwise the direction will be Y → X due to else
condition on line 15. In case tf and ts are equal, the correlation rule becomes ambiguous
and the subset rule is ignored. The reason behind this two-way comparison is to find
the direction based on temporal validity and individually establish the TAA of every
subset. The TAA value is calculated as a percentage of times any correlation rule was
found correct as shown in lines 13 and 16. Every output subset rule has a minimum of
50% TAA value due to the two-way comparison. All subset rules are accumulated in
a set C for further processing along with the newly found directions (lines 20 and 23)
between event relationships.
1https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winnt/ns-winnt-eventlogrecord
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A threshold value of above 50% TAA is chosen to select temporal-association rules as
shown in lines 19 and 22. Due to these conditions, only those rules will be selected for
further processing, where LHS event occurred before RHS more than half of the times,
or vice versa. The purpose of the TAA value is to show the accuracy of respective
relationship, regardless of what it represents. From a deterministic view point, any rule
whose TAA value is less than 100% might be spurious, but 50% threshold value was
applied for three major reasons. First, higher threshold values lead to empty results
in some datasets, which may be due to the large amount of noise consisting of routine,
repetitive log entries. This produces a relatively inconsistent object-model and therefore
makes it difficult to obtain rules with 100% TAA. Second, rules with a lower TAA value
can still provide beneficial knowledge to user. Third, choosing TAA value above 50%
means that the LHS event occurred at-least once before in time than the RHS event or
vice versa in other case. Hence we selected this threshold value create a balance between
the quality and quantity of rules by tolerating somewhat ‘inaccurate’ rules, rather than
having none at all. The threshold value depends on the user and can range from 50%-
100%. This can either increase or decrease the quality results; however, 50% is sufficient
based on our empirical analysis.
For example, consider a hypothetical event log dataset containing 200 entries, and the
proposed solution outputs (1234, 4567 − 5678) event-based rule (as explained in Sec-
tion 3.2.3). The first step is to divide the rule into two subsets, i.e. (1234 − 5678) and
(4567 − 5678). Considering the rule subset (1234 − 5678), the event type from LHS
(1234) might potentially occur at E9, E36, E59, E73, E105 and the event type from RHS
(5678) at E21, E43, E57, E88, E112. The tf and ts values of (1234−5678) would be 14 and
11 respectively. As the tf value is greater than ts, the final temporal-association would
be (1234 → 5678) with 14/(14 + 11) × 100 = 56% TAA. Similarly, assume the same
process is repeated on (4567 − 5678) and the other subset comes out as 4567 → 5678
with TAA value of 70%.
3.3.2 Forming And Validating Sequences Of Events
Now that we have a set of temporal-association rules, the next step is to consider their
relationships as it is probable that the underlying security task performed by a hu-
man expert will be described by more than two events. In this section, we present
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a process to construct sequences of temporal-association relationships. The temporal-
association sequences demonstrate a complete set of events that were triggered while
conducting security-related activities. The approach starts by iterating over all subsets
{(cx0 → cy0), . . . , (cxn → cyn)} ⊆ C and creates groups of subsets that have common
RHS event type. After that, the solution combines the LHS event types of each group.
The reason behind this step is to identify and connect all similar events (taken from
the LHS of subsets) into separate groups that were performed to achieve corresponding
common goals (identical RHS of all subsets). Although at this point, each group is
an unordered set of events that represents one or more particular actions to conduct
a single security-related activity or configuration. For example, consider the following
subset rules: (cx0 → cy3), (cx1 → cy3) and (cx2 → cy3). The combined subset rules are:
(cx0 , cx1 , cx2 → cy3). This outputs a group, G, containing the combined subsets. Again,
each member g ∈ G will have one or more event types on LHS linking a single event
type on RHS.
The next step is to create an ordered set of events within every g ∈ G, so that each
group of correlated events can be formulated into a chain to depict the correct sequence
of events. The first step is to identify those two event entries, which have a maximum
time difference between them. Such two events will be used as the starting and ending
events of action(s) that were performed on the underlying system. Similarly, determine
the second to last event based on the time that had happened before the ending event.
Repeat the process until all events are covered. This process will organise the event en-
tries within g with respect to time; hence, creating the initial set of temporal-association
rules (or sequences of events). The next step is to validate the extracted rules. This
process calculates a TAA value of each pair again in the sequence. After that, it mea-
sures a average/mean of all TAA values, which is considered a collective TAA value of
the sequence. The final TAA value of each sequence will be at-least 50%. The sequences
having high TAA values that are more closer to 100% are deemed as more accurate and
fine-grained for the user.
Continuing the same example from Section 3.3.1, g = (1234, 4567 → 5678), and G
would be equal to g as there are only two subsets in total. Set G implies that all
events from LHS (1234, 4567) lead towards a single event on RHS (5678), which would
be considered as a common goal. Referring back to Figure 3.2, it can be seen that the
time difference between 1234 and 5678 is 11 seconds and 4567 and 5678 is 17 seconds.
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This means 4567 occurred 6 seconds before 1234, which is why it would be considered
a starting point. The final chain or sequence of temporally associated events would be
(4567→ 1234→ 5678). The TAA values will be calculated between the following pairs:
(4567 → 1234) and (1234 → 5678). Assuming the values were found to be 70% and
80% respectively, the collective TAA of the sequence will be (70 + 80)/2 = 75%. Hence
the chains of events are formulated using frequent pattern observation of events (ARM
algorithm) and temporal evidence yielded by Algorithm 1.
At this stage, temporally associated events have been arranged into appropriate se-
quences, which can describe the set of actions required to perform a certain assessment
or configuration task. However, according to the Simpson Paradox [144], correlation
does not necessarily imply causality. The presence of correlation between events does
not suggest that one event is the result of the occurrence of the other event. For ex-
ample, before it was known that smoking causes cancer, researchers assumed that the
symptoms like yellow teeth, hair loss and pale skin cause cancer. These symptoms are in
fact effects of smoking, which also leads towards the cancer. So first of all, if two events,
say 4567 and 1234, are not in an associative relationship, they cannot form a cause
and effect relationship. But if both events are directly associated and the correlation is
falsified when a third event 5678 is introduced, they are still not causally connected. It
means that 4567 and 1234 are dependent on 5678 and 4567 is not a direct cause of 1234.
Hence it is necessary to identify the most feasible cause, amongst a group of different
correlated events, as multiple events can lead to a single event. The discovery of cause
and effect relationships will indicate the progression of events, such that the first event
is (fully or partially) responsible for the second event. Moreover, the additional infor-
mation of whether a certain correlation is in cause and effect relationship will increase
the confidence in the accuracy of extracted knowledge. This motivates the need to find
the strength of causality in the extracted sequences of events.
3.4 Determining Causality
Causality may have different meanings for different datasets, which makes it difficult
to discover causal connections in a unified and standard form. The causal relationships
are also hard to explain as their justification depends on intuition. In the presented
work, causality defines what (one or more) activities in the underlying machine led to
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a particular activity. To put it differently, causality refers to the relationship of two
or more events, such that they inform of a finite sequence of actions, which were per-
formed one after another by an expert in order to improve the security of a vulnerable
machine. The causal relationship can be both static and dynamic. The static causality
means that ‘Event A must always occur for Event B to happen’, whilst, the dynamic
causality is ‘Event A caused Event B’ depending upon the circumstances, system envi-
ronment and runtime conditions in which the events were generated. As the extracted
temporal-association sequences (process described in Section 3.3.2) are not universal,
but subjective to the event log dataset, the causal relationships in our case are dynamic.
As discussed in Section 2.3.4, the existing algorithms are based on either Bayesian or
Constraint-based approaches. The Bayesian approach defines the cause and effect re-
lationship in terms of probability, whereas the Constraint-based approach establishes
it conclusively, i.e. either conditionally dependent or independent. Moreover, the
Constraint-based approach is considered as high in performance and efficiency for large-
scale datasets. Due to these reasons and benefits, this research uses constraint-based
approach to discover causal relationships among the correlated events. We first create
a directed acyclic graph from the given set of temporal-associative relationships as it
is a requirement for causal inference algorithms. This involves the careful elimination
of relationships, which do not satisfy the criteria. Following on, an algorithm is used
to determine the causality or causal rank of each relationship. In the output, the rules
with higher causal rank are deemed as more reliable.
3.4.1 Building Directed Acyclic Graph
A graph (G) is defined as a set of vertices (V) and edges (E), i.e. G = (V,E), where
V = {1, . . . , n} and E ⊆ V ×V . The set of edges is a subset of all ordered pairs of distinct
nodes. The set V contains n number of elements and corresponds to all unique event
types, whereas the set E represents their associations. An edge between event type i and
j is called directed if the condition (i→ j) ∈ E but (j → i) /∈ E is satisfied. A directed
acyclic graph (DAG) is a type of graph, where every edge is directed, i.e. does not have
conflicting edges and cycles. It is important to create a DAG for finding causality as the
conflicts and cycles would present inaccurate, confusing and recurring event relationships
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instead of providing useful knowledge. The remaining section explains the procedure of
creating DAG.
The first step is to iterate over all temporally associated sequences and create subset
(one-to-one event) rules of relationships. This atomisation process makes the implemen-
tation easier for further processing. The next step is to remove duplicate and conflict-
ing subset rules based on temporal-association accuracy (TAA) value. For example, if
E1 = (i → j), E2 = (i → j) and E3 = (j → i), and all three edges exist in G at
the same time, find the TAA value of each edge to prioritise them. First, the E1 and
E2 are duplicate edges. If TAAE1 ≥ TAAE2, then remove E2, otherwise E1. Second,
the E1/E2 and E3 are conflicting edges and the one with the lower TAA value will be
removed. These steps are necessary to eliminate ambiguities from the final result and is
also a condition to build DAG. It should be noticed here that the number of event types
will remain the same overall, and only the associations will be removed.
The next step is to remove cycles from the graph G. A cycle is defined as the path of
edges and vertices, wherein at least one vertex is reachable from itself and the vertices
and edges cannot repeat. The cycles are important to remove for an automated solution
as it would prevent continuous repetition/duplication of rules in the final results. The
proposed solution uses topological sorting using Kahn’s Algorithm to detect cycles [145].
The overall time complexity of Kahn’s algorithm is O(V + E). Kahn’s algorithm first
determines the number of incoming (in-degree) and outgoing (out-degree) edges for each
vertex. The process is started by traversing the neighbours of a vertex, whose in-degree is
initially zero, i.e. no incoming edge. The algorithm maintains an ordered list of vertices,
whose in-degree is or becomes zero during the process. For every traversed neighbour of
the vertex, the out-degree of the vertex and in-degree of the neighbour is reduced. The
vertices are added into the list as soon as their in-degree becomes zero. In case there is
a loop in the graph, the in-degree of any vertex on a cycle never becomes zero, and it
would not be added into the list. In current settings, we take all such (remaining) edges
and rank them on basis of TAA value. An edge with a lowest TAA is eliminated, and
the graph is checked for cycles again. This process is continued until the graph becomes
completely acyclic.
Consider the event temporal-association rules and their TAA values (in brackets) pre-
sented in the first column of Table 3.1. The event types are represented in terms of A,
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Original rules Stage-1: Re-
move Conflicts
Stage-2: Re-
move Dupli-
cates
Stage-3: Re-
move Cycles
1. A→ B (1.0) A→ B A→ B A→ B
2. C → B (0.9) C → B C → B C → B
3. D → B (0.8) D → B D → B D → B
4. B → E (1) B → E B → E B → E
5. F → E (0.7) F → E F → E F → E
6. B → A (0.5) × × ×
7. B → C (0.6) × × ×
8. B → E (1) B → E × ×
9. E → D (0.5) E → D E → D ×
Table 3.1: Example of converting temporal-association rules to a DAG by removing
conflicts, duplicates and cycles.
B, C and so on. There are nine rules in total and the table demonstrates the three-step
process of converting those rules into a DAG. In the first stage, conflicting rules are
removed based on the TAA value. The rules (A→ B) and (C → B) are in conflict with
(B → A) and (B → C) respectively, where the later two rules have lower TAA values
and hence eliminated from further processing as shown in second column. In the second
stage, the rule (B → E) occurred two times (at number 4 and 8), and one of them is
removed as shown in third column. In final stage, Kahn’s algorithm discovered a cycle
containing the rules (B → E), (E → D) and (D → B), where TAA values are 1, 0.5
and 0.8 respectively. Within these rules, the one with the lowest TAA will be removed,
i.e. (E → D). The remaining cycle-free rules are shown in the last column of Table 3.1,
which represents the conversion of temporal-association rules into a DAG. This DAG
will be now used as input to the causal inference algorithm to determine the strength of
causal relationship for each edge.
3.4.2 Inferring Causal Rank
Several models and algorithms are available to perform causality analysis in a graph.
Most of them are the variants of following two algorithms: Peter-Clark algorithm
(PC) [146] and the subsequent improved version named Fast Causal Inference (FCI) [147].
For this research, the FCI algorithm is applied as it allows hidden variables, is scalable to
high-dimensional data and has better accuracy. Moreover, the first half of FCI is same
as the PC algorithm, so the following section starts by explaining the PC algorithm
and then proceeds on to the FCI algorithm. Both PC and FCI are the commonly used
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constraint-based algorithms [148] that search for causal constraints among all vertices
and edges of a DAG, and output a unified model of causality.
3.4.2.1 PC Algorithm
The PC algorithm is a fundamental and powerful structure-learning algorithm for DAGs.
It evaluates patterns in the DAG to determine whether they are consistent with hypo-
thetical DAGs representing possible causal structures. The PC algorithm has also been
used in several real time applications, such as analysing orthopaedic implant data for
hip replacement signal detection [149] and discovering relationships among the daily
index values of the four prominent teleconnection patterns in the atmosphere [150]. An
efficient implementation of the PC algorithm for high-dimensional data is presented by
Kalisch and Buhlmann [151]. It consists of the following steps:
1. Create DAG skeleton;
2. Perform conditional independence tests;
3. Orient v-structures; and
4. Orient other remaining edges.
Step 1 (Create DAG skeleton). The skeleton of a DAG is created by converting all
directed edges into undirected ones of a graph. Consider three events X, Y and Z,
where X is connected to Y and Y is connected to Z. Regardless of the direction of
relationships in this graph, the PC algorithm considers them as the X−Y −Z skeleton.
Processing the skeleton of a DAG creates an additional layer of validation and assertion
of previously acquired relationships as the directions are nullified for this stage and it will
infer the causality without any bias. Following on, the algorithm creates an adjacency
matrix of the skeleton and performs a conditional independence (CI) test between each
adjacent pair of vertices (event types) in the skeleton. An adjacency matrix is a N ×N
matrix that is used to represent a finite graph of N vertices. The elements of the
matrix depict whether pairs of vertices are connected and represents a complete graph.
The CI test is based on the Causal Markov Condition, i.e. given parents, the event is
conditionally independent of all non-descendants or the event is conditionally dependent
on its parents (direct causes). In other words, the occurrence of event is independent of
every other event in the DAG, except its effects.
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1. X → Y ← Z
2. X → Y → Z
3. X ← Y ← Z
4. X ← Y → Z
Figure 3.4: Possible edges between a pair of variables (X and Z) given a third variable
(Y )
Step 2 (Perform conditional independence tests). The PC algorithm employs a d-separation
technique to perform CI test [152]. The ‘d’ in d-separation stands for dependence. It
claims that two variables X and Z are d-separated relative to a set of variables Y in a
directed graph, then they are conditionally independent on Y in all probability distribu-
tions such a graph can represent. In other words, the events X and Z are d-separated
if all paths that join them are inactive relative to other events, or simply, there is no
active path between them [153]. This means that the knowledge of whether X occurs
provides no information of Z occurring and vice versa. In our settings, the CI prop-
erty means that the connected events in a sub-path of graph are not related to each
other, and hence either the whole sequence of events is either incorrect or it is missing
some crucial events that are necessary to define events sequence (i.e. a complete expert
security action). Hence, the event relationships where the Causal Markov Condition
is satisfied are the least reliable in terms of causality as they are not dependent on
each other. In the original PC algorithm, the conditionally independent vertices and
respective edges are eliminated from the graph. However in the proposed solution, we
keep track of such relationships in another set and assign them a low priority. These
relationships, although having a low priority, are still temporally associated and might
bring interesting information to the user.
Step 3 (Orient v-structures). After performing the CI tests on the adjacency matrix,
the PC algorithm applies orientation rules to the skeleton of the DAG. The orientation
is a process of assigning directions to the two ends of undirected edges, forming an
equivalence class of the DAG. The first step is to consider each triplet of vertices (X,
Y and Z), such that the pairs (X, Y ) and (Y , Z) are each adjacent in the skeleton
but (X, Z) is not, based on Y being empty or not. Consider the first path presented
in Figure 3.4 in terms of X is conditionally independent of Z, i.e. X ⊥ Z. Both
events X and Z cause Y , but there is no connection between them. This is known
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as inactive path or conditionally independent, where Y is called collider in the theory
of d-separation [154]. This path will be assigned a low priority with respect to causal
strength by the proposed solution. Now consider the same path again, but assume that
the event Y is already known or observed. It means that Y has now become a condition
for X and Z (X ⊥ Z|Y ), so the conditioning set, unlike before, is not empty. The
independent causes between (X, Y ) and (Z, Y ) are made dependent by conditioning on
a common effect. Knowing X → Y can provide information about event Z, as Y ← Z is
the only other connection left and makes this path active. Hence such triplets of vertices
will be oriented into X → Y ← Z shape. This orientation is called ‘v-structure’ and
will be applied to all triplets of vertices in the DAG.
Step 4 (Orient other remaining edges). After identifying all v-structures, the PC algo-
rithm orients the remaining edges in a way that does not introduce a new v-structure
or a directed cycle. The directions are assigned based on whether a path is active or
inactive between a pair of items from adjacency matrix. This can be determined by
examining the remaining paths (2, 3 and 4) of Figure 3.4:
• Empty conditioning set – The event Y is unobserved. All of the following paths
are active, as Y is the non-collider, and allows X and Z to be connected without
any condition:
– In the second path, the event X is an indirect cause of event Z;
– In the third path, Z is an indirect cause of X; and
– In the fourth path, Y causes both X and Z;
• Non-empty conditioning set – The event Y is known. All of the following paths
are rendered inactive, as Y is the non-collider and blocking a connection between
X and Z:
– In the second path, the event X can cause Z, if and only if event Y occurs;
– In the third path, the event Z can cause X, if Y occurs; and
– In the fourth path, only event Y can trigger X and Z.
All inactive paths are assigned a low rank in terms of causality due to d-separation.
Table 3.2 provides a summary of finding active and inactive paths based on whether the
conditioning set is empty or non-empty.
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Table 3.2: Determining the active and inactive paths
Collider Non-Collider
Empty Conditioning set Inactive Active
Non-Empty Conditioning set Active Inactive
Based on the above discussion, the PC algorithm processes the skeleton of DAG and
assigns appropriate directions. As all graphs are represented by an adjacency matrix,
it allows the algorithm to be more efficient for the high edge-density graphs. However,
a drawback of PC algorithm is that it can propagate errors if a mistake is made in the
earlier stages. Furthermore, the presence of hidden variables limits the algorithm to
consider only subsets of the adjacent vertices of X and Z to decide whether they are
d-separated. It is therefore safe to assume that the initial skeleton may contain some
superfluous edges, due to lack of fully accurate CI tests, that can be eliminated (or
assigned low priority in our case). Such edges can be determined by the FCI algorithm,
which is described in Section 3.4.2.2.
3.4.2.2 FCI Algorithm
The FCI algorithm is an extension and more generalised version of the PC algorithm
that takes the output of PC algorithm and applies additional CI tests [155] to learn
the structure of graph. The PC algorithm alone might produce incomplete results due
to the presence of hidden variables in the DAG. A hidden variable, sometimes also
referred as confounding or latent, is an unrelated or rather meaningless variable that
correlates with both dependent and independent variables, i.e. it is an unobserved
hidden common cause [156]. In the current solution’s context, a true causal structure
among events cannot be inferred without exposing all hidden variables as there might be
other connections influencing the relationship. The FCI algorithm includes additional
orientation rules to discover and represent such relationships, and consequently provide
complete and sound output.
To perform the CI tests between the items of an edge (e.g. X and Z), the FCI algorithm
applies two additional functions; Possible-D-SEP(X, Z) and Possible-D-SEP(Z, X). The
Possible-D-SEP (PDS) of X and Z is defined as follows: any vertex Vi of graph G will
be in PDS, if there is a sequence of distinct adjacent vertices (path) φ between Vi and
X or Vi and Z, such that either (a) φ contains a collider; or (b) φ is not marked as
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a non-collider and X − φ − Z form a triangle. A triangle is a set of three vertices all
adjacent to one another. Hence all of those vertices that are not yet determined to be
conditionally independent are placed in PDS. The CI tests are performed for arbitrarily
many hidden variables that are found in PDS. This larger exploration leads towards
discovering relationships that were missed by the PC algorithm. Secondly, any vertex
that is not PDS does not require the CI test [157]. Hence the FCI algorithm is capable
of providing complete and sound set of causal relationships in a reasonable amount of
time.
The FCI algorithm uses a type of mixed graph, called Maximal Ancestral Graphs
(MAGs), for representing the collection of all conditionally independent relationships
between the observed variables (depicting events in our case). A mixed graph is a
vertex-edge graph that can have three possible edges: directed (→), bi-directional (↔)
and undirected (−). It can have at most one edge between any two vertices. A mixed
graph is ancestral if (a) there are no directed cycles and (b) no such vertex X, which is
an ancestor of any of its parents or any of its spouses. The MAG is a type of ancestral
graph, in which for every pair of adjacent vertices X and Z, there exists one or more
vertices Y that ‘m-separates’ them [158]. The m-separation is a graphical criterion to
encode conditionally independent relationships, and can also be defined as an equivalent
of d-separation in the DAG. It measures the graphical disconnectedness in MAGs. To
define m-separation, first consider the definition of its opposite ‘m-connecting’. A path
φ between two distinct X and Z vertices of the ancestral graph is m-connecting (or
active) relative to a (possibly empty) set of vertices Y , where (X,Z) /∈ Y , if (a) every
non-collider on φ is not a member of Y and (b) every collider on φ has a descendant
in Y . The two vertices X and Z will be m-separated given Y in G, if there is no path
m-connecting X and Z.
Another property of MAGs is the representation of marginal independence (MI) models
of DAGs. Consider the following scenario: given any DAG containing a set of both
observed and latent variables, there is a MAG of observed variables, such that X and
Z are d-separated by Y , if and only if X and Z are m-separated by Y . So, MI means
that only two events (X and Z) are considered independent while the third (Y ) is
completely ignored, i.e. the knowledge of event Y does not affect the occurring of events
X and Z. Based on MI property of MAGs, several MAGs can describe the same set
of conditionally independent relations, which were identified by (a) d-separation and
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(b) Possible-D-SEP with respect to latent variables, and graphically encoded by the m-
separation [159]. Such MAGs are considered to be Markov equivalent [160]. The multiple
MAGs generated by the FCI algorithm can have same adjacent vertices and (usually)
common edge orientations [161], which is why it is not fully testable with observational
data. This raises the need for a single, unified graph that is capable of representing
all MAGs simultaneously. The unified graph is the output of FCI algorithm and called
Partial Ancestral Graph (PAG).
A PAG describes causal features common to every MAG in the Markov equivalence
class. It has been proven [162, 163] that the output of FCI algorithm is maximally infor-
mative due to PAG being capable of holistically representing the directed, undirected,
partially directed and double-headed edges. A PAG can have three end marks for edges:
arrowhead (>), tail (−) and circle (o). It can form four kinds of directed edges: →, o−o,
o→ and ↔. The PAG has the same set of adjacencies as of MAGs and represents all
types of causal connections found by FCI algorithm. The presence of any edge shows the
conditionally dependent relationship, whereas the tail and arrowhead on an edge means
that they occurred in all MAGs. Following is interpretation of output edges [164, 165]
with respect to proposed solution’s context. Each edge is assigned a specific causal rank
between 0 and 4, where 0 is the lowest and 4 is highest causal strength:
1. X → Z: both X and Z are conditionally dependent, and X is a direct cause of
Z. This is the strongest causal relationship of all, and we have assigned this the
highest rank 4;
2. X o→Z: the algorithm is certain that Z is not the cause of X, but not sure
about the other way around as this relationship was found in all MAGs. We have
assigned this a rank 3;
3. X o−o Z: the algorithm is uncertain about whether X caused Z or Z caused
X. This uncertainty occurred because both of these relationships were found in
different MAGs. We have assigned this a rank 2;
4. X ↔ Z: the bi-direction indicates that this edge was influenced by one or more
hidden variables, and that lead to X and Z having a common cause. However
neither X causes Z nor Z causes X, they are spouses. We have assigned this a
rank 1 due to the lowest form of causality; and
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5. All other associations, where the FCI algorithm assigned either (a) undirected
edges to show lack of sufficient knowledge to form causal structures; or (b) no edge
at all to show the conditional independence between vertices, are given rank 0.
The reason being FCI could not establish any evidence of causal connection.
Our solution uses the R package called, pcalg, to obtain the PAG in the form of an
adjacency matrix, in which circle is denoted by 1, arrowhead by 2 and tail by 3 [166].
For example, to represent X → Z in terms of adjacency matrix, the algorithm will
insert 3 at Xth row and Y th column, 2 at Y th row and Xth column. Using the adjacency
matrix of PAG generated by FCI algorithm, all (directed) event correlations in the DAG
are assigned corresponding causality ranks based on the aforementioned criteria. The
implementation of FCI in proposed solution is somewhat similar to Linear Non-Gaussian
Acyclic Model (LiNGAM) algorithm [167] in assigning scores to edge directions. The
LiNGAM algorithm uses a statistical method known as independent component analysis
to develop causal structures and prune edges in the DAG. However, instead of removing
the event temporal-association relationships, the solution assigns a causal rank (priority)
to signify the strength of causal relationship. The conversion of temporal-association
into causal rules, referred as temporal-association-causal rules from this point, provides
an additional layer of confidence in terms of reliability and accuracy [168].
Continuing the example from Table 3.1, the extracted DAG is shown in Figure 3.5 (L),
whereas a resultant PAG along with an assignment of causal rank on each edge is shown
in Figure 3.5 (R). The PAG represents the temporal-association-causal rules and has 6
vertices (A, B, C, D, E and F ) and 5 edges. Notice that the vertices represent the
events and the edges are the relationships. Each (o→) edge between (D, A and C)
and B shows that B is not the cause of D, A and C, however the algorithm is not
certain if D, A and C cause B. Due to this uncertainty, the assigned causal rank is 3.
Similarly (Fo→E) shows that E is not the cause of F , but there is no evidence that
F causes E. At the point, the vertices D, A, C and F have been observed, where B
is conditionally dependent on (D, A and C) and E is conditionally dependent on F .
Given these dependence conditions, the algorithm decides that B is the cause of E, and
is assigned a causal rank of 4. In other words, if the conditionally independent events D,
A, C and F have occurred regardless of the order, then B is the cause event, whereas E
is the effect event. This categorical separation of events, which becomes known due to
the different causal ranks of temporal-association rules, helps in distinguishing between
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Figure 3.5: (L) DAG created from the temporal-association rules given in Table 3.1
and (R) a PAG created from DAG where each edge is assigned a causal rank, using the
FCI algorithm.
the (user) actions and (administrative) responses in terms of security as the actions have
no cause events, unlike responses.
3.5 Storing Rules
Now the temporal-association-causal rules have been established and will be stored in
a simple database. The schema of the database is shown in Figure 3.6. The database
contains two tables; (a) ‘Events’ to store event information and (b) ‘Rules’ to store the
rules. The ‘Events’ table contains a list event types, their descriptions and corresponding
objects. This information is used to elaborate the rules that makes it easier for the non-
experts user to understand. All event data is anonymised, such that it does not contain
any sensitive or personal information. In the ‘Rules’ table, each row represents a rule,
which consists of one cause and one effect event, and has three associated values: number
of times a rule was found in different datasets (counter), temporal-association accuracy
(TAA) and causal rank. These values are calculated as follows:
• Counter – When a new rule is inserted in the database, the counter starts at one.
After processing a new dataset, if the solution finds one or more rules that already
exist in the database, the corresponding counters of rules are increased by one.
The counter value depicts the persistence of a rule, i.e. if a certain rule occurs
multiple times, there is more chance of it to be true;
• Temporal-association accuracy (TAA) – This numeric value (50−100) is calculated
by Algorithm 1; and
• Causal Rank – This numeric value (0 − 4) is calculated by FCI algorithm as de-
scribed in Section 3.4.2.
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Figure 3.6: Database schema to store temporal-association-causal rules along with
the anonymised event type information
The rules acquired from all event log datasets are stored in a same table. The database
acts as a central repository of rules, and further allows the exploration of a larger
knowledge-base from multiple sources for a given problem. When new set of TAC
rules are extracted from an unseen dataset, the new and existing rules collectively go
through the process of inferring causal ranks again. Although this is a resource intensive
task, it is necessary to always keep updated rules and values, which are also free from
cycles, redundancies and conflicting rules. In case a mismatch is found between new and
existing rule, the rule with higher set of values will be stored in the database and the
rest will either be updated or removed.
3.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, a novel mechanism of acquiring knowledge from event log entries of
an operating system has been described. The knowledge is extracted in the form of
temporal-association-causal (TAC) rules, which are essentially a sequence or pattern
of connected events. Each sequence depicts specific action(s) performed for security
configuration or to remediate a security issue. All TAC rules are stored in the database
along with the relevant information for application.
The process starts by removing the routine entries from given event log dataset, and
then creates an object-based model of the remaining entries. The object-based model is
used as an input for the association rule mining (ARM) algorithm to learn correlation
rules among events. The support for the ARM algorithm is calculated automatically
using the same object-based model. The correlation rules are then transformed into
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sequences of temporally-associated rules using the timestamps of events. At the end,
causal inference algorithm is applied to the temporal-association rules that assigns a rank
to each relationship in terms of causal strength. In a nutshell, the event relationships
are defined by associations, ordered by time and consolidated by causation.
Most of the existing solutions for discovering event relationships use manual approach,
where human experts are involved at certain stage in producing the correlation rules.
Such techniques are not feasible for the complex and large-scale datasets as it would
require massive amounts of time and effort in processing and continuously updating the
rules. The proposed solution is fully automated and can process any number of event log
entries. Furthermore, the proposed solution applies dynamic causal inference for finding
cause and effect between events to produce more reliable results.
Chapter 4
Automated Planning
Utilising the extracted knowledge in the form of temporal-association-causal (TAC) rules
on a previously unseen machine is not feasible as algorithmic support is required. The
TAC rules present a collective set of expert security actions that can be applied to any
machine. However, it is unknown which actions will serve the purpose, i.e. only a
subset of actions might be required and useful for a particular security issue or missing
configuration. Another important aspect to consider is the order of acquired actions,
which might not be in the same order that would be applied on an unseen machine.
Therefore, a precise, intelligent and clear decision-making process is needed regarding
which actions to select for any given machine. The problem of selecting appropriate
actions for different settings is a deliberation problem, which is traditionally performed
manually by human experts. However, the manual technique demands knowledge, can
be error-prone and requires a significant amount of time, effort and resources. So we
overcome this challenge by employing automated deliberation techniques in the form
of Automated Planning (AP). This is particularly an attractive solution for security
assessment and configuration as previous applications in the similar areas have shown
that it can potentially provide a method of eliminating representation and planning
complexities along with finding the most efficient solution and reduce manual effort.
Hence, this chapter describes the final stage of the research, which is to model the TAC
rules into discrete actions with a precondition and effect, and utilise AP techniques to
increase the usability of the proposed solution.
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4.1 Classical Planning
The origin of AP can be traced back to a General Problem Solver (GPS) developed in
1963 [169]. The GPS takes a problem and divides it into sub-goals before reaching the
final goal. It uses means-ends analysis to identify and reduce the differences between the
current state and the goal state. Later on, another approach for planning was introduced,
called as situation calculus [170]. This approach provides a theoretical framework to
represent actions with clear semantics by ‘reify’ situations. The meaning of reify is
to treat something abstract as an object. This introduced the concept of functions,
planning strategy, actions and logic along with the predicates containing variables and
constants to describe a situation or state of the world. Classical planning is the name
that is given to such earlier methods of planning.
In Artificial Intelligence (AI), problem solving is defined as an organised search through
a range of predefined actions to achieve particular goal from a present condition. It also
involves synthesising domain models and domain-specific constraints. The AP is a type
of general problem solving and has been a widely researched discipline of AI for nearly
six decades. The problem solving is performed by planning algorithms, also referred
as planners, which generally take (1) domain model that describes the knowledge in
the form of permitted actions and (2) a stand-alone problem instance that needs to be
solved as input and generate plan of actions to solve the given problem [1]. The planners
mainly deal with the order in which the activities should be performed, i.e. ‘what has
to be done’. Formally, the planners are responsible for the deliberation process, which
consists of reasoning with a knowledge-base of actions against a given problem and
explicitly arranges the output in a particular sequence to yield a sensible plan solution.
A complete plan solution starts from an initial state of the world and depicts all legal
actions to achieve desired goal state of the world. Notice that having sufficient and
correct knowledge, which is TAC rules in our case, is integral to the efficiency of planner
to produce useful plans and enable the autonomic properties.
4.1.1 Conceptual Model Of Classical Planning
To explain the fundamental idea of autonomous planning, a full conceptual model is
shown in Figure 4.1. It consists of the following three components:
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Figure 4.1: Concept of AI planning (inspired from [1])
• Planner – produces a plan (ordered set of actions) for a specified problem instance
using the knowledge encoded in a domain action model;
• Observer – examines the current state of the system and chooses an action from
the plan based on a state-transition function; and
• State transitions – a system that progressively performs the state transitions ac-
cording to the actions received from the observer.
4.1.2 Formalisation
The formalisation is based on the state transitions system, which is the dynamic mod-
elling of transitions from initial to goal states. A dynamic model describes that how one
state transforms into another state. The state transitions system employed by the AP
algorithms is a 3-tuple
∑
= (S,A, γ), where:
1. S = (s1, s2, . . . ) is a finite set of states;
2. A = (a1, a2, . . . ) is a finite set of actions; and
3. γ : S ×A→ 2s is a state-transition function.
A state is the factored representation of a ‘state of the world’ containing the combined
domain knowledge, which is gathered through agents in manual, automated or both
ways. Actions are transitions that are determined by the planer. If a ∈ A is an action
and γ(s, a) 6= ∅, the action a is valid for state s.
A solution P is a sequence of actions (a1, a2, . . . , ak) respective to a sequence of state
transitions (s1, s2, . . . , sk), such that s1 = γ(s0, a1), . . . , sk = γ(sk−1, ak), and sk is the
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desired goal state. The model’s configuration is represented by a set of first-order pred-
icates that uses quantified variables over non-logical objects. The predicates are subse-
quently modified through the execution of each action, a = {pre+, pre−, eff+, eff−},
where pre+ and pre− are the first-order preconditions that are positive and negative in
the action’s precondition list, respectively. Similarly, eff+ and eff− shows the action’s
positive and negative effects.
4.1.3 General Assumptions
Following list provides the common assumptions that are made while modelling the
knowledge. Such assumptions limits the complexity through abstracting the problem,
as well as defines the boundaries of the modelling process:
1. The system
∑
is fully observable. The domain model contains complete knowledge
regarding security assessments and configuration;
2. The system
∑
is deterministic, which means applying an action to a state always
outputs a single successor state [171]. The domain model and problem instances
are already known and there is no uncertainty involved, i.e. the output plan is
predictable and will be found if it exists;
3. The system
∑
contains finite number of actions, where each action represents a
relationship between two events;
4. The system
∑
is static. It is fully controlled by the planner;
5. The goals are restricted and explicitly specified. The objective is to identify any
sequence of state transitions that reaches the goal state(s);
6. A solution plan contains a linearly ordered finite sequence of actions;
7. A domain-independent planning approach is used, which enables general use of
constraints and resources to represent actions. This also eliminates future mainte-
nance challenges and allows the reusability of domains models across related areas,
including the development of new planning techniques;
8. The actions have no duration and there is no explicit notion of time; and
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9. Any change in
∑
during planning will not effect the planning process, i.e. oﬄine
planning.
4.2 Process Of Knowledge Representation And Modelling
Knowledge Representation (KR) is a method of describing expert knowledge and is
usually considered as a main issue of AP. The KR encodes the knowledge using symbols
that can be processed and manipulated by a software tool to take intelligent decisions.
It should include consistent and precise description of notions, facts, constraints and
actions of the world. A major aspect of AP process involves converting expert knowledge
into a formal domain model, such that it is valid, aligned with machine representation
formalism to solve complex problems and can be utilised by a large variety of application
domains. Another notable aspect is selecting a feasible representation language that can
comprehend the complexity of planning problems at hand.
To define a well-modelled scenario, consider the two constants D and K, where D is a
domain model and K is the real-world knowledge that D is representing [172]. The D
consists of symbols that describe and map the attributes and operations of K. A simple
example of K can be an administrative action, where a user creates a new password
that includes both lowercase and uppercase letters. To represent this as D, we can use
a symbol called, ‘Password’, along with corresponding arguments ‘User-1’, ‘Lowercase’
and ‘Uppercase’. The statements (or actions) of D correspond to a true value in the
real-world. So, if true in real-world, the D has ‘password of User-1 contains lowercase
and uppercase letters’ action to reflect the situation. Thus, by using a mapping function,
D represents a logical structure and an abstraction of K.
Modelling real-world scenarios can be a complex process, and correctness is of the essence
to obtain a quality plan solution. Hence it is necessary to validate domain models against
the knowledge. It is a challenging task as comparing domain model with real-world
scenario is not possible, and the consistency/equivalency cannot be proved formally.
However, several research studies [173, 174] have identified the following factors, which
should be considered while creating a domain model:
1. Accuracy – It is an informal process that matches the features represented in
domain model D with the real domain experts [175]. It checks the accuracy of
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assertions in every state through comparison. It also involves checking consistency
within D that can identify errors;
2. Adequacy – The domain D would be considered as adequate, if it is neither missing
nor has any additional details with respect to real-world knowledge K;
3. Completeness – The domain D is considered as complete if it satisfies both accu-
racy and adequacy conditions. In addition, all real-world requirements should be
present in D, such that every acceptable action plan to a related problem should
be derivable from D; and
4. Operationality – There can be several domain models (D1, D2, · · · ) of any given
knowledge that output quality plan solutions. However, some of the models would
be more efficient in terms of computational resources in finding an acceptable plan.
Such models would be considered more operational.
4.2.1 Modelling Process
Although there is no standard process to convert the knowledge into a formal domain
model, but there are some general recommendations that can be used to perform sys-
tematic domain modelling process [176]. The first step is to conduct an early analysis
to identify the sources and environmental characteristics of the knowledge. This can be
done through the survey of similar applications and technical literature in that partic-
ular knowledge category. The survey will also help in collecting domain requirements.
The next step is to choose a modelling language to represent the actions and their rela-
tionships along with the identification of state variables, types, constraints and precon-
ditions/effects. After that, acquire the knowledge from available sources through either
manual or automated mechanisms. Following on, encode the domain model (manually
or automatically) to represent the knowledge using declarative descriptions. After de-
signing the domain, it is important to perform the verification and validation checks
to determine the model’s accuracy and completeness. Further steps include continuous
maintenance and improvement of the domain model according to the new additions in
the knowledge.
In this research, the knowledge acquisition and domain modelling process is performed
in an automated manner. The knowledge is present in the form of TAC rules among
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other relevant information as described in previous chapter 2 and stored in the database.
The knowledge modelling is performed by a software tool that takes the TAC rules and
output a complete domain action model that can be utilised by supporting planners.
4.3 Representation And Utilisation Of Extracted Rules
A variety of knowledge representation languages has long been available to encode do-
main action models as described in previous Section 2.4.2.1. The choice of language
partially depends on the requirements of the planning application itself along with some
other factors, for example, is language commonly used, how many planner tools support
the language, level of support for operational aspects of the domain model, availability
of sufficient documentation etc. The language should be expressive, customisable and
structured, so that it can capture and represent complex scenarios of the real-world. It
should also contain a strong set of operator definitions that enables inference capability.
Apart from these attributes, the language should have a clear syntax and semantics.
The PDDL version 2.1 has been chosen in this research to represent event relationships
using the acquired temporal-association-causal (TAC) rules. It is a classical represen-
tation that allowed the use of typed state variables, numeric fluents and plan-metrics
in our research. It also improves the efficiency of a planning system in terms of mem-
ory usage by decreasing the number of instances it needs to create [177]. The PDDL
serves as a bridge between the knowledge acquisition phase and planning algorithm. It
uses simple and intuitive constructs that are sufficient to express the problem. Since
TAC rules have strict parameter, type and sequence requirements, failing to accurately
fulfil those requirements in the domain model would result in plans that would not be
beneficial for the users. This forces our PDDL representation of the TAC rules to be
quite verbose. On top of that, we take advantage of the optimisation metric of planning
algorithms that increases the quality and quantity of selected actions in an output plan.
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4.3.1 System Definition
Choosing PDDL allows a categorical separation of elements belonging to domain and
problem representations. This common format of representation has been widely ex-
tended and provides better knowledge distribution and more direct comparison of sys-
tems and approaches. The PDDL-based encoding of extracted rules also made it possible
to choose an efficient AP algorithm out of many, therefore producing a quality plan of
actions. The following sections provide the detailed explanation of encoding TAC rules
that are stored in the database into a domain action model and the event log entries of a
vulnerable machine into a problem instance. Specific to our research, a PDDL planning
problem can be formally defined as a 5-tuple P = (s, f, a, i, g), where:
1. s is the set of all possible predicates along with their parameters. Each predicate
represents a unique event type and its relevant property/object names;
2. f is the set of all possible numeric fluents. A single fluent is used in our domain
model to accumulate action costs;
3. a is the set of all possible actions that can be applied to a given problem. Each
action represents a cause and effect relationship between two event types;
4. i is the set of predicates representing the initial state of a vulnerable machine.
Each predicate is initialised with the respective event type property/object values;
5. g is the description of goal that should be achieved; and
6. P is the output plan that contains sequence of actions discovered from initial to goal
state. Ideally, the plan should identify security issues and missing configurations
of the vulnerable machine, and then propose solutions as well.
4.3.2 Domain Modelling
Consider an example of TAC rule presented in Table 4.1. This information is used to
produce a domain action. It shows a cause and effect relationship between two events
4720 and 4673. The event type 4720 means that a new user account was created, whereas
4732 informs that the account was created by using administrative permissions. The
object names and other information given in the rule are imperative for the planning
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Rule property Value
Cause
event
Type: 4720
Object names: DisplayName, HomeDirectory, HomePath, Pass-
wordLastSet, ProfilePath, SamAccountName, ScriptPath, Sub-
jectDomainName, SubjectLogonId, SubjectUserName, Subjec-
tUserSid, TargetDomainName, TargetSid, TargetUserName,
UserWorkstations
Effect
event
Type: 4673
Object names: ObjectServer, PrivilegeList, ProcessId, Process-
Name, SubjectDomainName, SubjectLogonId, SubjectUserName,
SubjectUserSid
Counter 3
Temporal-
association
accuracy
95
Causal rank 3
Table 4.1: An example of TAC rule for generating a PDDL domain action
algorithm to generate a quality plan of actions, which will consequently provide the
non-experts with an actionable knowledge. The remaining section will use the example
TAC rule to demonstrate the domain modelling process.
In this research, we encode the TAC rules and output a PDDL domain model file.
A domain model consists of types of objects, predicates modelling facts, functions to
handle numerical operations and actions. The objects and predicates are used to model
the underlying system and an action represents an evaluation or configuration step to
increase the security. A precondition depicts at what point the action is selectable
with respect to a problem, and an effect models a change to the objects, predicates
and functions, and is a step towards achieving desired goal. The cause becomes the
precondition, whilst, the effect event of a rule becomes the effect part of an action. This
is due to the reason that cause lead to the effect event and they are also ordered through
temporal metric.
4.3.2.1 Domain Name, Requirements And Types
The domain name is formatted as {EventRelations–<Number>}, e.g. EventRelations–
1. The domain model uses ‘typing’ and ‘fluents’ requirements. All unique object names
of cause and effect events in a TAC rule are encoded as variable names and types.
While the objects describe the entities involved in the occurrence of an event, defining
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variables with types will also inform the particular entities required to perform the do-
main action. All variables that are used in the domain model have types, hence the
need for typing requirement. Using the example, a typed variable would be ‘?Display-
Name - DisplayName’. Furthermore, every TAC rule has three numeric values: counter,
temporal-association accuracy and causal rank. The representation of these numeric
constraints in the PDDL domain model needs fluent requirement.
4.3.2.2 Predicates
The predicates represent the set of unique events found in the TAC rules. A pred-
icate is a combination of event type and its corresponding parameter list. It is for-
matted as ‘(e <EventType> TYPED-PARAMETER-LIST)’. Using the example TAC
rule, ‘(e 4720 ?DisplayName - DisplayName ?HomeDirectory - HomeDirectory · · · ?User-
Workstations - UserWorkstations)’ is a predicate to model event type 4720. Notice that
the variables and types have same names, except the variables starts with question mark
symbol (‘?’).
4.3.2.3 Functions
A function or numeric fluent is way of storing numeric values in the domains actions,
initial state and goal state, and the values are accessible during the execution of planning
algorithm. A function named accumulative-weight is used in the domain model to
hold the amount of confidence or importance of every modelled rule. This function is
increased upon the selection of underlying action by a value that is the sum of counter,
temporal-association accuracy and causal rank values of the rule. Using the example,
the TAC rule (4720→ 4673) has a sum of 3 + 95 + 3 = 101.
4.3.2.4 Actions
The actions are responsible for changing the current state of the world. In our research,
the cause and effect relationship between events in the TAC rules is represented as a
action, and there are same number of domain actions as there are number of rules in the
database. An action has four components: name, parameters, precondition and effect.
The name of an action is formatted as {e <Cause event>-to-e <Effect event>}, e.g.
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e 4720-to-e 4673. The combined list of unique object names from both cause and effect
of a TAC rule constitutes as a parameter list. Each domain action encodes all objects
(in the form of one or more parameters) that are required to make any configuration
change in the underlying system.
The precondition and effect are always written as and/or conjunctions. The precondi-
tion is composed of a single predicate that models the cause event, whereas the effect part
represents the effect event of a TAC rule, as well as the accumulative-weight function
that assigns a cost/confidence value to the action. A negative predicate is also placed in
the effect that prevents the consecutive selection of the same actions, involving the same
objects. It is false (void or inapplicable) before the action selection and means that the
given arguments have not been processed yet, and consequently marked true to depict
that the same arguments cannot be executed again. Note that the negative predicate
would not limit the repetition of actions in a plan. It would just prevent successive re-
dundancy that can occur due to absence of goal state and use of maximisation metric in
a problem instance (explained in Section 4.3.3.3). So the planning algorithm would not
allow the duplication of the same set of actions to forge a maximum accumulative-weight
value, and only generate a precise plan of actions.
4.3.2.5 Domain Model Example
Continuing the example, a complete domain action model of the TAC rule is provided
in Figure 4.2. The event types 4720 and 4673 have some objects in common, e.g.
‘SubjectDomainName’ and ‘SubjectUserName’. Such duplicate objects will be removed
for the parameter list.
4.3.3 Problem Instances
Problem instances are automatically constructed using a given domain action model and
the event log entries of a vulnerable machine. A problem instance contains the following
components: objects, initial state, goal state and an optimisation metric. The reason
behind using the domain model is to ensures that the object types and initial state of a
problem instance are restricted to the types and predicates of the domain model, thus
avoiding any execution errors during the planning.
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(define (domain EventRelations--1)
(:requirements :typing :fluents)
(:types DisplayName HomeDirectory HomePath ObjectServer PasswordLastSet
· · · TargetDomainName TargetSid TargetUserName UserWorkstations)
(:predicates
(e 4720 ?DisplayName - DisplayName
· · · ?UserWorkstations - UserWorkstations)
(e 4673 ?ObjectServer - ObjectServer
· · · ?SubjectUserSid - SubjectUserSid)
)
(:functions
(accumulative-weight)
)
(:action e 4720-to-e 4673
:parameters (?DisplayName - DisplayName · · ·
· · · ?UserWorkstations - UserWorkstations)
:precondition (and (e 4720 ?DisplayName - DisplayName · · ·
· · · ?UserWorkstations - UserWorkstations))
:effect (and (increase (accumulative-weight) 101)
(not (e 4720 ?DisplayName - DisplayName · · ·
· · · ?UserWorkstations - UserWorkstations))
(e 4673 ?ObjectServer - ObjectServer · · ·
· · · ?SubjectUserSid - SubjectUserSid))
)
)
Figure 4.2: An example of PDDL action, which is created from the temporal-
association-causal relationship of two events. It also shows the relevant objects/pa-
rameters and an accumulative-weight value.
4.3.3.1 Problem Name And Objects
The problem instance is formatted as {Problem–<Domain name>}, e.g. Problem-
EventRelations–1. Using object or property name-value pairs of the event entries, values
will be used as objects, whereas the respective names will be assigned as types. Defining
types improves the quality of domain model as it categorises the objects of problem in-
stance. The planning algorithm uses these objects as constant arguments to the domain
actions. This is quite beneficial for the non-experts as these objects will be involved in
carrying out the security-related actions.
4.3.3.2 Initial State
The initial state models the current state of a vulnerable machine by using its security
event logs. It is a set of predicates, whose variable parameters are initialised/replaced
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with the corresponding objects or constants. Such predicates are known as grounded
predicates. Each predicate represents a unique event type of a vulnerable machine. Only
those predicates are included in the initial state, which also occur in the domain action
model. In other words, all predicates of the initial state are also found in the domain
model. The order of predicates (or events) is not important as they are considered as a
collection in the initial state.
4.3.3.3 Goal State And Optimisation Metric
Defining a goal state in this particular case is a challenging task. First of all, we cannot
determine or even predict beforehand what actions need to be scheduled. Secondly, there
is no way of finding the set of one or all missing configurations in the target machine.
Several scenarios can be speculated at this stage. Let us consider a scenario where a
new predicate, say Goal-reached, is introduced. This predicate becomes part of every
action’s effect in the domain model as well as a goal state. Doing so will not work
because as soon as the planner finds a single action with respect to the initial state, it
would have reached goal and the planning process will be terminated. Again, consider
a similar scenario where each domain action is assigned its own unique predicate, for
example Goal-reached-1, Goal-reached-2, · · · , Goal-reached-N. All these predicates
form a goal state. This is not an acceptable solution as the planner would never reach
the goal unless every single action is found to be included in the plan solution.
Considering the aforementioned discussion, the goal state is kept empty. Also, a max-
imisation plan metric is applied in the problem instance to obtain the complete set of
actions or those with the highest accumulative-weight value in the specified planning
time. As the PDDL does not allow more than one metrics in a single problem instance,
we have used the sum of counter, temporal-association accuracy and causal rank as
an accumulative-weight. A combination of empty goal state and maximisation metric
enables the planning algorithm to explore all possibilities with respect to initial state
and find a quality solution. The planning algorithm will seek for the maximum total
accumulative-weight value of a plan, which is the sum of accumulative-weight of each
chosen action. In other words, the planning algorithm will choose the maximum number
of actions that have relatively higher accumulative values, hence finding an accurate and
complete plan solution for a given problem.
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(define (problem Problem-EventRelations--1)
(:domain EventRelations--1)
(:objects
Test1 - DisplayName
NULL - HomeDirectory
NULL - HomePath
DS - ObjectServer
O 1794 - PasswordLastSet
SeTcbPrivilege - PrivilegeList
0x238 - ProcessId
C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe - ProcessName
NULL - ProfilePath
test1@local - SamAccountName
NULL - ScriptPath
WORKGROUP - SubjectDomainName
O 0x3e7 O 0x105f5 - SubjectLogonId
IE8SAAD$ IEUser1 - SubjectUserName
S 1 5 18 S 1 5 19 - SubjectUserSid
IE8Win7 - TargetDomainName
S 1 5 32 - TargetSid
Administrators - TargetUserName
NULL - UserWorkstations
)
(:init
(= (accumulative-weight) 0)
(e 4720 Test1, NULL, NULL, O 1794, NULL, test1@local, NULL,
WORKGROUP, O 0x105f5, IE8SAAD$, S 1 5 18, IE8Win7, S 1 5 32,
Administrators, NULL)
...
(:goal (and ) )
(:metric maximize (accumulative-weight))
)
Figure 4.3: An example of problem instance generated automatically from a machine
that has poor security configurations
4.3.3.4 Problem Instance Example
A problem instance from a live system is presented in Figure 4.3. It was extracted from
a machine having poor security configurations. Every object is assigned to a type, for
example, Test1 - DisplayName represents an object Test1, which is of DisplayName
type. Same goes for the WORKGROUP - SubjectDomainName, where domain name of
underlying subject is WORKGOUP. The initial state is comprised of the grounded predicates,
and the goal is not explicitly specified. The accumulative-weight value is initialised with
zero and will be incremented (to maximum extent) according to the execution of domain
actions.
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4.3.4 Automated Plan Generation
The plans (sequence of actions) are produced by a planning algorithm or planner,
which is capable of processing PDDL-based domain action model and problem instance
files [178]. The purpose of a plan is to show the progression of actions to achieve the
goal within specified constraints. In our context, a plan presents the series of steps for a
particular machine that shows the security assessment process and proposes a solution.
The planning algorithms can be categorised into two main types [179]: (1) guarantee
to discover the optimal solution, provided they are given enough time and resources,
and (2) generate the best possible plans within a predefined time with no assurance of
optimality. The domain model used in this research involves large number of actions
alongside numeric computations, and the problem instance might contain large number
of objects as well. Furthermore, there is a limited amount of time and computing re-
sources available for the planner. Hence, we have chosen a planning algorithm from the
second category.
The remaining section reviews the problem solving techniques to obtain a quality plan
of actions and also provides the concepts related to the general working of existing
planning algorithms. After that, it explains the process of generating plan solutions
with an example.
4.3.4.1 Planners
The first problem-solving planner, called Nets of Actions Hierarchies (NOAH), was de-
veloped in 1975 [180] that presented a practical implementation of conjunctive goals
and treated them as independent and additive. After that, a system known as Graph-
plan [181] was developed in 1997 that converted STRIPS-style specification into a plan-
ning graph, and then applied a graph analysis technique (satisfiability planning) to
produce partial-order plan solution. These solutions represent a sub-graph of the plan-
ning graph, contains all the facts from the initial and goal states, and might have several
parallel predicates occurring at the same time step. The main focus of Graphplan was
to increase the planning productivity and efficiency by generating the shortest possible
plan. Another similar system was developed in 1997 that integrated a stochastic/random
search algorithm into the satisfiability planning and improved the scalability issues [182].
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One of the most successful planner was introduced in 2001, called Fast-Forward (FF) [183].
It proposed a new forward-chaining approach that unified a variant of hill-climbing ap-
proach with the Graphplan. The hill-climbing is used to perform a local and systematic
search, whereas the Graphplan acts as a heuristic estimator function that reduces the
search space. The FF planner also includes goal prioritisation mechanism that helps in
saving time on achieving goals that should to be considered in later stages. The repre-
sentation of numeric constraints is essential for modelling real-world problems. For this
purpose, the FF was extended to Metric-FF [184] planner in 2003 that allowed the use of
numeric constraints to enable arithmetic operations and the user-specified optimisation
metric, i.e. minimisation and maximisation of action costs for improving plan solution
quality.
Another planner, called Local search for Planning Graphs (LPG) [185], was introduced
in 2003 that combined stochastic and local search algorithms to support the features
of PDDL 2.1. The LPG is a domain-independent planner that employs an informed
search technique (described in previous Section 2.4.2.2). It is a winner of both third
and fourth IPCs. It is a complete planner but does not guarantee an optimal output.
It is also the first incremental planner that generates more than one valid plans, each
of which has improved the plan’s quality over the previous one. The plan quality is
flexible and defined through multiple criterion, such as number of plans to generate,
time restrictions and computing resource allocation. The LPG planner is also capable
of utilising best-first search to determine the search and execution costs of achieving a
precondition. These costs are calculated by using heuristic estimator functions [186].
Another important feature of the LPG is a better performance on large-scale planning
problems [187], which is achieved by creating a balance between finding quick and best
solutions.
Exploring a complete list of planners is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, the
above discussion shows that various planners are available to satisfy our requirements, i.e.
heuristics-based search planning, scalable to manage large datasets, and process PDDL-
based numeric fluents and optimisation metrics. For this research, we have adopted
the LGP planner to extract the ordered set of actions from our domain model and
problem instances that can improve the security of vulnerable machines. The order of
plan actions is important to perform the configuration tasks. The main reason of using
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[0]: (E 4720-TO-E 4673 Test1, NULL, NULL, DS, O 1794, SeTcbPrivilege,
0x238, C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe, NULL, test1@local, NULL,
WORKGROUP, O 0x3e7 O 0x105f5, IE8SAAD$ IEUser1, S 1 5 18 S 1 5 19,
IE8Win7, S 1 5 32, Administrators, NULL)
Figure 4.4: A simple plan generated by by the LPG planner
LPG is to exploit its incremental planning capability for identifying plans of increasing
quality within a user-specified time.
It should be noticed here that we can void the stochastic nature of the LPG planner by
adding a new predicate, say Check-all-Objects, to the precondition of every domain
action, and initialised in the problem instance. As this predicate will be true from the
beginning of planning, it will enable the planner to consider all objects and actions
before reaching a decision, regardless of the initial state. However, for a large-scale
domain model, this will require a significant amount of time and computing resources
that might not be always available. As this research is aimed at building an efficient
solution, we did not apply this technique.
4.3.4.2 Example
Using the simple domain action presented in Figure 4.2 and the problem instance pro-
vided in Figure 4.3, the LPG algorithm will generate a plan solution as shown in Fig-
ure 4.4. Although the plan is quite simple, it describes the plan generation process.
The objects correspond to the parameter list of the domain action and describe the
information that is required to perform the proposed operation. The plans shows that a
user account IE8SAAD$ was created in a network by another account Administrators.
The Administrators account performed the process with ‘SeTcbPrivilege’ permission,
which means it had system-wide authorisation to access any resource.
There is a possibility of multiple actions having same a precondition but different effects.
In that case, the action with highest accumulative-weight value will be included in the
plan and the rest of them will be discarded. Still, if the accumulative-weight is identical
as well in such actions, the LPG planner will employ the heuristic function to choose the
action that, in later stages of planning, will maximise the overall accumulative-weight
value.
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It should also be noticed here that the plan solution includes only those actions from the
domain model, which were selected by the planner based on matching the initial state
of the problem instance. The matched initial state of a plan describes the security con-
cerns or some missing configurations, while the remaining part manifests the mitigation
actions. As the routine/meaningless events are filtered in early stages of creating TAC
rules and assuming the domain model comprises of relevant and sufficient knowledge,
the actions in a plan can perform one of the following tasks: (1) recognise pattern of
a security issue and (2) identify a security issue and propose a method to resolve it as
well. It is also possible that the plan delivers partial information; however, it would still
provide useful insight to some extent for the non-experts. Furthermore, the objects of
each action in a plan play an important role in conveying the desired level of information
as they belong to the vulnerable machine.
4.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter describes the representation and utilisation of knowledge acquired as the
TAC rules. This chapter begins by describing the conceptual model of classical planning
along with general assumptions. After that, it explains the process of knowledge rep-
resentation and domain modelling. The chapter also presents an overview of common
domain representation languages.
The representation of TAC rules is performed in two fully automated steps: (1) encoding
the rules into a PDDL domain action model and (2) converting event log entries of a
given vulnerable machine into a PDDL problem instance. After that, the domain model
and problem instance are used as input for the LPG planner to search a plan solution in
reasonable time. The plan is complete and sub-optimal, and it proposes the sequences
of actions that can provide security assessment and configuration steps relevant to the
vulnerable machine.
As mentioned before, the AP techniques have been successfully used to conduct pene-
tration testing on systems and networks. The application of AP is also integral in our
research as it provides several benefits, which are provided in the following list:
1. AP algorithms provide a fully automated and systematised deliberation mecha-
nisms to replicate the human expert actions;
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2. The parameters and accumulative-weight values of domain actions enabled the
modelling of additional information specified in the TAC rule;
3. Objects in the actions of a plan belong to the underlying machine, hence providing
usable and relevant results for non-experts;
4. Ability to generate an optimal plan based on a metric, ensuring that actions with
the maximum accumulative-weight values are chosen to output the best results
against a given situation; and
5. The knowledge is presented in a standardised format and can be utilised by any
PDDL supporting planner, and thus distributing a benchmark domain model for
the AP community.
Chapter 5
Implementation and Evaluation
This chapter provides the details of proof-of-concept implementation along with the
evaluation process of the solution proposed in this research. The implementation in-
cludes the explanation of complete software development process, which is supported by
figures and and other visual aids for evidence and better understanding of the reader.
The software application is based on the theoretical foundation of the proposed solu-
tion, which is provided in the previous chapters. After building the application, it is
evaluated against the security expert knowledge to determine the quality, accuracy and
validity of the underlying concepts. This is based on the empirical analysis of evaluation
data and further includes performance and scalability comparison with manual security
assessment and configuration procedures. This chapter also discusses the limitations
and bottlenecks of the developed application in terms of live operation, environment
and usage.
5.1 Implementation
This section presents the specific details of software requirements, design and imple-
mentation of the proposed solution. Various aspects were considered during the design
and development stages of the solution, such as ease of usability for all users having
different technical knowledge, robust and suitable programming languages, clear and
precise format of input/output, error and exception handling, and higher flexibility. It
is important to use a structured approach to build the proposed solution as any logical
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error/bug in the application will lead to the incorrect output, and negatively impact the
quantity and quality of final results.
5.1.1 Software Requirements
The proposed solution is implemented with the help of two separate, prototype software
applications. The requirements of both software applications are described in Chapter 3
and Chapter 4. To get a better understanding of the overall scheme, Figure 5.1 shows all
components of both applications: knowledge acquisition (1A) and representation (1B),
and knowledge utilisation (2). This figure summarises the steps taken from processing
the event log entries to producing a security action plan. Both applications should be
fully automated and fulfil all functional requirements. The synopsis of each application
is described in the following:
1. An application to perform the knowledge acquisition and representation process,
which consists of the following two modules:
(a) For the first module, read the event log entries of a machine that was config-
ured by security experts, remove the routine events and acquire the expert
security knowledge by learning user-activity patterns in the form of TAC
rules;
(b) Convert the TAC rules into a PDDL domain action model file, such that it
represents the acquired knowledge from a particular event log dataset. The
users should be able to enable or disable this feature;
(c) Store every TAC rule in a MySQL database. Each rule should have the
following information: properties of every event in the form of object-value
pairs, number of times this specific rule was found in different datasets, a
temporal accuracy value and a causal rank; and
(d) For the second module, collect all TAC rules from the database that were
acquired from one or more distinct event log datasets and convert them into
a single PDDL domain action model file to represent and utilise the acquired
knowledge.
2. The second application will perform the knowledge utilisation process, which also
consists of two modules:
Chapter 5. Implementation and Evaluation 94
Figure 5.1: Overview of the proposed solution represented in two phases. The first
phase is further divided into two segments; first, extract temporal-association-causal
(TAC) rules from the given event log dataset and second, represent the TAC rules in a
PDDL domain action model file. In second phase, a plan solution is generated for the
vulnerable machine to improve its security.
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(a) For the first module, read the event log entries of a previously unseen, vul-
nerable machine along with the existing domain model to generate a PDDL
problem instance;
(b) Modify the default parameters of existing LPG planner software tool (details
are in Section 5.1.2.2) to accommodate the processing of domain models and
problems instances with a large number of objects, and use it to generate
a sequence of actions that can be used to perform security assessment and
configuration on the vulnerable machine; and
(c) For the second module, create a simple parsing tool that essentially converts
the output plan solution of LPG planner in a clear, descriptive format for
presenting the discovered security risks and proposed mitigation actions to
non-expert users.
Flexibility is one of the significant requirements for building the application. This is be-
cause the working of some features needs exploration before finding the best performing
implementation methodology. This will also allow the users to configure the software
application in a desired manner. For example, the proposed solution calculates the sup-
port range automatically for Apriori algorithm (Section 3.2.2); however, users should
also be allowed to manually input the minimum and maximum support values in case of
incorrect automated values. Another example is the elimination of temporal-association
rules based on a 50% threshold of temporal-association accuracy value (Section 3.3.1).
This threshold should be changeable by the user to achieve a desired balance between
the quantity and quality of rules.
Another requirement is the design of both applications that should cater the need of
all the potential users. For the knowledge acquisition and representation application,
the main focus should be on the expert-level users, who want to acquire domain action
models from configured machines. For the knowledge utilisation application, the main
focus should be on the non-expert users, who want to analyse and understand the secu-
rity status of vulnerable machines. Furthermore, in order to provide a better experience
to all kinds of users, both applications should display and explain the step-by-step out-
put of each module in a well-known and clear format, e.g. within console and HTML.
This is not an essential requirement for the developed solution to operate; however, it
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can benefit both expert and non-expert users in terms of debugging and visualising the
results of overall process as shown in Appendix C.
The proposed solution should also aim to reuse the open-source code of existing tools
and libraries during the development of both applications (where possible). Such code
is generally reliable, tested, verified, crowd-sourced and will also minimise the develop-
ment effort [188]. For example, the Two-Sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov normality test,
performed in Section 3.2.2.1, has already been implemented in Accord.NET1 library.
Similarly, the source code of graph analysis and several causal inference algorithms used
in Section 3.4 is available in a Pcalg2 library of R language. Furthermore, the source
code of LPG planner3 used in Section 4.3.4.2 is also available and can be easily modi-
fied to fit our needs. The format of input and output of different components in both
applications are designed to be compatible with external tools.
5.1.2 Development Of Applications
Both applications have been developed using standard software engineering techniques.
The source code is written in the C#, Python and R programming languages. The
C# is used for graphical user interface, reading and processing event log entries, and
generating domain models and problem instances. The Python is used to implement
Apriori algorithm for association rule mining. The R language is used for causal analysis
by implementing Fast Causal Inference algorithm. Both applications are configured as
desktop-based and contain several modules, where every module is responsible for a
specific operation. Both applications are low in coupling and high in cohesion. The
coupling refers to the degree of different modules depending on each other, whereas
the cohesion refers to the degree of elements within a module belonging together [189].
Therefore, all modules are independent of each other, and at the same time all related
code is joined as close as possible. This approach also ensures high ‘Separation of
Concerns’, where every module can easily be modified without affecting the workings of
other modules in the application.
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Figure 5.2: Screenshot of console application demonstrating the generation of (live)
PDDL domain action model using event log entries. This domain model only represents
the rules extracted from a single event log dataset.
5.1.2.1 Knowledge Acquisition And Representation
The knowledge acquisition and representation tasks are performed through a command-
line application. It has two parts that perform two distinct operations. First, generate
temporal-association-causal (TAC) rules directly from the event log entries and store
them in a database along with encoding the rules into a PDDL domain action model.
Second, generate a domain action model from the database by consolidating all stored
rules.
Figure 5.2 demonstrates the execution of first part of this application using an event
log file, named ‘5.evtx’, and producing a domain action model file, named ‘live-domain-
5.pddl’. It mainly consists of twelve steps. The input event log dataset contains 1,079
1http://accord-framework.net/docs/html/TAccordStatisticsT estingKolmogorovSmirnovTest.htm
2https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/pcalg/index.html
3http://zeus.ing.unibs.it/lpg/
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entries. The application extracted all unique event types, which are 28 in number, and
created an event frequency distribution (FD). The Standard Deviation (SD) and Mean
(M) of FD was found to be 70.93 and 38.54, respectively. As the coefficient of variation
(
SD
M
) is greater than 1, 5 event types were removed as their frequencies were higher than
the SD. After that, the application created the object frequency distribution (OFD) of
the remaining entries and conducted a Two-Sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov normality
test. The OFD was determined as normal distribution and the support range (SR) was
calculated as 5%−33%. Using the SR and 100% confidence value, the Apriori algorithm
generated 64,931 object-based association rules. These rules produced 9 chains of events,
which resulted in 10 temporal-association rules using a 50% threshold of temporal-
association-accuracy value. The entire set of these rules formed a Directed Acyclic
Graph (DAG) as no cycles, conflicts and redundancies were found. After that, a causal
rank was calculated and assigned to each rule in the DAG using Fast Causal Inference
algorithm. This produced the final set of TAC rules, which was stored into the MySQL
database and represented as a PDDL domain action model as well. Every step of this
application is performed in a fully automated manner, and are also capable of error
management and exception handling. It is worth mentioning here that the processing
of this application is based on batches. It can process a batch of event logs, specified by
a directory path, and generate individual domain action models against each dataset.
Every time an event log dataset is processed, the resulting TAC rules alongside other
relevant information are stored in the database. Another Figure 5.3 presents the second
part of the same application. It shows the process of generating a PDDL domain action
model file, named ‘database-to-domain.pddl’, directly from the database that contains
347 TAC rules. After creating a DAG of the rules, only 134 of them remained and
were encoded into a domain action model. Rest of the rules were eliminated by the
application due to cycles, conflicts and redundancies.
5.1.2.2 Knowledge Utilisation
The knowledge utilisation phase is based on three steps: first, generate the problem
instance; second, produce a plan solution; and third, convert the plan into a user-friendly
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Figure 5.3: Screenshot of the same application demonstrating the generation of PDDL
domain action model from the existing rules stored in database. This domain model
represents the set of all those rules, which were previously acquired from one or more
event log datasets.
format. The knowledge utilisation mechanism is implemented through a graphical user-
interface application that guides the user to appropriately perform all steps in an ordered
manner.
The first part of the application takes event log entries along with the domain action
model that contains the security expert knowledge, and produces a problem instance as
shown in Figure 5.4. It is possible that the objects extracted from the event log entries
and used in the problem instance do not align with the input format of planner, and hence
will require alteration. For example, objects starting with a number or fully numeric
objects are not acceptable, so we added a ‘O <numeric object>’ prefix to denote them
as alpha-numeric objects. Similarly, some objects might contain special characters, such
as round brackets, colons, commas and so on, which are not permitted. Such characters
raise syntax errors during the planning process and will be completely removed if found
in any object.
The second part of the same application is to use the domain action model and problem
instance as input to LPG planner and produce a plan solution. The LPG produces
multiple plans as it is an incremental planner, where each increment or iteration has
increased quality. Therefore, only the last plan is displayed as an output as it would be
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Figure 5.4: Screenshot of application that takes the domain action model and event
log entries of a vulnerable machine to generate a problem instance, representing the
current security state of the machine.
of the highest quality. As the source code of LPG is available, we increased the value
of constants MAX RELEVANT FACTS to 40,000 and MAX TYPE INTERSECTIONS
to 10,000 and recompiled the code to accommodate all problem instances, especially the
ones with higher number of objects. The developed application limits the maximum
amount of plans to 15 and time to 30 minutes. The reason behind enforcing 15 plans
limit is to find as many plans as possible; however, this limit is flexible and can be any
number from 2 and onward. The 30 minute execution time of the planner is programmed
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Figure 5.5: Screenshot of the same application that takes the domain model and newly
generated problem instance to produce an action plan for expert security assessment
and configuration actions.
by-default and can be changed as well. Due to these limits, the execution of planner
will automatically terminate if it either finds 15 plans or exceeds 30 minutes of planning
process. The user can also manually signal the planner to exit. An example of plan
is shown in Figure 5.5, which is the 12th plan solution. This plan was found in 95.47
seconds, which means that the planner executed for 30 minutes and could not find more
than 12 plans. It should be noticed here that there is a repetition of actions in the plan.
This is due to the planner providing a collective solution for multiple objects of the same
types.
The final part of the same application is to convert the planner output into a more usable
and explanatory format, as shown in Figure 5.6. This is achieved by implementing a
simple plan parser that splits every action name into separate cause and effect events,
along with adding their event descriptions. The parser processes the entire plan to
describe the security issue and suggested solution. The order of parsed plan is kept same
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Figure 5.6: Screenshot of the same application that contains a simple plan parser to
display the LPG planner output in an easy-to-understand format.
as the original plan. Also, every object-value in the action parameter list is assigned a
corresponding object-name to make it more descriptive. The object-names are extracted
from the given event log entries. The plan parser also includes a searching mechanism
that uses a simple string matching as well as regular expressions to find keywords in
event types, descriptions and object-value pairs.
5.2 Evaluation
This section presents an evaluation framework to explore the accuracy and performance
of the implemented solution. This involves empirical analysis of the automated learning
behaviour of the developed solution using test data. The implementation is a prototype
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of this research and has been developed with the intention to assess the proposed tech-
nique from multiple aspects. The aims of the evaluation framework are stated in the
following:
1. Test the ability of the developed solution to automatically discover the patterns
of event relationships, which accurately depict the expert user actions for security
improvements; and
2. Determine the efficiency and performance of using automated over manual plan
solution in identifying security issues of the underlying machine and proposing
mitigation actions.
5.2.1 Challenges
According to a recent study [190], there is a critical deficiency of security event log
datasets that are operational and publicly available, especially from Microsoft Windows-
based operating systems. This is due to the security and privacy related concerns of
sharing data. The available datasets have limited access and other constraints regard-
ing their usage. Most of the datasets are not suitable for research purposes as they
do not provide a complete understanding of the context/environment and information
about the user activities that triggered the events. This can lead researchers to forge
assumptions about the fidelity and utility of event log datasets. So, one of the main
challenge in evaluating the developed solution is to find or rather produce benchmark
datasets that contain events depicting mitigation action(s) for predefined security vul-
nerabilities. Generating such datatsets would need a thorough understanding of event
logging mechanism and security auditing and policies, along with the expert security
knowledge. Without understanding the knowledge inside the datasets, it would be quite
challenging to evaluate the extracted sequences of event relationships.
The PDDL domain action model, which represents Temporal-Association-Causal (TAC)
rules acquired from the event log datasets, acts as a knowledge base for generating plan
solutions against specified problems. Therefore, the correctness of the domain knowledge
and modelling process is a critical factor to determine the overall quality of problem
solving process. According to multiple research studies [191, 192], the validation and
verification (V&V) of planning systems are one of the biggest challenges. In our context,
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verification is the process of finding whether the actions of a plan are correct with respect
to the expert security knowledge, whilst, validation is the process of finding whether the
actions of a plan are correct with respect to the domain model.
As mentioned in Section 4.2, the V&V process is performed based on the ability of
operating in real-world settings, completeness and accuracy measures. Some tools are
available that can validate a plan solution against the respective domain model, such as
VAL [193]; however, there is no standard and dedicated process, automated or otherwise,
which can be used for verification. The knowledge acquisition and representation are not
mathematical procedures, thus a domain model cannot be measured on any accuracy
scale. To encourage automated planning researchers, the International Competition on
Knowledge Engineering for Planning and Scheduling (ICKEPS) has devoted a section
to present novel domain debugging, validation and verification mechanisms. It is con-
cluded in recent ICKEPS that the verification process is still relied on human expertise,
and there is a lack of cooperation and coordination between the experts and domain
modelling process [194].
The developed solution is the first system of its kind in terms of integrating automated
rule mining, domain modelling and knowledge utilisation mechanisms. The previously
proposed solutions employ human experts to define the event relationships, create and
encode rules, and then perform automated or semi-automated deliberation process. As
the aim of our solution is to replicate human expert actions for security assessment
and configuration of a machine, it would require a human expert to decide whether the
proposed sequence of actions for the problem instance is correct in terms of security
resolution. Therefore, accuracy analysis of the solution would require human assistance.
5.2.2 Methodology
The evaluation methodology adopted in this research is inspired from the testing of
several automated knowledge acquisition techniques [195, 196]. An overview of the
methodology is shown in Figure 5.7, and described in the following:
1. Obtain the event log datasets, where they are already known to contain events
describing expert mitigation and configuration actions for specific vulnerabilities;
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Figure 5.7: Overview of the evaluation methodology
2. Using the datasets, generate automated domain models from the developed solu-
tion and manual domain models with the help of human experts;
3. Extract a problem instance from a machine that is known to be vulnerable;
4. Find plan solutions from both automated and manual domain models against the
same problem instance; and
5. Conduct a comparison between manual and automated plan solutions with re-
spect to sequences of actions and time to determine accuracy and performance,
respectively.
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5.2.3 Process Of Evaluation
The developed solution has been evaluated using a set of security event logs acquired
from multiple, live computing machines. Here the term ‘live’ is used to express that
the machines are regularly used in the real-world operations and not solely for research
purposes. The reason behind including multiple machines in the evaluation process
is to verify that the developed solution is sufficiently adaptable and applicable under
different circumstances. The accuracy of the developed solution is based on whether it
was successfully able to extract knowledge from the configured machines, and then use
the knowledge to propose human-like security actions for unseen vulnerable machines.
This evaluation also determines the effectiveness and performance against a manual log
analysis approach that requires significant security knowledge and human resources in
terms of time and effort. It should be noticed here that the measured time displayed in
the evaluation results is subjected to change. It depends on the hardware specification
of a machine, and availability and amount of free computing resources. The remaining
section provides a detailed explanation of the evaluation process.
5.2.3.1 Data Collection
To acquire data for evaluating the solution, 21 machines are chosen that are part of
a university network and used on a daily basis by different kinds of users. All ma-
chines are configured by security administrators according to the university’s policies.
In addition, a tool called, Microsoft Security Compliance Toolkit4, was used to confirm
the implemented policies. This tool performs the comparison of actual and expected
machine configuration based on the given security policies, hence verifying the ground
truth. These machines have different operational roles/settings (e.g. student, staff,
administrator etc.) and configurations. Each event log dataset has a distinct set of
characteristics, such as amount of routine events, security-related activity, number of
entries and so on. As the specifications of security policies are already known, their in-
terpretation provided the ground truth and made it possible to determine the accuracy
domain model generated by the proposed solution.
4https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=55319
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5.2.3.2 Knowledge In The Events
As described in Section 1.2, the security event log of a Windows-based system contains
a complete and organised information regarding the security-related activities of appli-
cations, system and users. Event logs are stored in local files and contain a repository of
different activities, such as adding, deleting and updating the firewall rules, modifying
the access permissions of a file or application, all attempts to log on a machine, change in
system configurations, escalating or deescalating rights of user accounts, cryptographic
operations, etc. An ordered collection of such activities creates a complete and holistic
view of a security-related operation, thus providing beneficial knowledge for conducting
security assessment and system configuration. A few examples of the patterns that exist
in the 21 datasets are shown in Table 5.1. The table provides an evidence of how a se-
quence of events can describe a security-related operation that includes the identification
of a security issue and its remedial action. Extracting such patterns in an automated
manner and applying it to vulnerable machines will enable the users to perform expert
security configuration, without having significant security knowledge.
5.2.3.3 Automated Plan Generation
To generate the plan solutions, the first step is to extract the security event logs of 21
Microsoft Windows-based machines, which are in the form of ‘.evtx’ files. The second
step is to process each file using the developed automated tool to generate TAC rules of
event relationships, which are further encoded into respective domain action models. The
third step is to create a problem instance from a vulnerable machine, which is essentially
an entirely unconfigured machine containing a new copy of Microsoft Windows OS and
requires various security improvements. The reason behind selecting such a machine is
to evaluate the developed solution under adverse circumstances, and determine if the
solution can recognise all security issues. Finally, using the acquired domain models
and the problem instance, 21 plans are produced using the Local search for Planning
Graphs (LPG) planner to test the accuracy of the solution, which is based on the ability
of discovering correct set of vulnerabilities and suggesting mitigation actions for the
machine.
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Description Events pattern
A user account was locked after several
failed logon attempts. The account was
deleted
1. 4625: An account failed to log on;
2. 4740: A user account was locked out;
and
3. 4726: A user account was deleted.
An administrator probed the system for
user accounts that have no password.
Upon finding such an account, the user
password was changed from empty to a
certain string
1. 4797: An attempt was made to query
the existence of a blank password for
an account;
2. 4724: An attempt was made to reset an
accounts password; and
3. 4624: An account was successfully
logged on.
An unauthorised user account altered
the security configuration settings of the
machine. The user account was identi-
fied and suspended
1. 4673: A privileged service was called;
2. 4891: A configuration entry changed in
Certificate Services;
3. 4739: Domain Policy was changed; and
4. 4725: A user account was disabled.
The remote security access was enabled
on the machine, and several system ob-
jects were accessed by a user account.
The remote access was removed along
with the user rights
1. 1149: A successful RDP network con-
nection was established;
2. 4624: An account was successfully
logged on;
3. 4656: A handle to an object was re-
quested;
4. 4663: An attempt was made to access
an object;
5. 4705: A user right was removed; and
6. 4729: A member was removed from a
security-enabled global group.
Critical services like Firewall, event log-
ging and IPsec failed to start on the user
logon. All services became operational
1. 4712: IPsec Services encountered a po-
tentially serious failure; and
2. 4709: IPsec Services was started. Or
1. 5030: The Windows Firewall Service
failed to start; and
2. 5024: The Windows Firewall Service
has started successfully.
Table 5.1: Examples of security-related operations expressed in terms of order set of
events. The events are displayed as <Event type>: <Description> format.
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Figure 5.8: Process of manually extracting the knowledge from an event log dataset.
The user can view all event entries along with their types, descriptions and objects. The
event relationships and corresponding ‘accumulative-weight’ values are defined that are
further encoded into a domain action model using PDDL.
5.2.3.4 Manual Plan Generation
Using the same set of security event logs, 21 domain action models are manually pro-
duced by three university security auditors. The auditors are experts in their domains
and have a day-to-day job to monitor event logs and identify interesting patterns in
terms of user activities. The reason behind using three experts to create a manual
domain model is to perform a fair and impartial evaluation. A manual domain model,
similar to automated domain model, also represents the set of actions that were taken by
the security expert for either configuration or to resolve a particular issue in an underly-
ing machine; however, the only difference is that the event patterns are extracted by the
human experts. Processing a number of event log datasets, each with a large number
of entries, can be a time-consuming, exhaustive and error-prone task. To make it less
difficult, we developed another software application as shown in Figure 5.8. This simple
application does not play any role in the proposed solution, and it is only developed for
assisting the human experts in creating manual domain models. The feature set of this
tool includes:
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1. Load event log dataset from an underlying machine or a stored file;
2. View all event log entries including types, descriptions and all empty/non-empty
object-value pairs;
3. Determine and display the frequency of all unique event types;
4. Search events based on a string or regular expressions matching. Both features
are implemented in a single search bar;
5. Allow the user to define sequences of events along with the ‘accumulative-weight’
value for each event relationship; and
6. Producing a PDDL domain action model file based on the event relationships
without manual encoding. The acquired PDDL domain is complete and without
syntax errors, such that it can be processed by the LPG planner.
Using the manually constructed domain models and the problem instance, 21 plan so-
lutions were produced. Each plan depicts the set of actions that human experts would
take to resolve security issues of the same vulnerable machine. The manual plan is cre-
ated using a combined knowledge of ground truth (i.e. security policies implemented on
the 21 machines) and expert opinions with respect to the security issues. Note that the
large amount of time, effect and security knowledge is required to generate a manual set
of security actions from large-scale event datasets. This further motivates the need for
our proposed automated solution, where the complete process is accomplished without
human intervention.
5.2.3.5 Accuracy
Accuracy is defined as a degree of similarity between a measured and a standard or
accepted value. In our case, the accuracy of developed solution is determined by com-
paring the plan solutions of manually and autonomously acquired domain models. As
mentioned before, each action in the plan solution involves action name and parameters.
The action name represents the relationship between cause and effect events, whereas,
the parameters represent the objects required to perform that particular operation. The
comparison process determines the number of correct, incorrect, additional and missing
actions of the automated plan, where:
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1. An action of automated plan would be considered as ‘correct’ if the same rela-
tionship, i.e. have identical events and direction, is found in the manual plan as
well;
2. An action of automated plan would be considered as ‘incorrect’ if the same events
are discovered in the manual plan, but with an opposite relationship direction;
3. An action would be considered as ‘missing’ if it exists in the manual plan, but is
absent from the automated plan; and
4. An action would be considered as ‘additional’ if it exists in the automated plan, but
is not found in the manual plan. An important point here is that the additional
rules, even if they are proved to be correct, reduces the accuracy of automated
plan.
After finding these values, the second step is to apply the Equation 5.1 to calculate
accuracy. Note that if the automated domain model is complete and accurate, the
generated plans will represent similar steps that were taken by the human experts to
perform a certain security assessment and/or configuration task.
Accuracy =
correct
correct+ incorrect+missing + additional
× 100 (5.1)
It is possible that some of the extracted sequences of event relationships are obvious for
the security experts; however, novice users might still be unfamiliar with them. The
complexity and novelty of the knowledge presented by an automated plan is determined
by the problem instance, i.e. amount and severity of vulnerabilities in a underlying
test machine. If the machine has poor security, the automated plan would be large
and complex due to suggesting multiple sequences of actions. Otherwise, the plan will
involve relatively simpler and easy-to-configure actions. Further to that, the perception
of complexity of the presented knowledge is subjective to the experience and background
of the user. Henceforth, this empirical analysis only determines quantitative accuracy
of the event patterns, rather than the qualitative accuracy. This accuracy measure does
not examine how simple or difficult would it be for the user to implement the proposed
security solution. It only determines whether the set of actions are capable enough to
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discover the security issues and recommend one or more solutions for the vulnerable
machine.
5.2.3.6 Performance
The performance of the developed solution is calculated by comparing the time required
for producing automated and manual domain models from a given event log dataset.
For automated domain modelling, the time refers to the overall execution time of the
knowledge acquisition and representation application. The time is measured between
reading the event log entries, discovering event relationships and the generation of the
PDDL domain file. On the order hand, time required for the manual domain modelling
process is the time taken by a human expert to manually probe the dataset and discover
event relationships using the assistive application, as discussed in Section 5.2.3.4. The
performance of the automated solution is demonstrated against the manual approach
by comparing the number of entries in each event log dataset and corresponding time
to create domain model from it. If the automated approach generates a domain model
similar to the manual approach in less time, it will be deemed as more productive.
Otherwise, if it takes more time, it will be considered as less effective.
5.2.4 Results
This section provides the evaluation results of the developed solution. The results are
based on the empirical analysis of multiple datasets, and demonstrate the accuracy,
scalability and performance of the proposed solution. The evaluation was conducted on
a 32-bit Microsoft Windows-7 virtual machine with two cores of Intel i7 CPU at 3.50GHz
and 4GB of RAM. All tools and applications described in previous sections are involved
in the evaluation process.
Table 5.2 presents the results from each phase of processing for all 21 event log datasets.
The table describes different kinds of information about each dataset, such as number of
entries, computed minimum and maximum support values, number of rules, generated
actions in the plan solution, etc. The table also includes the planner execution time of
each domain model and problem instance, along with the percentage of accuracy using
Equation 5.1. Notice that the time to produce any plan solution follows a consistent,
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Event logs Rule Mining and Domain Modelling Automated Planning
1 5,027 0.07 0.59 516,608 14 84 32 37 123.03 87%
2 8,253 0.08 0.49 107,503 5 19 11 30 31 85%
3 521 0.25 0.49 147 6 11 9 5 10.55 83%
4 1,122 0.05 0.53 266,671 5 5 5 4 3.06 74%
5 1,079 0.05 0.33 64,931 9 17 10 9 6.19 88%
6 1,691 0.05 0.20 263,800 4 6 6 6 9.87 80%
7 1,714 0.13 0.46 978 9 58 21 32 72.64 87%
8 9,721 0.08 0.33 4,252 8 11 9 6 13.17 83%
9 9,770 0.05 0.32 4,027 9 21 12 5 5.38 73%
10 13,026 0.06 0.72 1,176 8 8 7 10 22.5 85%
11 10,948 0.05 0.62 1,349 5 33 11 9 8.69 85%
12 8,832 0.07 0.41 15,729 4 12 10 10 15.62 90%
13 3,403 0.05 0.37 97,574 10 7 6 9 8.27 78%
14 31,719 0.11 0.69 150,593 3 13 9 49 185.48 82%
15 1,072 0.07 0.26 14,681 7 15 11 6 6.62 86%
16 1,991 0.05 0.39 4,959 17 160 75 82 291.1 91%
17 826 0.05 0.40 280,482 4 8 5 6 8.27 81%
18 5,309 0.06 0.23 46,151 5 4 4 4 10.56 75%
19 69,854 0.05 0.37 66,600 10 16 15 72 263.55 92%
20 313,470 0.05 0.34 215 6 115 43 80 452.14 87%
21 32,688 0.15 0.43 237,155 4 6 6 7 6.69 80%
Table 5.2: Results of the empirical analysis of automated knowledge acquisition,
representation and utilisation mechanism proposed in this thesis. The evaluation is
performed on 21 different event log datasets obtained from live machines, which were
configured based on expert security knowledge. The results are presented as output
values from each stage of processing along with the amount of accuracy of each plan
solution against a given problem.
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proportional relationship with number of TAC rules, i.e. if there are more number of
TAC rules, it will take more time and vice versa. The table presents the following
specifications about the evaluation data and results:
1. Number of event log entries ranges from 521 to 313,470;
2. Minimum support value ranges from 0.05 to 0.25;
3. Maximum support value ranges from 0.20 to 0.72;
4. Number of object-based rules ranges from 147 to 516,608;
5. Number of event-based rules ranges from 3 to 17;
6. Number of Temporal-Association rules ranges from 4 to 160;
7. Number of Temporal-Association-Causal rules ranges from 4 to 75;
8. Number of actions in plan solutions ranges from 4 to 82;
9. Amount of time to produce plan solution by the planner ranges from 3.06 to 452.14
seconds; and
10. Amount of accuracy of plan solutions ranges from 73% to 92%, where 4 are between
70%− 79%, 14 are between 80%− 89% and 3 are between 90%− 92%.
It should be noticed that the table only mentions the number of Temporal-Association-
Causal (TAC) rules, not the actions in PDDL domain model, as both are the same. The
acquired knowledge from individual datasets has shown reasonable accuracy. Different
kinds of plan solutions present varying amount of knowledge for a given security problem.
The amount of accuracy depicts that how much of the plan solution was correctly able
to resolve the problem. There is potential for a degree of uncertainty in finding the
accuracy as the human expert might not know the exact, complete set of events that are
produced when a particular security configuration activity is performed on a machine.
Moreover, there can be one or more alternative ways of executing the same task, which
might produce a different set of event entries. This can lead the expert to make erroneous
judgement regarding the validity of sequences of events. There is also uncertainty around
the security plan solution as LPG is a sub-optimal planner; however, its ability to
apply stochastic local search to draw plan without any goal state motivated the use.
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Furthermore, any successfully found plan, optimal or otherwise, will provide one of the
many ways to conduct a certain security configuration.
Event
dataset
Number of
unique events
(total entries)
Automated do-
main modelling
time
Manual domain
modelling time
1 29 (5,027) 00h:08m:03s 00h:17m:54s
2 31 (8,253) 00h:04m:46s 00h:20m:40s
3 16 (521) 00h:00m:18s 00h:08m:53s
4 20 (1,122) 00h:03m:21s 00h:11m:54s
5 23 (1,079) 00h:01m:09s 00h:13m:27s
6 27 (1,691) 00h:02m:58s 00h:17m:18s
7 25 (1,714) 00h:02m:53s 00h:16m:40s
8 31 (9,721) 00h:04m:34s 00h:22m:28s
9 29 (9,770) 00h:04m:37s 00h:17m:15s
10 29 (13,026) 00h:07m:02s 00h:21m:58s
11 13 (10,948) 00h:05m:29s 00h:14m:26s
12 19 (8,832) 00h:05m:05s 00h:13m:46s
13 32 (3,403) 00h:07m:00s 00h:21m:20s
14 14 (31,719) 00h:26m:04s 00h:29m:10s
15 18 (1,072) 00h:00m:47s 00h:11m:06s
16 33 (1,991) 00h:01m:42s 00h:18m:20s
17 23 (826) 00h:05m:01s 00h:12m:46s
18 29 (5,309) 00h:03m:10s 00h:16m:54s
19 67 (69,854) 00h:38m:33s 01h:05m:41s
20 44 (313,470) 00h:30m:45s 02h:26m:41s
21 21 (32,688) 00h:27m:51s 00h:38m:53s
Table 5.3: Comparison of automated and manual domain action models with re-
spect to knowledge acquisition and representation time. The ‘Automated domain mod-
elling time’ is the execution time of developed solution producing an automated domain
model, whilst, the ‘Manual domain modelling time’ is the time taken by three human
experts for creating a manual domain model from the event log dataset. The time is
expressed in ‘h’ for hours, ‘m’ for minutes and ‘s’ for seconds.
Table 5.3 presents the amount of time required to generate automated (generated by
proposed solution) and manual (created by human expert) domain actions models. For
automated domain model, time depicts the execution period of a complete processing
cycle; reading the event log dataset, building event relationships and writing results in
a PDDL file. For manual domain model, the time only depicts the duration of creating
event relationships. The table mentions both total and unique number of events in a
dataset as these factors highly influence the increase or decrease in the processing time.
Following specifications are gathered from the table by comparing the processing time
of automated and manual approaches:
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1. The maximum automated domain modelling time, 38 minutes and 33 seconds, was
taken by dataset-19 to process 69,854 entries having 67 unique events. The same
dataset took 1 hours, 5 minutes and 41 seconds for manual processing;
2. The maximum manual domain modelling time, 2 hours, 26 minutes and 41 seconds,
was taken by dataset-20 to process 313,470 entries having 44 unique events. The
same dataset took 30 minutes and 45 seconds for automated processing;
3. The minimum automated domain modelling time, 47 seconds, was taken by dataset-
15 to process 1,079 entries having 23 unique events. The same dataset took 11
minutes and 6 seconds for manual processing; and
4. The minimum manual domain modelling time, 8 minutes and 53 seconds, was
taken by dataset-3 to process 521 entries having 16 unique events. The same
dataset took 18 seconds for automated processing.
5.2.5 Discussion
This section presents the key findings and interpretation of the evaluation results along
with the demonstration of their significance.
5.2.5.1 Completeness
Consider the following enumeration of datasets from Tables 5.2 and 5.3: the dataset-16
has 1,991 total and 33 unique entries; the dataset-19 has 69,854 total and 67 unique
entries; and the dataset-20 has 313,470 total and 44 unique entries. The dataset-16
generated the highest number of Temporal-Association-Causal (TAC) rules (75) and the
corresponding actions (82) in the plan solutions; although, it is dataset-20 that contains
the highest number of event entries out of others. On the contrary, the minimum number
of unique entries (13) relative to total entries (10,948) were found in dataset-11, which
only produced 11 TAC rules and 9 actions in the respective plan solution. This indicates
that the dataset-11 has relatively large number of routine events that occurred frequently
over time, but they were removed during the initial stages of processing, thus reducing
the number of final domain actions.
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The higher ratio of unique to total event log entries implies substantial user activity
and fewer routine/repetitive tasks. As expected in this case, the developed solution
produces a larger object-based model, and therefore results in more number of TAC
rules or domain actions. The relationship between the number of unique events and
domain actions is directly proportional, i.e. higher number of unique events in a dataset
produces higher number of domain actions, which demonstrates the solution’s ability
to extract complete knowledge. This enables the planner to always find a plan for any
given security problem, assuming the targeted knowledge is present in the domain model.
Therefore, we claim that the proposed solution is fully data-driven and complete.
5.2.5.2 Efficiency
Consider the following observations from Table 5.2: the maximum number of associa-
tion rules (516,608) is produced by dataset-1 that contains 5,027 event log entries, and
resulted in 32 final TAC rules; the dataset-6 generated 263,800 association rules from
1,691 event entries, but only resulted in 6 final TAC rules; the dataset-13 contains 3,403
event entries, which produced 97,574 association rules and only 6 final TAC rules; and
the dataset-16 only used 4,959 association rules to output 75 TAC rules from 1,991
event entries. Based on this inconsistent pattern, we can deduce that the number of
object-based association rules, TAC rules/domain actions and event log entries are all
independent of each other. The output of proposed solution depends on the content
and characteristics of input data, for example, the amount of security-related activities
stored in the dataset, quantity of routine events and number of distinct object-value
pairs. Furthermore, due to the temporal validation of association rules and formation of
Partial Ancestral Graph (PAG) of event relationships, the majority of false positive and
conflicting rules are either corrected or removed. This signifies the efficiency of devel-
oped solution that is achieved by conducting both qualitative and quantitative analysis
of input event log entries.
5.2.5.3 Performance
The performance is measured as a time difference between creating a manual and auto-
mated domain action model from the same event log dataset. The results presented in
Table 5.3 clearly demonstrate that the automated solution is reasonably faster, efficient
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and scalable than the manual approach. The automated domain modelling of every
dataset took less amount of time than manual domain modelling. Besides, unlike man-
ual domain modelling, the automated solution does not require any human resources,
hence making it more suitable for the real time environments. Furthermore, the de-
veloped solution eliminates incorrect and irrelevant rules during each phase, which also
contributes towards the reduction of overall processing time.
Regarding the manual processing, dataset-10 took 21 minutes and 58 seconds to iden-
tify event relationships within 13,026 entries, whilst, dataset-13 took 21 minutes and
20 seconds for 3,403 entries. There is a difference of 9,623 entries between the two
datasets; however, the time variation is only 38 seconds. The reason behind this appar-
ent discrepancy is the (approximately similar) amount of unique events, which is 29 and
32 for dataset-10 and dataset-13, respectively. This means dataset-10 contains a large
and continuous segment of routine event entries, possibly due to a lengthy user/appli-
cation/system inactivity, as compared to dataset-13. Such events were quickly skipped
by the human experts, thus reducing the manual processing time. Similarly, it took 14
minutes and 26 seconds to extract knowledge from 10,948 entries of dataset-11, whereas
for dataset-17, which has 826 entries, consumed 12 minutes and 46 seconds. So, a differ-
ence of 10,122 entries only added 1 minute and 41 seconds in time, which is again due
to a large portion of routine events.
5.2.5.4 Importance Of Causal Inference
Another important aspect of the evaluation results is the difference between the num-
ber of Temporal-Association (TA) and Temporal-Association-Causal (TAC) rules. The
TAC rules are always less or sometimes equal in number than the TA rules. The main
reason behind this difference is the formation of Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG), which
eliminates all redundancies, conflicts and cycles from the TA rules, therefore improv-
ing the quality of results. It also depends on the characteristics of event log dataset
and the extracted TA rules. For example, the dataset-1 has 84 TA and 32 TAC rules,
which means 52 event relationships were removed. Similarly, for dataset-2, 8 TA rules
were eliminated. In case of dataset-4, 6, 18 and 21, the number of TA and TAC rules
are equal, which shows that correlation can imply causality sometimes; however, it not
always true.
Chapter 5. Implementation and Evaluation 119
Furthermore, calculating and assigning a causal rank to each TAC rule either increases
or decreases its overall accumulative-weight value. So, besides temporal-association ac-
curacy and counter values, the causal rank becomes an additional measure that enforces
the planner to select the most feasible plan of actions (from entire domain knowledge)
to solve a given security issue. This signifies the importance of application of causality
that lead towards better accuracy.
5.2.5.5 Other Findings
It has also been observed that the datasets with comparatively lower accuracy con-
sists of such kind of rules, where a single event is connected to several other events
simultaneously. To minimise this issue, Automated Planning plays an important role to
determine the most feasible set of actions by maximising the accumulative-weight val-
ues. Hence, the planner always selects those actions, which will result in the maximum
overall accumulative-weight value.
Another observation is that, sometimes, a dataset contains a large number of event
log entries, but they are only comprised of few unique event types. Such datasets
should not produce many actions in their respective domain models. It is clear from
Table 5.2 that the solution does not force event relationships, where they are not present,
regardless of number of entries in a dataset. Some of the datasets were excluded during
the evaluation phase as they did not produce any domain actions at all. The object-
based event associations ensure that a rule, and consequently a domain action, is created
only where there exists a relationship among the properties of event log entries.
Another observation is that the automated solution has not shown full accuracy; the
maximum accuracy achieved is 92%. Although, the manual approach is capable of pro-
viding a fully accurate domain action model from event logs, there still can be errors
considering the tiresome as well as continuous creation, updation and alteration of secu-
rity knowledge (as the process is conducted by human beings). Moreover, there is also
a possibility of incomplete knowledge acquisition and representation due to missing one
or more relationships.
Apart from the results, it is important to acknowledge that the solution will provide
better accuracy if the configuration, environment and intended use of the vulnerable
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Automated plan Manual plan
Actions Relevant Objects Actions
1. 5145→ 5140 Share name: Users, Subject: IEUser1, SID:
S 1 5 18
1. 5145→ 5140
2. 5140→ 4648 Target-domain: IE8Win7, server: localhost 2. 5140→ 4648
3. 4648→ 4657 Operation: registry value added, Type:
Mult-String
3. 4648→ 4657
4. 4657→ 4798 Subject: IEUser1, Domain: WORKGROUP, Pro-
cess: mmc
4. 4657→ 4798
5. 4798→ 4647 Subject: IEUser1 5. 4798→ 4728
6. 4647→ 4624 Subject: IEUser1, SID: S 1 5 19, Domain:
WORKGROUP
6. 4728→ 4738
7. 4624→ 4726 Subject: IEUser1, Domain: WORKGROUP 7. 4738→ 4647
8. 4726→ 4729 Target: IEUser1, SID: S 1 5 19, Subject:
Administrator
8. 4647→ 4624
- - 9. 4624→ 4726
- - 10. 4726→ 4729
Table 5.4: Automated and manual plans to solve same problem instance. The con-
version of plans in a user-friendly format is performed by the plan parser that shows
actions and object-value pairs.
machine are same as of the machine from which the domain action model was extracted.
The similar settings and context/properties of events will improve the compatibility of
learnt security knowledge and help the users, in a better and easier way, to perform the
necessary changes.
5.2.6 Accuracy Analysis Of An Automated Plan
This section presents a comparison between an automated and manual plan that show-
cases the ability of the proposed solution to suggest human-like actions. Both plans are
complete, which means they include valid sets of actions for security identification and
mitigation. The plans are shown in Table 5.4, whereas a detailed elaboration of the
automated plan actions is provided in Section 5.2.7. As mentioned before, the actions of
a plan might be difficult for the non-expert to understand, so we used the plan parsing
application to elaborate all related events and parameters. The accuracy calculation
mechanism covers all aspects for any given plan solution by finding the number of cor-
rect, incorrect, additional and missing actions. For the current automated plan, all 8
actions are correct as they are found in the manual plan, and there are no incorrect
and additional actions. However, the automated plan is not entirely accurate as it is
missing three actions (5, 6 and 7) that are present in the manual plan. The missing
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Figure 5.9: A complete timeline of events extracted in the form of an automated
plan. The related events and corresponding objects reflect the security-related actions
of human expert on a particular machine. The red and blue coloured boxes show the
events found in vulnerable machine, whilst, the green coloured box shows the mitigation
plan.
actions are: 4798 → 4728, 4728 → 4738 and 4738 → 4647. Hence the accuracy would
be: (8/(8 + 0 + 3 + 0))× 100 = 73%.
5.2.7 Interpretation Of The Plan For Usability
The domain action models are the representatives of TAC rules that vary on the basis
of scenarios they are captured in, and how the proposed solution assigns accumulative-
weight in the actions. The event entries are logged as soon as they are generated by
multiple system activities running in parallel, and there is no way of knowing which of
the events are linked corresponding to a single human expert action. So, the solution
provided in this research can be used to find those sequences and connections in the pres-
ence of large number of routine event entries, and facilitate the autonomous replication
of human expert actions.
A timeline demonstrating the automated mitigation plan for a security concern (pre-
sented in Table 5.4) is shown in Figure 5.9. The timeline consists of a complete list of
actions found in the plan; however, it is important to mention here that a large portion
of the actions have already been discovered in the event log of a vulnerable machine
and represented in the corresponding problem instance. This section also demonstrates
that the proposed solution is easy-to-use as it does not require any human aid. It also
shows that an automated plan only requires a fundamental knowledge of computing to
interpret and implement the actions. It should be noticed here that the sequences of
events generated from a single dataset are not universally applicable, they are subjective
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and based on the expert activities performed on the underlying machine. Following is
the brief interpretation of automated planner output:
• Matched – This part of the plan determines security issue of the vulnerable
machine and was identified by matching one or more initial state(s) of the problem
instance with the domain action model:
– User Logon – Event 5145 shows that a certain user, with a S 1 5 18 group
security identifier (SID) and IEUser1 username, tried to access file-share ser-
vice on a remote server. The group SID is a unique value of variable length
that is used to identify a trustee and issued by an authority. The event 5140
shows that server access was allowed for IEUser1. After that, the remote
server requested the login credentials from IEUser1. The required username
and password were provided to the server as evident by event 4648; and
– Privilege Escalation attack – Following the login, event 4657 is triggered to
show that the IEUser1 added a new registry value. After that, event 4798
informs that the IEUser1 probed all local users of the server. The next two
events (4647 and 4624) reveal that the IEUser1 logged out of the server, and
then successfully logged back in, but, with a different group SID S 1 5 19.
It should be noticed here that both events 4648 and 4624 indicate the user
account login; however, the event 4648 shows that the login occurred through
‘RunAs’ command or third-party local application.
• Partially Matched – This part of the plan provides the security solution, which
was discovered by the planner based on the propagation of linked domain actions:
– Elimination of security issue – The next event 4726 shows that the IEUser1
account was deleted from the remote server. The last event 4729 further
informs that the account was removed from global security group by a server
administrator.
Based on the sequence of events in Figure 5.9, it is shown that an administrator found
a suspicious activity in terms of system registry modification by a local user account
(possibly malicious insider), which lead to the discovery of a privilege escalation attack
on a remote server. Initially, it is unknown whether the user account actually became
a legitimised member of another user-group, but it became apparent later on when the
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security identifier (SID) was changed from S 1 5 18 to S 1 5 19 upon a second login. The
user might have exploited a server vulnerability to login and added a registry value, which
allowed the scanning and identification of other existing users. This process enabled the
user to find and change to a user-group with higher access permissions. Furthermore,
the plan shows that the newly added value in the registry was a string, which is done
through a ‘net’ command to add the current user in an administrator group, and placed
in registry path HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\currentversion\run. As the user
attempted (and failed) to access the file-share service of the server, the new user-group
provisioned sufficient rights to gain unauthorised access to the service. The administrator
resolved this security issue by completely removing the malicious user account from the
server to prevent any future issues.
Continuing the discussion from Section 5.2.6, the automated plan is missing information
as it does not fully match (only 73%) with the manual plan. It depends on the amount
of absent event relationships and level of expertise of the user to determine the severity
of the missing information in an automated plan solution. As evident by this sequence
(4798 → 4728 → 4738 → 4647), after gathering the user-groups (event 4798), the
account of IEUser1 was added to a security-enabled global group (event 4728). This
change in the user account IEUser1 is depicted by the event 4738. Later on, IEUser1
logged off from the server that triggered the event 4647.
5.2.8 Example Of An Incorrect Automated Plan
Based on our analysis, there is also a potential of generating an incorrect plan solu-
tion, where the extracted sequence of actions present inaccurate method of conduct-
ing security-related activities. This happens due to the erroneous extraction of event
relationships. An example of incorrect plan is presented in Figure 5.10. The ob-
ject names of the plan are extracted by the plan parser application and explained in
the following: RSA is the algorithm name, d5 0e7b98a02239 represents the address of
cryptographic-key file path, SMS is the key name, O 2499 is the key type, AD is the
subject’s domain name, O 0x3e7 login ID of subject, CES000963029$ is the subject
username, S 1 5 18 is the SID, O 16390 presents a specific cryptographic-related action,
GUID MFE TCP STREAM CALLOUT V4 is the callout function name of Windows Filtering
Platform (WFP), DataFinder is the filter name of WFP, Kerberos is an authentication
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0: E 5058-TO-E 5061 RSA d5 0e7b98a02239 SMS O 2499 AD O 0x3e7 CES000963029$
· · · S 1 5 18 )
1: (E 5061-TO-E 5441 RSA d5 0e7b98a02239 O 16390 GUID MFE TCP STREAM CALLOUT V4
· · · DataFinder )
2: (E 5441-TO-E 4625 Kerberos AD O 0x3e7 CES000963029$ · · · S 1 5 18 S 1 0 0)
Figure 5.10: Incorrect sequence of actions extracted for the test machine using the
acquired domain knowledge.
protocol and S 1 0 0 is the SID of target user. At first, the events 5058 and 5061 show
that a cryptographic operation was performed on a Key Storage Provider file. The op-
eration can be one of: create, delete, export, import, open and store cryptographic keys.
The next event is 5441, which is recorded for every filter of Windows Filtering Platform
at every system start-up. This event just documents the time of system startup and
does not indicate any configuration change. The last event 4624 indicates that a user-
account failed to login by providing a bad username or password. This plan is wrong
because it has linked two separate system activities, i.e. key operation of Cryptography
and Windows logon service, with each other in a single sequence. The order of events
is also incorrect as all cryptographic operations are performed after the user is logged
onto the machine. Furthermore, these actions do not provide any useful or actionable
knowledge to the non-experts that might improve their systems’ security.
5.2.9 A different approach to evaluation
The automated knowledge acquisition (KA) is performed by the developed solution,
whereas, the manual KA is conducted by the human experts as mentioned in Sec-
tion 5.2.3.4. Both kinds of expert security knowledge are acquired in the form of
Temporal-Association-Causal (TAC) rules. In the following discussion, the TAC rules
acquired through developed solution are referred as ‘automated TAC rules’, whereas,
the TAC rules acquired from human experts are referred as ‘manual TAC rules’. As
the human involvement terminates after the ‘Manual extraction of event relationships’
stage in the evaluation process shown in Figure 5.7, a direct comparison between the
automated and manual TAC rules will help in evaluating the acquired knowledge itself,
rather than the utilisation of the acquired knowledge. In other words, this comparison
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will determine how accurately the developed solution identified patterns of security-
related actions in a given event log dataset, instead of how accurately the developed
solution suggested the human expert-like actions in resolving a certain security threat
or an issue (as described in Section 5.2.3.5). Therefore, this comparison can provide
another perspective regarding the accuracy of knowledge acquisition in the developed
solution.
Event
dataset
TAC rules
accuracy
1 84%
2 83%
3 75%
4 75%
5 90%
6 83%
7 90%
8 78%
9 91%
10 86%
11 81%
12 81%
13 75%
14 80%
15 83%
16 97%
17 83%
18 80%
19 93%
20 89%
21 86%
Table 5.5: Evaluation of knowledge acquisition phase in terms of accuracy using a
different approach, i.e. direct comparison between manually and automatically acquired
TAC rules.
The results of comparing automated and manual TAC rules from each dataset are shown
in Table 5.5. The amount of accuracy ranges from 73% to 97%, where 4 are between
70%− 79%, 12 are between 80%− 89% and 5 are between 90%− 92%. These results are
calculated using the same accuracy formula presented in Equation 5.1. An automated
TAC rule would be considered as ‘correct’ if the same relationship, having identical
events and direction, is found in the set of manual TAC rules as well. An automated
TAC rule would be considered as ‘incorrect’ if a rule with the same events is discovered
in the set of manual TAC rules, but with opposite relationship direction. An automated
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TAC rule would be considered as ‘missing’ if it exists in the set of manual TAC rules,
but is absent from the set of automated TAC rules. An automated TAC rule would be
considered as ‘additional’ if it exists in the set of automated TAC rules but is not found
in the set of manual TAC rules.
Using Table 5.2 and Table 5.5, it is visible that for 12 datasets, the accuracy of TAC rules
is greater than the accuracy of its corresponding automated plan, whereas, for remaining
9 datasets, the accuracy of automated plan is greater than the accuracy of its respective
TAC rules. This inconsistency has occurred mainly due to the following reasons. First,
for the given problem, only those actions were found applicable from the domain model
that had relatively lower/higher accuracy than other actions. In other words, as the
action plan usually presents a subset of the domain model (which is the representation
of all TAC rules), it is possible that depending on the problem instance, only those
specific actions were included in the plan that had comparatively lower/higher accuracy.
Second, the LPG, which is a sub-optimal and stochastic algorithm, randomly selected
low/high priority actions. The priority is defined based on the accumulative-weight
value. If lower or higher priority actions were chosen, it would result in a decreased
or increased accuracy of the automated plan, respectively. Third, the empty goal state
forces the planner to choose a plan (albeit valid); however it might not be the best
possible plan.
5.3 Limitations
The research work presented in this thesis is novel and demonstrates a reasonably ac-
curate approach of autonomous elicitation and utilisation of security knowledge by pro-
cessing existing event log sources. However, the approach is a first step in this direction
and has the following limitations:
1. The associating rule mining is a compute-intensive task as it is an iterative ap-
proach and processes all possible itemset. This significantly decreases the overall
efficiency of the developed solution. On the other hand, applying a mechanism
that reduces the number of iterations and candidate itemsets for relatively quicker
processing, will decrease the quality of association rules;
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2. The proposed solution is not capable of modelling complex scenarios, where con-
secutive repetition of an event is part of the sequence of actions. For example,
if an event dataset contains ‘suspend the user account for more than three failed
log-on attempts’ knowledge, it cannot be extracted as an automated rule and rep-
resented in PDDL as the proposed solution is not capable of correlating events
with themselves;
3. Another issue with the developed solution is that it cannot distinguish between
a correct and incorrect plan solution against a given problem instance. In other
words, there is no automated mechanism of providing an accuracy value for the
generated plan. If a user, especially non-expert, is unaware of a plan being fully
or partially incorrect, it can mislead him/her into performing wrong security as-
sessment or configuration;
4. The generalisation of modelling security knowledge has restricted the solution to
use domain-independent planners. However, the range of planners can be increased
by introducing human assistance in the domain designing and modelling process,
which also might result in plans that do not represent the real-world security issues
and solutions.
5. The environment, type and context of problem instance are unavailable, whilst,
the planner is searching for a solution in the domain action model. This uncer-
tainty can lead to a plan solution, which is not fully applicable to the identified
vulnerabilities of the underlying machine.
5.4 Chapter Summary
The purpose of this chapter is to present the implementation and evaluation process
of the proposed solution. The implementation consists of two applications. The first
application is console-based that extracts the knowledge from event log datasets, stores
it in a database and represents in a PDDL-based domain action model. This application
can process one or more datasets in a single execution and output both separate and
combined domain action models. The second application has a graphical user interface
and is capable of applying the domain action model on any vulnerable/unconfigured
machine to strengthen its security. This application is integrated with the LPG planner
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as well as a plan validator. Both applications are designed simply and efficiently so that
they can be used by both expert and non-expert users.
The evaluation of the developed solution includes accuracy and performance analysis. It
is performed with the help of three human experts. The event log datasets for evaluation
are obtained from 21 live machines, which were configured by experts according to
different security policies. The domain action models are produced from each dataset
using manual and automated approaches. After that, their comparison is performed to
demonstrate: if the automated approach generated a similar domain action model as
of human experts (accuracy) and how much time was saved by using the automated
tool (performance). The results have shown suitable accuracy, i.e. between 73% and
92%, and a significant reduction of time for every dataset. At the end, this chapter
provides a real-world scenario, where the automated tool identified a security issue and
presented an acceptable solution. The scenario also helps in demonstrating the usage of
the developed tool.
Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future work
6.1 Conclusion
The Chapter 2 of this thesis indicates that there is no existing method to automatically
extract security knowledge from a machine and apply it to other machines for strength-
ening their security. Although a good amount of previous research has been done in the
construction of domain action models and automated planning (AP) for security appli-
cations, it has two major problems: manual knowledge modelling and attack planning as
the only area of focus. The manual domain designing process is quite resource-intensive
and a big challenge for human operator as it is not efficient, and requires intimate
knowledge of the area. The automated knowledge extraction and modelling of event
relationships is a complex task, so is the manual process. Furthermore, we argue and
demonstrate that the AP can play an important role in the deliberation of security
knowledge as well. Therefore, in this thesis, we present a novel technique that automat-
ically extracts a domain action model from the security event logs of a system, without
any assistance from a human operator. The main purpose of this technique is to allow
non-expert users to perform expert security analysis of the new or previously unseen
(vulnerable) machines without investing significant amount of effort, cost and time in
acquiring the required knowledge. This technique provides a computer-based alternative
of a scenario, where a human expert performs a security assessment or configuration of
a machine.
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As mentioned in Section 1.2, all system changes and actions are explicitly recorded
by the event logging mechanism. Learning is a fundamental aspect of autonomous
behaviour and it can be defined in many different ways. Initially, several techniques
were considered for automated learning, such as using clustering algorithm to group
events against security actions, developing assistive tools for human experts to produce
security templates and applying deep learning algorithms to the text of security-based
academic papers and online forums to find security problem-solution pairs. Upon careful
examination, these techniques were found unsuitable for the real-time environments
due to lack of decision-making criteria and intelligent reasoning for probing security
issues and suggesting remedial actions. However, the experimentation by constructing
manual domain model using event logs showed promising results in terms of accuracy
and performance. So, it was identified that the most suitable method is to adopt the
state-of-the-art AP technology, where the knowledge is acquired and encoded using a
domain-independent language and utilised using an increased range planning algorithms.
Hence, learning domain models for AP is what motivated this research, and a technique
was developed to extract temporal-association-causal (TAC) relationships from the event
log entries and encode them into PDDL-based domain action model. After that, a
planning algorithm utilises the domain model to output one or more sequences of actions,
which were performed by the human expert user to identify and mitigate the particular
vulnerabilities of the machine. In other words, the proposed technique orchestrates the
security evaluation of a system, in a similar way, as a human expert would.
The main contributions of this research work are presented in the following:
1. An automated procedure to determine and eliminate noise from the event logs;
2. A new scheme to find support for association rule mining algorithms;
3. A novel algorithm to create ordered sequences of correlated events based on a
temporality metric;
4. A method to define and rank strength of causality within a graph of connected
events; and
5. An intelligent mechanism to utilise knowledge on new or previous unknown ma-
chines.
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6.1.1 Summary
The proposed solution is split into two parts; automated rule mining from event logs
to gain and store knowledge (presented in Chapter 3) and intelligent application of the
knowledge on vulnerable machines using planning algorithms for security improvements
(presented in Chapter 4).
For the rule mining part, the first step is to read all security event log entries of a
given system. After that, determine routine events in the given dataset and eliminate
them. Next, the solution creates an object-based model to represent event log entries in
a unified format, and determines minimum and maximum support values (referred as a
support range in the thesis) for the association rule mining (ARM) algorithm. In the next
step, the solution mines strong object-based correlation rules using a modified Apriori
algorithm. The object-based rules are converted into the event-based rules where any two
event types are associated by the object-based rules. The quality of event relationships
is improved by ordering the events based on a temporal metric, whilst, filtering all
insignificant relationships where the temporal value is below threshold. After that, the
event-based correlation rules are combined and validated into sequences of temporally-
associated rules. These rules are further converted into a directed acyclic graph and
assigned a causal rank using the FCI algorithm, hence obtaining temporal-association-
causal (TAC) rules. All TAC are stored into MySQL database as well for future use.
For automated planning part, the knowledge extracted in the form of TAC rules is
encoded into a stand-alone domain action model using PDDL version 2.1. The PDDL
format provides a standardised mechanism of representing and storing the extracted
knowledge, along with fulfilling the required level of expressiveness to support domains.
It also increases the adoption of the solution due to wider understanding and presence
of domain independent automated planners. Apart from domain model, the developed
solution is also capable of automatically generating problem instances by processing
live events and their objects from any (vulnerable) machine. Given the domain and
problem files, LPG planner is used to produce relevant actions in the form of a plan that
can be utilised by the non-expert users to enhance the machine’s security. The plan is
responsible for identifying security issues and providing mitigation actions. The LPG
is one of the most powerful domain-independent planners that has the ability to solve
problems of a large variety with diverse requirements (numeric fluents, minimisation and
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maximisation metrics, etc.). It should be noticed here that the research into domain-
independent planners is progressing rapidly, and new planners are being continuously
developed. It is envisaged that in the future, there will be an increased variety of planners
to solve the current domain model with better performance and accuracy.
Through an extensive empirical analysis, the proposed automated solution has shown
to be effective. The technique was implemented as two separate applications; one for
knowledge acquisition and representation, and other for knowledge utilisation. The
developed solution was evaluated on live, real-world event log datasets to determine the
accuracy, completeness and performance measures. The solution achieved 73% − 92%
accuracy for 21 datasets and a significant performance increase against the manual
approach. Furthermore, a detailed comparison between an automated and manual plan
solution has been performed to demonstrate the autonomous replication of human expert
actions along with the ease of usability and applicability in real time environments. The
event log entries are generally produced in high frequency, but a significant portion of
them represents routine events (noise). Despite this, the proposed solution has clearly
demonstrated that it is capable of extracting the domain knowledge with a reasonable
accuracy and be applicable in practical environments, meanwhile, reducing manual time
and effort and financial cost without the assistance from a human expert.
6.2 Suggested Future Work
The research work presented in this thesis several potential areas for research. Moreover,
there are several avenues that can be explored for future development of this solution.
Some are summarised below based on their importance:
1. To apply the proposed technique on other operating systems and applications,
there is a need to create parsing tools or software modules that can process the
respective event log datasets to generate object-based models. The event log entries
are found in different text-formats, and requires different parsing and analysis
mechanisms to obtain objects (as described in Section 3.1.2). Doing this will
increase the applicability and adoption of the proposed solution;
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2. There are some event logging mechanisms, e.g. application-specific security event
logs, that do not assign a numeric identifier to an event. In general, it is consid-
ered a good practice to add a unique identifier for every event type as it increases
the parsing accuracy [197]. A small amount of research has been done that au-
tomatically introduces event identifiers in the raw event entries [198]. Extending
and incorporating such software modules in the developed solution will also lead
towards wider adoption;
3. The next stage of this research is the augmentation of plan parser tool, which is
described in Section 5.1.2.2. The would include the development of automated
tools and techniques, which are capable of translating any valid plan solution into
concrete set of actions. After that, the actions will be converted into (a) system
commands (where possible) and (b) complete step-by-step guideline that can be
executed on the vulnerable machine. This will remove or reduce the manual effort
of non-expert users implementing the recommended security measures;
4. From the utilisation perspective, the developed solution described in Section 5.1
can be expanded into a web-application that can be easily used by numerous
individuals/organisations, simultaneously. A large and diverse set of event logs
from multiple sources would create a bigger, central repository of TAC rules. This
would allow the domain action model to contain more and better knowledge for
identifying security issues and suggesting solutions; and
5. As highlighted in Section 4.3 and Section 4.3.4.1, PDDL-based representation of
knowledge and LPG planning algorithm, respectively, have shown great potential
to solve large and complicated planning problems. This motivates the further
advancement of tools and languages for knowledge engineering, so that they can
be utilised in commercial settings. The improvements will increase the efficiency,
quality and performance of plan generation along with benefiting all application
areas of automated planning.
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Appendix A
Description of Microsoft events
According to Microsoft documentation1, there are five categories of events that can be
logged in Windows operating system. All event entries have structured data and an entry
can only be of a single type. Table A.1 explains each category used by the event logging
mechanism. Similar events are organised into separate collections that are explained in
the following:
1. Application – all events generated by the applications installed on the machine;
2. Security – events triggered by the security auditing policies. All categories of
security events are shown in Table A.2;
3. Setup – events related to the domain controller servers;
4. System – all events related to the Windows file system; and
5. Forwarded – events sent by other machines in the network.
1https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/eventlog/event-types
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Event category Description
Information Describes about the successful operation performed by
a user-application, hardware driver or background ser-
vice. For example, if user starts a MS-SQL service on a
machine, it will log an Information event 26022 with a
message ‘Server is listening on [‘any’ <ipv4> 1433]’.
Warning Indicates an issue that is not significant at the
moment, but might cause future problems. For
example, if user attempts to restart the MS-
SQL server and it fails, the event logging mecha-
nism will log a Warning event 10010 with a mes-
sage ‘Application ‘C:\Program Files\Microsoft SQL
Server\130\LocalDB\Binn\sqlservr.exe’ (pid 4984) can-
not be restarted’. The warning events are still logged if
the application or service recovers without losing data
or operations.
Error Notifies about a significant problem. For example, if
the MS-SQL service fails to load upon user request, it
will log an Error event 1000 with a message ‘Faulting
application name: sqlservr.exe · · · ’.
Success Audit Describes the successful completion of an operation for
which security auditing is enabled. For example, if a user
tries to login and enters correct credentials, it will log a
Success Audit event 4624 with a message ‘An account
was successfully logged on’.
Failure Audit Records the failed attempt of an operation for which
security auditing is enabled. For example, if a user tries
logs on and enters incorrect credentials, it will log a
Failure Audit success event 4625 with a message ‘An
account failed to log on’.
Table A.1: Event categories of a Microsoft Windows operating system
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Category of security policy Description
Account logon events Stores all information regarding users logging
on and off, timestamp, valid/invalid creden-
tials, etc.
Account management Keeps track of all activities related to user
account, such as account creation and dele-
tion, password change and so on.
Directory service access Records all information regarding the system
access control list.
Object access Stores all events where user tried to access
an object, such as printer, file, registry key,
etc.
Policy change Records all changes in security, audit and
trust policies, and user right assignment.
Privilege use Keeps track of all instances where user exer-
cised authorised-permissions.
Process tracking Stores activities of a process, such as duplica-
tion, start/exit, indirect resource access and
so on.
System events Stores all security events during the start and
shutdown of a machine.
Table A.2: Security event categories of a Microsoft Windows operating system
Appendix B
Elements of PDDL-based
representation
Every PDDL planning problem consists of two components: domain model and problem
instance. The schemata are given in the following:
B.1 Domain model
(define (domain DOMAIN-NAME)
(:requirements [:strips] [:equality] [:typing] [:adl] [:fluents])
(:types T1 T2 · · · TN)
(:predicates
(PREDICATE-NAME-1 ?P1 ?P2 · · · ?PN)
(PREDICATE-NAME-2 ?P1 ?P2 · · · ?PN)
· · ·
)
(:functions
(FUNCTION-NAME-1 ?F1 ?F2 · · · ?FN)
(FUNCTION-NAME-2 ?F1 ?F2 · · · ?FN)
· · ·
)
(:action ACTION-NAME-1
:parameters (?P1 ?P2 · · · ?PN)
:precondition (PRECOND-CONJUNCTION)
:effect (EFFECT-CONJUNCTION)
)
· · ·
)
Figure B.1: Domain action model schema of PDDL
The domain schema is shown in Figure B.1, where elements written inside square brack-
ets (‘[]’) depends on the user requirements. It contains the following elements:
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1. Domain-name – This represents the domain’s name, which allows alphanumeric
characters, hyphens and underscores;
2. Requirements – As PDDL is a generic language, specifying syntax requirements
makes it easier for the planning algorithm to interpret the domain model. For
example, [:strips] shows that the current model uses STRIPS representation, [:flu-
ents] depicts the usage of numeric fluents, etc.;
3. Types – These are used to represent the state variable types. The types are optional
and require explicit definition by the user;
4. Predicates – These are the descriptive, logical expressions containing a set of pa-
rameters, which can be null as well. Each parameter is a variable name, starts with
a question mark (‘?’) and can also have a type. The predicates have no intrinsic
meaning in terms of domain definition;
5. Functions – These are the numeric fluents, which are used within actions to per-
form arithmetic operations; and
6. Actions – These represent the pre-condition and effect relationships among predi-
cates to depict an operation. Each action has a name and takes a list of parameters
along with their types. Both pre-conditions and effects contain the and/or con-
junctions of one or more predicates, where each predicate can be formulated as
either positive or negative. The negation is defined by a not operator. The effect
conjunction can also have an action cost value, which is modelled and manipulated
by numeric fluents.
B.2 Problem instance
(define (problem PROBLEM-NAME)
(:domain DOMAIN-NAME)
(:objects OBJECT-1 OBJECT-2 · · · OBJECT-N )
(:init INITIAL-1 INITIAL-2 · · · INITIAL-N )
(:goal GOAL-1 GOAL-2 · · · GOAL-N )
(:metric MINIMIZE|MAXIMIZE (NUMERIC-FLUENT))
)
Figure B.2: Problem instance schema of PDDL
The problem schema is shown in Figure B.2, which contains the following elements:
1. Problem-name – This defines the problem instance name, which can have alphanu-
meric characters, hyphens and underscores;
2. Domain-name – This specifies the name of domain model, which will be used for
this particular problem instance;
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3. Objects – This is the list of constant objects, which are usually categorised into
respective types. The type of an object is assigned using Constant − ObjectType
syntax. The objects are used as arguments for the action parameters;
4. Init – This contains a list of predicates or facts that are true in the initial state.
All other predicates are considered as false. The numeric fluents are also initialised
here;
5. Goal – This contains a list of predicates, which are fully or partially satisfied upon
successful planning process. The predicates with one or more parameters in both
initial state and goal description are grounded, i.e. the variable parameters are
replaced with constant objects; and
6. Metric – These are used to improve the quality of plan by maximising or minimising
the accumulative value of numeric fluents encoded in domain actions.
Appendix C
Example of
Temporal-Association-Causal
(TAC) rules in HTML format
Figure C.1 presents an example of HTML representation of TAC rules that provides the
following information to the user:
1. List of all TAC rules, where all events are depicted by their corresponding event
types;
2. Complete information about the event type (by clicking the hyperlink). This
information is collected from the online resources12;
3. Temporality of all TAC rules;
4. List of one or more security event categories involved in each TAC rule; and
5. At the end, a summary stating number of total rules, rules with 100% temporality,
rules belonging to a single category and single category rules with full temporality.
1https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/
2https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/
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Figure C.1: An example of TAC rules represented in the HTML format.
